Jerry - I think Ben is doing a great job at explaining the problem but I just
have to comment on your outline, where you write:
First of all, is modus ponens simply indicated by switching the order of the
three lines?
That is,
“If p then q. = “But if A were true, C would be a matter of course”
p. = “The surprising fact C is observed”
Ergo, q. = “Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true”
The difference I see here is that p = A in the first line but p = C in line 2.
NO! NO!...You can't change the content of the subject/predicates. And what
you've set up is a fallacy:
If p then q,
q,
Therefore p.
That's called the Fallacy of affirming the consequent.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jerry Rhee
To: Benjamin Udell
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 2:05 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is CP 5.189 a syllogism?
Ben,
Thanks for that. Your explanation works for me but it also leaves me a
little unsettled.
First of all, is modus ponens simply indicated by switching the order of the
three lines?
That is,
“If p then q. = “But if A were true, C would be a matter of course”
p. = “The surprising fact C is observed”
Ergo, q. = “Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true”
The difference I see here is that p = A in the first line but p = C in line
2.
Similarly, q = C in the first line but q = A in line 3. So, they switch. In
like manner, the attitude of the inquirer switches from surprise to suspect.
Moreover, Randy Goebel gives the formulation,
From P, and Q => P, infer Q, which isn’t exactly the same as modus ponens.
Additionally, the motivation for the inference itself is a HUGE matter, one
that requires bringing attention to specific things (e.g., black beans and not
just beans because black beans to me is not surprising but to you, it is)
because if you don’t have the motivation, where is the inquiry (c.f., fingers
example in Republic)?
As you say, “The emotion of surprise mentioned in the abductive schema is
affected, and in particular, reduced or eliminated, by the abductive inference
itself.” But isn’t that what is being stated in the NA? “The inquiry begins
with pondering these phenomena in all their aspects, in the search of some
point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved.”
If Peirce is intending to treat “C & A without B because he is treating
abduction as a transformation of modus ponens” only, he could have simply
stated it as B & A instead of C & A since A and B are necessarily in sequence.
So, why A to C by leaving out B? That is a surprising fact that I observed.
This goes to the overall hypothesis that the NA is simply a demonstration of
the abductive method. The Additament, if I recall correctly, gives a fuller
account of deduction and induction.
Thanks for your work on this and for providing such direct responses to my
questions throughout. I truly appreciate it.
Admittedly, I think I err in saying that CP 5.189 is a syllogism; that I am
taking too many liberties in saying that they are the same and not respecting
the history and rules of logic. There is also the matter that I do not know
that history and rules well enough to even speak on it. Yet, this is the
manner in which I pursue the inquiry. The two may not be identical but my
hypothesis is that the essence of syllogism is maintained in CP 5.189 to be
able to call it syllogism and to even claim a "technical" correctness because:
“At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible Explanation, by
which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily
consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth of
the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the
inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favour.”
That is, by calling CP 5.189 a syllogism, it harmonizes Peirce's ideas in
unity.
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 12:17 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote:
Jerry R., list
Emotions, or emotion-producing characteristics, can be predicates, as you
say. The emotion of surprise mentioned in some of Peirce's schemata of
abductive inference is not among the terms (subject, middle, predicate) under
consideration there. They pertain instead to the motivation of the inference
itself. Different inference modes, different motivations. Keeping them in there
even after you've retro-transformed the abduction to a deduction makes for
confusion. The emotion of surprise mentioned in the abductive schema is
affected, and in particular, reduced or eliminated, by the abductive inference
itself. The inference is not about the surprisingness itself, but about the
suprising phenomenon. An abductive inference could be about surprisingness as a
phenomenon, but I figure it would take a pretty acrobatically "meta" inference
to make the inference be about the very surprisingness which it decreases.
Peirce considers just C & A without B because he is treating abduction as a
transformation of modus ponens, a standard deductive logical form considering
just two propositions taken simply and their compounding into a conditional:
Modus ponens:
If p then q.
p.
