I'll continue to assert that abduction can't be a syllogism, for a syllogism by 
definition is deductive. Not inductive. Not abductive.

I don't think that the logical format of syllogism has changed; and remember, 
it operates around a major premise.

Abduction is certainly a mode of logic - but, I'll maintain that it is 
propositional, ie, IF-THEN..
This format keeps the Rule open to change, while the syllogistic AFFIRMS [not 
generates/creates] a Rule and does nothing to change that rule. Entirely 
different process.

Edwina

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  Cc: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List ; Edwina Taborsky 
  Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2016 1:48 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?


  Ben,



  Thank you for your thoughts and I like your modified formulation, even though 
it does not implement the logical structure.  

  The Josephson X 2 addition also adds value.  

  I believe also that C and A should be dynamic, that is, the surprising fact C 
that is observed is moving and the explanation A should also be moving, for 
instance, that C = (Q=>P).  Despite these reasons, I believe CP 5.189 is 
perfect.



  I’d also like to bring the question back and ask whether CP 5.189 is or is 
not a “syllogism”.  That is, I am concerned about the strict technical 
definition of what makes a “syllogism” a “syllogism” or whether the symbol has 
grown.    



  For example, you refer to it as “Peirce’s abductive syllogism”.  

  So, it’s a syllogism despite it not guaranteeing a true guess about a case 
right now or that it does not have the 1-2-3 structure?  

  Even though it does not have a “knock-down” list of three terms?  

  What if it turns out to be true that these beans are from this bag?  

  If you already possess knowledge about this situation, say you go into the 
future, figure out what happened and come back to the present to construct the 
logical argument in 1-3-2 structure, then can we call that structure a 
syllogism?



  _________



  Edwina, 



  I really like what you said about chance, law and habit-taking, especially 
“Abduction is a flexible process of the universal Mind to generate adaptive 
rules. Within the scientific method, abduction is similar - it keeps 
explanations open to evidentiary proof and is able to abandon one rule and 
generate another.”  Also, thank you for keeping this conversation going, which 
invite others’ contributions.  They are very helpful.    



  This is what I am trying to do: to bring attention to the point that Peirce 
was a careful writer and that if you look at CP 5.189, it is mysterious that a 
“syllogism” should have a term missing, that is, if it even counts as a 
syllogism.  



  So, one issue is whether to view surprise/suspect as a single term, as I am 
asserting.  You call it four terms but I call it three terms; that surprise and 
suspect belong to persons and that person is B, so surprise/suspect (aka., 
transformed B) is one term and not two.  Yet, to even call it a syllogism is 
problematic because you’d have to consider all the other technical constraints 
of what a syllogism ought to be, like the rules for distribution, etc…



  Thank you for the reference to Gensler’s site.  I can see why the example of 
chimps is wrong but I still can’t explain it strictly by the logical structure, 
so I will continue to work on that.  Also as clarification, I have corrected 
myself to state that the middle term is A and not C.  

  ________



  The example you attribute to me (“This event is a surprise…”) is not mine.  
It’s yours, you wrote it.  But it brings attention to various ambiguous points. 
 



  For instance, it is not the case that some events are surprising.  

  It is that ALL events of a particular kind is ALWAYS surprising but only to 
ALL inquirers of a particular kind, say for prepared inquirers named Charles.  



  So, all golden spirals in particular and not all spirals of any kind, are 
always surprising to all Charleses but not all Stuarts (because they are not 
prepared, so cannot have the correct recognition to hazard a good guess) and 
only for right now, before the experiments are completely carried out to 
completion.  For in that future, the golden spiral will be explained by 
maturation and modification of the current structured guess, the best 
argumentation (c.f., Ben’s criteria).  



  Also, if it’s a good guess, one that carries the assertion in the future to a 
true conclusion, then we are talking about an inchoate abduction that gets 
modified and matures into a polished abduction with truth value where the 
essence has not changed enough to be called something else, like the colloquial 
usage of the term “syllogism”, if there is such a thing.  So, I think there are 
good reasons for referring to CP 5.189 as a “syllogism”, which is still in 
contention.  

  __________



  My main motivation here is to give clear, spirited reasons for generating a 
rule that abandons (perhaps too harsh a term?) an old one to link CP 5.189 with 
Peirce’s esoteric writing in A Neglected Argument.  I certainly do need to 
figure out what the technical definition of “syllogism” is, as that is 
critical, but if Ben who knows better than I do refers to it as a syllogism, 
then is he wrong or is he simply using it in a colloquial manner…what then, are 
colloquial standards? 



  Finally, it is true that Peirce’s formulation has an if/then in it.  But if 
we consider that section at the future limit of inquiry, the if/then is gone.  
A is C because it’s true as matter of course by definition.  





  With best regards and thanks to all,

  Jerry Rhee




  On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
wrote:

    Jerry C., List:


    I must confess, I do not understand what specific point you are trying to 
make with this response; please elaborate/clarify.


    To supplement my previous comments--surprise and suspicion are not part of 
the reasoning itself; i.e., not included within the syllogism.  Surprise (at 
the observation of fact C) corresponds to the irritation of doubt that prompts 
an inquiry in the first place.  Suspicion (that A explains C) corresponds to 
the fixation of belief that is the aim of inquiry and brings it to an end, at 
least provisionally and for the time being.


    Regards,


    Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
    Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
    www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


    On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 9:08 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
<[email protected]> wrote:

        On Apr 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<[email protected]> wrote:


         then the syllogism looks like this.


        A = X is Y.
        R = Y is Z.
        C = X is Z.
      Really?


      Perhaps you mean that the conclusion you seek can be reached by this 
clear, distinct and logical expression of your ideas.


      Cheers


      Jerry

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