Thanks Edwina! Noted and appreciated.
Best, Jerry R On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > I'll continue to assert that abduction can't be a syllogism, for a > syllogism by definition is deductive. Not inductive. Not abductive. > > I don't think that the logical format of syllogism has changed; and > remember, it operates around a major premise. > > Abduction is certainly a mode of logic - but, I'll maintain that it is > propositional, ie, IF-THEN.. > This format keeps the Rule open to change, while the syllogistic AFFIRMS > [not generates/creates] a Rule and does nothing to change that rule. > Entirely different process. > > Edwina > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> > *To:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> ; Peirce List > <[email protected]> ; Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, April 24, 2016 1:48 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? > > Ben, > > > > Thank you for your thoughts and I like your modified formulation, even > though it does not implement the logical structure. > > The Josephson X 2 addition also adds value. > > I believe also that C and A should be dynamic, that is, the surprising > fact C that is observed is moving and the explanation A should also be > moving, for instance, that C = (*Q=>P*). Despite these reasons, I > believe CP 5.189 is *perfect*. > > > > I’d also like to bring the question back and ask whether CP 5.189 is or is > not a “syllogism”. That is, I am concerned about the strict technical > definition of what makes a “syllogism” a “syllogism” or whether the symbol > has grown. > > > > For example, you refer to it as “*Peirce’s abductive syllogism*”. > > So, it’s a syllogism despite it not guaranteeing a true guess about a case > right now or that it does not have the 1-2-3 structure? > > Even though it does not have a “knock-down” list of three terms? > > What if it turns out to be true that these beans are from this bag? > > If you already possess knowledge about this situation, say you go into the > future, figure out what happened and come back to the present to construct > the logical argument in 1-3-2 structure, then can we call that structure a > syllogism? > > > > _________ > > > > Edwina, > > > > I really like what you said about chance, law and habit-taking, especially > “Abduction is a flexible process of the universal Mind to generate > adaptive rules. Within the scientific method, abduction is similar - it > keeps explanations open to evidentiary proof and is able to abandon one > rule and generate another.” Also, thank you for keeping this > conversation going, which invite others’ contributions. They are very > helpful. > > > > This is what I am trying to do: to bring attention to the point that > Peirce was a careful writer and that if you look at CP 5.189, it is > mysterious that a “syllogism” should have a term missing, that is, *if it > even counts as a syllogism*. > > > > So, one issue is whether to view surprise/suspect as a single term, as I > am asserting. You call it four terms but I call it three terms; that > surprise and suspect belong to persons and that person is B, so > surprise/suspect (aka., transformed B) is one term and not two. Yet, to > even call it a syllogism is problematic because you’d have to consider all > the other technical constraints of what a syllogism ought to be, like the > rules for distribution, etc… > > > > Thank you for the reference to Gensler’s site. I can see why the example > of chimps is wrong but I still can’t explain it strictly by the logical > structure, so I will continue to work on that. Also as clarification, I > have corrected myself to state that the middle term is A and not C. > > ________ > > > > The example you attribute to me (“*This event is a surprise…”) *is not > mine. It’s yours, you wrote it. But it brings attention to various > ambiguous points. > > > > For instance, it is not the case that some events are surprising. > > It is that ALL events of a particular kind is ALWAYS surprising but only > to ALL inquirers of a particular kind, say for prepared inquirers named > Charles. > > > > So, *all* golden spirals in particular and not all spirals of any kind, > are *always* surprising to *all* Charleses but not all Stuarts (because > they are not prepared, so cannot have the correct recognition to hazard a > good guess) and only for right now, before the experiments are completely > carried out to completion. For in that future, the golden spiral will be > explained by maturation and modification of the current structured guess, > the best argumentation (c.f., Ben’s criteria). > > > > Also, if it’s a good guess, one that carries the assertion in the future > to a true conclusion, then we are talking about an inchoate abduction that > gets modified and matures into a polished abduction with truth value where > the essence has not changed enough to be called something else, like the > colloquial usage of the term “syllogism”, if there is such a thing. So, > I think there are good reasons for referring to CP 5.189 as a “syllogism”, > which is still in contention. > > __________ > > > > My main motivation here is to give clear, spirited reasons for generating > a rule that abandons (perhaps too harsh a term?) an old one to link CP > 5.189 with Peirce’s esoteric writing in A Neglected Argument. I > certainly do need to figure out what the technical definition of > “syllogism” is, as that is critical, but if Ben who knows better than I do > refers to it as a syllogism, then is he wrong or is he simply using it in a > colloquial manner…what then, are colloquial standards? > > > > Finally, it is true that Peirce’s formulation has an if/then in it. But > if we consider that section at the future limit of inquiry, the if/then is > gone. A *is* C because it’s true as matter of course by definition. > > > With best regards and thanks to all, > > Jerry Rhee > > On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jerry C., List: >> >> I must confess, I do not understand what specific point you are trying to >> make with this response; please elaborate/clarify. >> >> To supplement my previous comments--surprise and suspicion are not part >> of the reasoning itself; i.e., not included within the syllogism. Surprise >> (at the observation of fact C) corresponds to the irritation of doubt that >> prompts an inquiry in the first place. Suspicion (that A explains C) >> corresponds to the fixation of belief that is the aim of inquiry and brings >> it to an end, at least provisionally and for the time being. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 9:08 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Apr 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> then the syllogism looks like this. >>> >>> A = X is Y. >>> R = Y is Z. >>> C = X is Z. >>> >>> Really? >>> >>> Perhaps you mean that the conclusion you seek can be reached by this >>> clear, distinct and logical expression of your ideas. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >> >
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