Ergo, q.
On the other hand, the propositional form most similar to his term-level
treatment of abductive inference would be:
(Surprisingly) If p then q.
If r then q.
Ergo (plausibly) if p then r.
Spelling out the resemblance:
(Surprisingly) If p then q. (Likewise as "(Surprisingly), each thing is,
IF one of these beans, THEN white").
If r then q. (Likewise as "Each thing is, IF a bean from that bag, THEN
white").
Ergo (plausibly) if p then r. (Likewise as, "Ergo (plausibly), each thing
is, IF one of these beans, THEN a bean from that bag").
However, that propositional schema seems less illuminating than 5.189,
which is explicit about some of reasoner's emotion. Bringing in some more of
the structure of 5.189, such that "C" = "if p then q" and "A" = "if p then r"we
can get:
(Surprisingly) it is observed that C {If p then q}.
But if A {if p then r} were true, then (of course) C {if p then q} would be
true (since If r then q).
Ergo (plausibly) if p then r.
Best, Ben
On 4/25/2016 7:18 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Ben, Gary, and others, thank you for your inputs.
I hope you will agree that this situation is ironic. If forced to respond
with either an affirmative or negative to the simple question of whether the
icon “CP 5.189” is or isn’t the index “syllogism”, a community of inquirers who
study Peirce can’t come up with consensus on which is correct but the reasons
are becoming clearer.
How important is transforming minds to Peirce?
Can emotions or sensations be predicates?
Why does he only include (C and A) instead of (B and A)?
That is, why C and not B?
Was the exclusion of B intentional?
Is the presence of surprise to suspect combined with absence of B
intentional and how is it consistent with Peircean thought?
“That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of
sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty…When the sensation
beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises as a predicate
; that is, we think that something is beautiful…Accordingly, a sensation is a
simple predicate taken in place of a complex predicate; in other words, it
fulfills the function of an hypothesis.
…The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our
attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances…”I do
not understand you,” is the phrase of an angry man. The indescribable, the
ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite the emotion; but nothing is so
chilling as a scientific explanation . Thus an emotion is always a simple
predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated
predicate.” ~CP 5.291-292
_________
My argument and accounts are the following:
CP 5.189 is a syllogism, that is, they share identity because:
Given B = surprise or suspect:
Conversion to deductive form of categorical syllogism (which requires
three terms and distributed constraints):
Abductive form
The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
Deductive form
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
Substitution gives:
A is C Rule
B is A Case
B is C Result
Subject B
Predicate C
Middle A
Major premise: A is C Rule if A were true, C matter of course
Minor premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect
that A is true.
Conclusion: B is C Result The surprising fact, C, is
observed;
Inversion gives:
C is A Rule A is C or C is A
A is B Case Suspicious is A or A is suspicious
C is B Result Surprising is C or C is surprising
Subject: C
Predicate B
Middle A
Major premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect that A
is true'. Minor premise: A is C Rule But if A were true, C a matter of
course. Conclusion: C is B Result The surprising fact, C, is
observed;
_______________
As for whether I can make a claim on whether something missing should be
allowed, I would refer to Leo Strauss and his distinction between esotericism
(writing for philosophical readers) and exotericism (writing for vulgar
readers).
For instance:
“The link between the two works is a negative one: the absence from the
Political Treatise of an extensive discussion of religion. But Spinoza’s
politicization of religion, when it is not explicitly stated, can be deduced
from his theory of human nature. The two treatises are compatible with each
other…
~ Strauss and Cropsey, Benedict Spinoza, History of Political Philosophy
“The hermeneutic principle that legitimates the whole argument and thus
blurs the fundamental difference between its heterogeneous parts, is expressed
by the assertion that, as a matter of principle, the literal meaning of the
Bible is its only meaning..
…“He who understands, should be silent…it suffices to indicate the matter
to the wise.”
~Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
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