Jerry R., List: Not surprisingly, I disagree.
I only said something about CP 5.189 because you associated C with Firstness, A with Secondness, and B with Thirdness--although there is no B in Peirce's text, so I am not sure what you mean by it--and this did not seem right to me. C is something observed, an actuality, which is Secondness. A is a hypothesis, a possibility, which is Firstness. That C would follow from A as a matter of course is a necessity, which is Thirdness. That said, I acknowledge that Peirce is writing there about abduction, not deduction or induction, so my inclusion of those terms was inapt. The hypothesis that a phi spiral best describes the mouse cornea is indeed Firstness. However, the computer models cannot be indices, because there is no direct existential connection between them and the actual phenomenon of interest. Instead, they are icons that formally embody the significant relations; i.e., diagrams. The simulations using the models are indeed deductive--i.e., necessary reasoning--but that makes them Thirdness. The evaluation of results is indeed inductive, but since that involves comparison with the actual phenomenon, this is Secondness. In semeiosis, the order of determination is indeed object, sign, interpretant; but these correspond to Secondness (dynamic/immediate), Firstness, Thirdness (immediate/dynamic/final). Icon, index, symbol implies three different signs; it is a category mistake (no pun intended) to align these with object, sign, interpretant. Maybe I have completely misunderstood Peirce, but this is how I see it. Regards, Jon S.
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