Jon,
Eeg…where to start. Actually, I appreciate your putting your thoughts out there. But it’s extremely rough and wrong. Yet it’s helpful because these are things I thought were already matter of fact but I am finding many are operating with different definitions. Also, one should NOT label CP 5.189 the way you did. The entire thing is a tool for abductive reasoning. It is a *complete* argument about an abductive idea that becomes refined over time if it’s well-constructed and worth any salt. To clarify, let’s talk about a specific situation; my situation: I examined the mouse cornea and discovered that one particular spiral, the divine/golden spiral is the best one to describe the phenomenon because it promotes intelligibility. This comes in Musement, in Firstness. So, producing an explict statement about C is to say that the object observed is a perceptual judgment, or an *icon* about a bunch of log spirals on mouse corneas. You could say that the phi spiral is iconic in the way that God and Nature are iconic…that they are all perfect. A computer model is something that my collaborators and I composed/constructed to represent something else, in this case, of the real world, the mouse corneal spiraling phenomenon. So, it is pointing at it. It *indexes* the phenomenon. To get at which model is the *good* one, we constructed two *different* ones that say *different* things about the world and DEDUCED (necessary reasoning, non-ampliative, 2ns) simulations. A product that *resembled* the real world (logarithmic spiral) was deduced by one model but not the other. So by comparing simulations from the distinct models against the phenomenon, we INDUCED (3ns, a mediation between the icon C and index A; induction is *ampliative*) that the mechanical model is a better index (indicator) of the icon (the phenomenon) than the chemotactic model because log spiral (the convincing reasons are filament-like and not burst-like). The symbol/meaning of the computer model is connected to the constraints of the model, which is pointing at some optimal mechanical representation of corneal stromal organization (symbol). Therefore, the sequence is one, two, three…object, sign, interpretant (o, s, i) or icon, index, symbol. Pause… Now, for *you*, the new person entering into inquiry, you might start with the index, the computer model, the representamen, which already carries meaning. For you, the problem is different. You are trying to figure out what is iconic about the index/representamen. In trying to do that, you look at the object (the mouse cornea) *after* you have sussed out what others (viz., me) have said about what the corneal phenomenon is. So, for your situation, the object can serve as 2ns, which tells you whether what I say has truth value or not. That is, you check the sign against the object. Therefore, the sequence in this case is sign, object, interpretant (s, o, i). But if you go back to what Peirce said, and nicely summarized by Jeff earlier, a normative inquiry starts with the object, not the sign. One starts with the object and not the sign because the normative sequence is a response to the “What is?” question through a direct encounter with a phenomenon. This is discussed in a Neglected Argument but also in different places, especially Greek philosophy (c.f., the three fingers in the Republic, ~523c). Other than going through the experience yourself and supplementing it with what others have said (c.f., Leo Strauss on Socrates and common sense), there isn’t anything that serves as a burst-like, knock-down argument that convinces a skeptical mind for where one ought to start in inquiry. It is a matter of habit-taking. Most often, an inquiry is already going on when you enter, to which you bring your worldview, which is the sum total of organized experience that you have at the moment you enter into inquiry. I hope that helps, Jerry R On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Jerry R., List: > > My understanding is that a computer (i.e., mathematical) model is a > primarily *iconic* representation that is generated mainly by abduction > (Firstness); in particular, it is an icon of *relations*, which is > Peirce's definition of a *diagram*. The analysis or processing of it is > simply the working out of its necessary consequences; i.e., deduction > (Thirdness). Its object in a scientific or engineering context is the > actual situation, which is why it has to be tested by means of induction > (Secondness). > > Regarding CP 5.189, it seems to me that the categories are more properly > associated with each step as follows. > > - The surprising fact, C, is observed - Secondness (induction). > - But if A were true, C would be a matter of course - Thirdness > (deduction). > - Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true - Firstness > (abduction). > > Of course, as Gary R. has pointed out, the process of inquiry takes > place in the reverse order. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
