Helmut,
Yes, by all means write it down step by step, and think it through before you share it with us, whether it’s a “new theory” or not. That’s what I did with both of my recent long posts. Also, since they were about Peirce’s concept of “determination,” I was careful to include his definition of the term near the beginning. You should probably do the same with yours, as it seems to be quite different from Peirce’s, if you’re going to post it here. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 11-Apr-16 14:46 Gary, list, I think, that there is continuous determination only in inanimate nature, efficient causation. Organisms act due to their needs, final causation, and nervous animals, or at least animals with a brain, also act due to their wishes. Needs and wishes rather occur than are determined. Especially wishes may be quite nonrational, capricious, whatever. Peirce believed in the phaneron, I dont. I rather believe in some sort of autonomy of the mind of a nervous animal. Free will, volition. Ok, it has to be synchronized with the environment, with society, to turn out to having a viable effect. So there is feedback and learning. But one certain wish is not a determined result of the past, I guess. So maybe I am not in accord with Peirce in this respect, but am so in the other respect, that I think there are three kinds of causation in accord with the three categories: force, need, and wish, or to say it in latin: Causa efficiens, Causa finalis, Causa exemplaris. Applying to the causal closedness of the three kinds of systems: Inanimate universe, organism, brain. Determination only is there within causa efficiens. This is a new theory ok, i will have to write it down step by step... Best, Helmut
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