Ben, Gary, and others, thank you for your inputs. I hope you will agree that this situation is ironic. If forced to respond with either an affirmative or negative to the simple question of whether the icon “CP 5.189” is or isn’t the index “syllogism”, a community of inquirers who study Peirce can’t come up with consensus on which is *correct* but the reasons are becoming clearer.
How important is transforming minds to Peirce? Can emotions or sensations be predicates? Why does he only include (C and A) instead of (B and A)? That is, why C and not B? Was the exclusion of B intentional? Is the presence of surprise to suspect combined with absence of B intentional and how is it consistent with Peircean thought? “That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty…When the sensation beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises as a *predicate*; that is, we think that something is beautiful…Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place of a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfills the function of an hypothesis. …The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances…”I do not understand you,” is the phrase of an angry man. The indescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite the emotion; but nothing is *so chilling as a scientific explanation*. Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated predicate.” ~CP 5.291-292 _________ My argument and accounts are the following: CP 5.189 is a syllogism, that is, they share identity because: Given B = surprise or suspect: Conversion to deductive form of categorical syllogism (which requires three terms and distributed constraints): *Abductive form* The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case *Deductive form* But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result *Substitution gives:* A is C Rule B is A Case B is C Result Subject B Predicate C Middle A Major premise: A is C Rule if A were true, C matter of course Minor premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. Conclusion: B is C Result The surprising fact, C, is observed; *Inversion gives:* C is A Rule A is C or *C is A* A is B Case Suspicious is A or *A is suspicious* C is B Result Surprising is C or *C is surprising* Subject: C Predicate B Middle A Major premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Minor premise: A is C Rule But if A were true, C a matter of course. Conclusion: C is B Result The surprising fact, C, is observed; _______________ As for whether I can make a claim on whether something missing should be allowed, I would refer to Leo Strauss and his distinction between esotericism (writing for philosophical readers) and exotericism (writing for vulgar readers). For instance: “The link between the two works is a negative one: the absence from the Political Treatise of an extensive discussion of religion. But Spinoza’s politicization of religion, when it is not explicitly stated, can be deduced from his theory of human nature. The two treatises are compatible with each other… ~ Strauss and Cropsey, Benedict Spinoza, *History of Political Philosophy* “The hermeneutic principle that legitimates the whole argument and thus blurs the fundamental difference between its heterogeneous parts, is expressed by the assertion that, as a matter of principle, the literal meaning of the Bible is its only meaning.. …“He who understands, should be silent…it suffices to indicate the matter to the wise.” ~Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* Best*,* Jerry Rhee On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > List, > > > For those who (like me) might like or need to brush up on their > understanding of the development of the Aristotelian approach in logic, in > which great weight is placed on the notion of the canonical forms of > inference, see the very nice and relatively short explanations of > Aristotle's work on the syllogism and the development of those ideas in the > medieval tradition in the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. > > > Aristotle's logic: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-logic/ > > Medieval theories of the syllogistic forms: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-syllogism/ > > > For the sake of understanding the influences that Peirce was drawing on as > he formulated his explanations of synthetic inference--and set up > the examples of inductive and abductive arguments the way he did--it might > be helpful to consider the Medieval account of supposition and logical > consequence. This approach in logic differs in a number of respects from a > logical theory that is built around the idea of canonical forms of > inference. On this approach, the idea of a logical consequence is modeled > on the relationship found in the conditional (and vice versa)--which is an > approach that Peirce found to be quite illuminating. > > > Medieval account of logical consequence: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequence-medieval/ > > > The author of this entry (Catarina Dutilh Novaes) on the theory of logical > consequence makes the following remark: It is important to note that, in > the 14th century, rules of consequence were often discussed against the > background of the genre of oral disputation known as *obligationes* (see > entry on *obligationes* of this encyclopedia). It is common to encounter > formulations of rules of consequence in obligational terms, for example: if > you have conceded the consequence and its antecedent, then you must concede > the consequent. Thus, interesting reflections on consequence are also to be > found in *obligationes* treatises (and vice-versa). > > > In light of that remark, we can see that the theory of logical consequence > might provide an interesting way of thinking about the character of the > conclusion in the example of abductive inference that is offered at CP > 5.189. What, if anything, is a reasonable person obligated to do in > drawing the consequence? Peirce says: "Hence, there is reason to suspect > that A is true. " If we affirm that having a