Jeff, Jon, Gary F., list,
As I recall, Peirce regarded relations of reaction and resemblance as
"real" relations in the sense that they do not _/depend/_ on
interpretation.
Now, reaction is a second, but resemblance is a third (in Peirce's
system, as I recall; note that resemblance is not the same thing as
quality of feeling). Resemblance is independent of interpretation but
relative some mode of apprehension (sensory, intellectual, etc.).
It's when an interpretant, or at least a potential interpretant, is
involved, that the reaction/resistance becomes indexicality, and the
resemblance/correlation becomes iconicity, a kind of portraying. More
generally one can say that, in Peirce's view, semiosis involves things
essentially triadic, dyadic, and monadic, but _/is/_ the genuinely triadic.
The nice thing about the idea of determination is that it allows one to
distinguish representation as involving triadic determination, from
reaction/resistance as dyadic determination. (I confess that I don't
know what to do with uninterpreted resemblance here).
Best, Ben
On 4/7/2016 7:27 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
Jon, Gary F., List,
Jon claims that the kind of determination that is at work in sign
action is always triadic in character. He says: "Looking back over
many previous discussions on the Peirce List, I think the most
important and frequently missed point is that concepts like
correspondence and determination in Peirce refer to triadic forms of
correspondence and determination, and that these do not reduce to the
dyadic structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms."
I want to express a few reservations about this blanket statement, and
then I'll offer some qualifications for the purpose of articulating an
account of determination that fits better (I hope) with what Peirce
says in essays such as "On the Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to
develop my categories from within" and "Nomenclature and Division of
Triadic Relations."
It might help if we note a contrast between two different points of
view from which we might analyze and attempt to explain what it is for
one correlate to be determined by another correlate in a dyadic,
triadic or higher order relation. From the point of view in which we
are looking at what is /involved/ in sign relations, all such
relations might--in one respect or another--be triadic in character.
That is, all of the relations of determination that are essential for
the success of the semiotic process--including those that appear to be
dyadic in character-- are really (in the end, when looked at from the
point of the view of successful acts of cognition) parts of larger
triadic relations.
>From the point of view of the /evolution/ of the parts that come be
connected into larger wholes via sign action, my hunch is that there
are dyadic relations of determination--and these dyadic relations are
essential for the process. That is, over time, these dyadic relations
are brought together into larger complexes. Some of those larger
complexes are individual existing things that are brought together
into larger dyadic relations, and some of the larger complexes are
made up of combinations of possibilities, existing objects and general
rules that are brought together into triadic relations.
So, the reservation I am expressing can be summarized in the following
way: from the point of view of the /evolution/ of the essential parts
that make up larger complexes of signs, objects and interpretants, it
does not appear to be accurate to the texts to say that the kinds of
determination that are essential are all triadic in character. In some
cases, it is one existing thing determining another existing thing in
some respect or other, and this determination is dyadic in character.
That is, the relation can be analyzed in terms of relate A
/determines/ correlate B in some respect. There are quite a number of
different sorts of dyadic determination, and that is the reason he
sorts through them with such care in "On the Logic of Mathematics, an
attempt to develop my categories from within." The simplest sort of
dyadic determination is for one quality to be contained within another
quality (e.g. the feeling of scarlet is contained in the feeling of
red). The richest sort of dyadic determination is for one individual
thing to be the cause of the existence of another individual thing.
This sort of determination is poietical in character.bHere is the
qualification I would like to add: over time, as the dyadic relations
of determination between individual objects (e.g., a stove in kitchen
before us now) and a indexical sinsign (e.g. a parent pointing at the
stove) are formed, such dyadic relations of determination come to be
part of larger complexes /involving/ relations between possibilities,
existing individuals and general rules. As these larger complexes are
formed, the dyadic relations come to be parts of larger triadic
relations and ultimately, the forms of determination that govern such
processes of interpretation are predominately triadic in character. In
a paradigmatic kind of case, three relatively separate dyads come to
be joined together by a triad--and the kind of determination that
governs that process is triadic in character because it is a general
rule (e.g., a rule of comparison, a rule of time ordering, an
inferential rule, etc.) that supplies the glue that combines and
orders the correlates in the resulting triadic relation.
As such, I do not believe that, on Peirce's account, all such forms of
determination in the processes of representation are essentially
triadic in character (e.g., of a token representamen by an existing
object, of an immediate object by dynamical object, of a qualisign by
immediate object, or of an indexical sinsign by a dynamical object,
etc.). Some may evolve from dyadic forms of determination--especially
the sort of referential relation that is essential in the last kind of
case on the list.
Hope that helps,
Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________________________________
From: Jon Awbrey [[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2016 6:40 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Determination, etc.
Peircers,
The subject of determination comes up from time to time.
Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected
back when I was first trying to understand the meaning
of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition
of a sign relation.
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS
Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List,
I think the most important and frequently missed point is that
concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer
to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that
these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic
to the more reductionist paradigms.
In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including
correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on
all fall under the notion of constraint. Constraint is present in
a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by
some mark from a larger set of choices. That mark may distinguish
the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or
any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view.
Regards,
Jon
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
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