My apologies to Gary and the list. Best, Jerry Rhee
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 7:14 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jerry wrote: "I don't mean to pick a fight" > > It has been my experience that when people announce that they "don't mean > to pick a fight," that they usually do. So I'll keep my comments brief and > give you the last word. > > This is a rather large philosophical forum involving people with very many > different interests, not all of them shared or necessarily overlapping. And > it is a very democratic place, so as long as the discussion is "Peirce > related" (and this must be taken in the broadest sens) and the tone of > discourse is civil, well, virtually anything goes. > > My own special interests, clearly different from yours, at least in part, > include Peirce's pragmatism, his logic as semiotic, inquiry as he > understands it (especially how the several inferences patterns are involved > in scientific inquiry), and how his universal categories relate to all > these and, for that matter, most every logical, scientific, and > philosophical issue imaginable. For me this is because, as Albert Atkins > wrote in recently published book, *Peirce *(Routledge, 216) > > [W]e see Peirce returning to his account of the categories throughout the > course of his life and using it at all stages in the development of his > philosophy. Whether or not Weiss is correct that they give us the very > essence of Peirce's system [i.e. architectonic GR] of philosophy, it is > clear that they are a prominent feature in his thinking (op. cit, 227). > > > You mock the beans in the bag example Peirce offered. But if one is > investigating the categorial structure of the several inference patterns, > that example is quite helpful. It doesn't reveal everything that might be > said categorially about those patterns, but it is helpful. You might not > find this kind of minute categorial analysis of interest or importance, but > there are those on this list who do. > > So, in a word, if one is interested in how the categories relate to the > deductive, inductive, and abductive inference patterns and, finally, how > these play out in "a complete inquiry" according to Peirce, then not only > their logical structure, but their categorial associations are of interest > and value. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I don't mean to pick a fight but this problem of underdetermination and >> intentionality of abduction has always been a sore spot with me. >> >> >> A few questions off the cuff: >> >> >> >> Where’s genuine doubt in the bean and bags example? >> >> >> >> If esthetics, ethics and logic are not included, then how do you assess a >> *good* abduction, where the question of pragmatism is nothing but the >> logic of abduction? >> >> >> >> That is, “What does right reasoning consist in? It consists in such >> reasoning as shall be conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our >> ultimate aim?”...Beans and bags? >> >> >> >> If abduction is a problem of subduance, where’s the state of aporia in >> beans and bags? >> >> >> >> Where’s the problem of truth, i.e., the opinion fated to be agreed upon >> by all who investigate? >> >> >> >> How do beans and bags help with the problem of extending the art of >> reasoning to those who conceive himself to be proficient enough already? >> Where's the conflict? >> >> >> >> “Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself >> to be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that >> this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not >> extend to that of other men.” >> >> >> >> It’s true that Peirce’s philosophy can be broken up and talked about in >> bits and pieces but then why does it matter to Peirce that it be shown in >> its unity? >> >> >> >> Will any example do to settle the matter? Why is his assertion any >> better than her assertion? >> >> >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> I tend to agree with your post, Jon, although I might associate the >>> categories somewhat differently for abduction. >>> >>> In my own analysis of abduction I tend to employ the famous 'bean' >>> example (which categorially explicates deduction, inducton, and abduction; >>> see: CP 2.622-3) along with Peirce's suggestion that Retroduction >>> (inference from effect to cause) will tend to bring about sound hypotheses >>> in a scientific mind, that is, one open and extremely well-prepared. >>> >>> In that case 3ns stands for that scientific mind set (this needs further >>> explication, I know, but the suggestion is that the scientist has >>> 'previewed', as it were, the entire requisite inquiry process--that's the >>> retroduction), so can posit an explanatory hypothesis (1ns), which makes >>> sense of that unusual phenomenon within the world (2ns). So the order (in >>> the bean example) is 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns. >>> >>> That's just a very brief and rough (perhaps confusing) sketch requiring >>> much more explication, and if I get a chance in an, unfortunately, >>> super-busy end of week and weekend, I'll try to say more in the next few >>> days. >>> >>> But I need immediately add that I think that your suggestion that >>> abduction might follow a reverse vectorial path than inquiry (you suggested >>> the categorial ordering of 2ns -> 3n -> 1ns for abduction, what I've termed >>> the order or vector of aspiration) is an interesting one to consider. And >>> so I'm once again reminded of Peirce's comment to the effect that the >>> categories offer only 'hints' and 'suggestions' (as valuable as these >>> proved to be through his entire scientific and philosophic career from 'A >>> New List' through his architectonic around the turn of century). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Jerry R., List: >>>> >>>> My understanding is that a computer (i.e., mathematical) model is a >>>> primarily *iconic* representation that is generated mainly by >>>> abduction (Firstness); in particular, it is an icon of *relations*, >>>> which is Peirce's definition of a *diagram*. The analysis or >>>> processing of it is simply the working out of its necessary consequences; >>>> i.e., deduction (Thirdness). Its object in a scientific or engineering >>>> context is the actual situation, which is why it has to be tested by means >>>> of induction (Secondness). >>>> >>>> Regarding CP 5.189, it seems to me that the categories are more >>>> properly associated with each step as follows. >>>> >>>> - The surprising fact, C, is observed - Secondness (induction). >>>> - But if A were true, C would be a matter of course - Thirdness >>>> (deduction). >>>> - Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true - Firstness >>>> (abduction). >>>> >>>> Of course, as Gary R. has pointed out, the process of inquiry takes >>>> place in the reverse order. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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