Jerry wrote: "I don't mean to pick a fight" It has been my experience that when people announce that they "don't mean to pick a fight," that they usually do. So I'll keep my comments brief and give you the last word.
This is a rather large philosophical forum involving people with very many different interests, not all of them shared or necessarily overlapping. And it is a very democratic place, so as long as the discussion is "Peirce related" (and this must be taken in the broadest sens) and the tone of discourse is civil, well, virtually anything goes. My own special interests, clearly different from yours, at least in part, include Peirce's pragmatism, his logic as semiotic, inquiry as he understands it (especially how the several inferences patterns are involved in scientific inquiry), and how his universal categories relate to all these and, for that matter, most every logical, scientific, and philosophical issue imaginable. For me this is because, as Albert Atkins wrote in recently published book, *Peirce *(Routledge, 216) [W]e see Peirce returning to his account of the categories throughout the course of his life and using it at all stages in the development of his philosophy. Whether or not Weiss is correct that they give us the very essence of Peirce's system [i.e. architectonic GR] of philosophy, it is clear that they are a prominent feature in his thinking (op. cit, 227). You mock the beans in the bag example Peirce offered. But if one is investigating the categorial structure of the several inference patterns, that example is quite helpful. It doesn't reveal everything that might be said categorially about those patterns, but it is helpful. You might not find this kind of minute categorial analysis of interest or importance, but there are those on this list who do. So, in a word, if one is interested in how the categories relate to the deductive, inductive, and abductive inference patterns and, finally, how these play out in "a complete inquiry" according to Peirce, then not only their logical structure, but their categorial associations are of interest and value. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > I don't mean to pick a fight but this problem of underdetermination and > intentionality of abduction has always been a sore spot with me. > > > A few questions off the cuff: > > > > Where’s genuine doubt in the bean and bags example? > > > > If esthetics, ethics and logic are not included, then how do you assess a > *good* abduction, where the question of pragmatism is nothing but the > logic of abduction? > > > > That is, “What does right reasoning consist in? It consists in such > reasoning as shall be conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our > ultimate aim?”...Beans and bags? > > > > If abduction is a problem of subduance, where’s the state of aporia in > beans and bags? > > > > Where’s the problem of truth, i.e., the opinion fated to be agreed upon by > all who investigate? > > > > How do beans and bags help with the problem of extending the art of > reasoning to those who conceive himself to be proficient enough already? > Where's the conflict? > > > > “Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to > be proficient enough in the art of reasoning already. But I observe that > this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not > extend to that of other men.” > > > > It’s true that Peirce’s philosophy can be broken up and talked about in > bits and pieces but then why does it matter to Peirce that it be shown in > its unity? > > > > Will any example do to settle the matter? Why is his assertion any better > than her assertion? > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 4:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> I tend to agree with your post, Jon, although I might associate the >> categories somewhat differently for abduction. >> >> In my own analysis of abduction I tend to employ the famous 'bean' >> example (which categorially explicates deduction, inducton, and abduction; >> see: CP 2.622-3) along with Peirce's suggestion that Retroduction >> (inference from effect to cause) will tend to bring about sound hypotheses >> in a scientific mind, that is, one open and extremely well-prepared. >> >> In that case 3ns stands for that scientific mind set (this needs further >> explication, I know, but the suggestion is that the scientist has >> 'previewed', as it were, the entire requisite inquiry process--that's the >> retroduction), so can posit an explanatory hypothesis (1ns), which makes >> sense of that unusual phenomenon within the world (2ns). So the order (in >> the bean example) is 3ns -> 1ns -> 2ns. >> >> That's just a very brief and rough (perhaps confusing) sketch requiring >> much more explication, and if I get a chance in an, unfortunately, >> super-busy end of week and weekend, I'll try to say more in the next few >> days. >> >> But I need immediately add that I think that your suggestion that >> abduction might follow a reverse vectorial path than inquiry (you suggested >> the categorial ordering of 2ns -> 3n -> 1ns for abduction, what I've termed >> the order or vector of aspiration) is an interesting one to consider. And >> so I'm once again reminded of Peirce's comment to the effect that the >> categories offer only 'hints' and 'suggestions' (as valuable as these >> proved to be through his entire scientific and philosophic career from 'A >> New List' through his architectonic around the turn of century). >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 1:27 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Jerry R., List: >>> >>> My understanding is that a computer (i.e., mathematical) model is a >>> primarily *iconic* representation that is generated mainly by abduction >>> (Firstness); in particular, it is an icon of *relations*, which is >>> Peirce's definition of a *diagram*. The analysis or processing of it >>> is simply the working out of its necessary consequences; i.e., deduction >>> (Thirdness). Its object in a scientific or engineering context is the >>> actual situation, which is why it has to be tested by means of induction >>> (Secondness). >>> >>> Regarding CP 5.189, it seems to me that the categories are more properly >>> associated with each step as follows. >>> >>> - The surprising fact, C, is observed - Secondness (induction). >>> - But if A were true, C would be a matter of course - Thirdness >>> (deduction). >>> - Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true - Firstness >>> (abduction). >>> >>> Of course, as Gary R. has pointed out, the process of inquiry takes >>> place in the reverse order. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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