reason to suspect that > something is true involves an obligation to form a supposition (but not > necessarily an assertion) that A is true, then what should on do on the > basis of such a supposition? In order to answer that question, we would > need to consider the mode of the supposition. Here is what Buridan says > about the mode of the different suppositions one might form: In the > present context, the way in which we here speak of matter and form, we > understand by the “matter” of the proposition or *consequentia* the > purely categorematic terms, i.e. subjects and predicates, omitting the > syncategorematic terms that enclose them and through which they are > conjoined or negated or distributed or forced to a certain mode of > supposition. All the rest, we say, pertains to the form. (Buridan, TC, 30) > > > To answer the question I posed above, I suspect that the obligation that > follows is a duty to engage in further inquiry for the sake of putting the > matter to the test before making any assertions about what, really, is the > truth of the matter (or something of that sort). In his discussion of > Peirce's logical theory in Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth draws > out these sorts of points in quite interesting ways. In the remarks that > follow the quote from Buridan, Novaes says that part of Buridan's point > lives on in the modern discussion of what is necessary in order properly to > set up the constants in a logical theory (see > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/) > <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/>. > > > In what sense might the first cotary proposition that Peirce is arguing > for in this essay on perception and abduction be a matter of setting out > something akin to a set of "constants" that govern the proper application > of the leading principle that guides us in abductive reasoning? Notice the > manner in which Peirce draws the conclusion in the essay when he moves from > a claim about the logical form to one about the matter of thought. > > > But as to the logical form, it would be, at any rate, extremely difficult > to dispose of it in the same way. ... Where do the conceptions of > deductive necessity, of inductive probability, of abductive expectability > come from? Where does the conception of inference itself come from? ... Now > when an inference is thought of as an inference, the conception of > inference becomes a part of the matter of thought. Therefore, the same > argument which we used in regard to matter in general applies to the > conception of inference. 5.194 > > > This, I think, is a rather remarkable hypothesis about the source of our > ideas concerning the validity of arguments--such as an argument to an > explanatory hypothesis. What obligations, if any, follow from the > supposition that is formed as the conclusion of this abductive argument > about the logical validity of abduction? > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 1:50 PM > *To:* Edwina Taborsky > *Cc:* Benjamin Udell; [email protected] > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? > > Edwina, List: > > The rearranged form (rule/case/result) is clearly NOT abductive, it is > deductive. The original form (rule/result/case), which is deductively > INvalid, is the one that is required for generating hypotheses. Again, the > "new rule" is really just "the circumstances of [the surprising fact's] > occurrence," which serves along with "the credible conjecture" as the two > premisses of a (valid deductive) syllogism that constitutes "a possible > Explanation," on account of which "the inquirer is led to regard his > conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally > holds it to be 'plausible.'" (EP 2.441) > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:38 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon -.OK. >> >> The example I outlined - in my last post which I said was invalid due to >> its having an undistributed middle term [I was wrong to also state >> undistributed major]...has the same problem in the example you give. >> Undistributed middle - 'white'. >> >> However - to switch it as you suggest: >> >> All the 'beans from this bag' are white >> Some beans are 'beans from this bag' >> Therefore Some beans are white. >> >> This is valid. Format 'Darii'. >> >> BUT - is this abductive? As you say, it's moved into the deductive >> format, not questioning that new rule of 'all the beans from this bag are >> white'.. >> >> The question remains - what is the logical format for generating >> hypotheses? >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> ; [email protected] >> *Sent:* Monday, April 25, 2016 3:14 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism? >> >> Edwina, Ben, List: >> >> I think that what Peirce meant by a "minor indirect probable syllogism" >> is one with the form that he presented as "hypothesis" in CP 2.623. >> >> *Rule.*--All the beans from this bag are white. >> >> *Result.*--These beans are white. >> >> .·.*Case.*--These beans are from this bag. >> >> For translation to CP 5.189, "Result" is the surprising fact, C; "Case" >> is the proposed explanation, A; and "Rule" is the reason why C would be a >> matter of course if A is true. Obviously this is not a valid deductive >> syllogism; the whole point is that it involves a different type of >> inference (abductive). However, we can rearrange it into a valid deductive >> syllogism by making "Rule" and "Case" the premisses, and "Result" the >> conclusion; thus the subject is "these beans," the predicate is "white," >> and the middle term is "beans from this bag." This is what I have >> suggested that Peirce actually had in mind when, in "A Neglected Argument >> for the Reality of God," he referred to "a syllogism exhibiting the >> surprising fact [Result] as necessarily consequent upon the circumstances >> of its occurrence [Rule] together with the truth of the credible conjecture >> [Case], as premisses." >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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