Jerry R., list
Emotions, or emotion-producing characteristics, can be predicates, as
you say. The emotion of surprise mentioned in some of Peirce's schemata
of abductive inference is not among the terms (subject, middle,
predicate) under consideration there. They pertain instead to the
motivation of the inference itself. Different inference modes, different
motivations. Keeping them in there even after you've retro-transformed
the abduction to a deduction makes for confusion. The emotion of
surprise mentioned in the abductive schema is affected, and in
particular, reduced or eliminated, by the abductive inference itself.
The inference is not about the surprisingness itself, but about the
suprising phenomenon. An abductive inference could be about
surprisingness as a phenomenon, but I figure it would take a pretty
acrobatically "meta" inference to make the inference be about the very
surprisingness which it decreases.
Peirce considers just C & A without B because he is treating abduction
as a transformation of /modus ponens/, a standard deductive logical form
considering just two propositions taken simply and their compounding
into a conditional:
/Modus ponens:/
If /p/ then /q/.
/p/.
Ergo, /q/.
On the other hand, the propositional form most similar to his term-level
treatment of abductive inference would be:
(Surprisingly) If /p/ then /q/.
If /r/ then /q/.
Ergo (plausibly) if /p/ then /r/.
Spelling out the resemblance:
(Surprisingly) If /p/ then /q/. (Likewise as "(Surprisingly), each
thing is, *IF* one of these beans, *THEN* white").
If /r/ then /q/. (Likewise as "Each thing is, *IF* a bean from that
bag, *THEN* white").
Ergo (plausibly) if /p/ then /r/. (Likewise as, "Ergo (plausibly), each
thing is, *IF* one of these beans, *THEN* a bean from that bag").
However, that propositional schema seems less illuminating than 5.189,
which is explicit about some of reasoner's emotion. Bringing in some
more of the structure of 5.189, such that "C" = "if /p/ then /q/" and
"A" = "if /p/ then /r/"we can get:
(Surprisingly) it is observed that C {If /p/ then /q/}.
But if A {if /p/ then /r/} were true, then (of course) C {if /p/ then
/q/} would be true (since If /r/ then /q/).
Ergo (plausibly) if /p/ then /r/.
Best, Ben
On 4/25/2016 7:18 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
Ben, Gary, and others, thank you for your inputs.
I hope you will agree that this situation is ironic. If forced to
respond with either an affirmative or negative to the simple question
of whether the icon “CP 5.189” is or isn’t the index “syllogism”, a
community of inquirers who study Peirce can’t come up with consensus
on which is correct but the reasons are becoming clearer.
How important is transforming minds to Peirce?
Can emotions or sensations be predicates?
Why does he only include (C and A) instead of (B and A)?
That is, why C and not B?
Was the exclusion of B intentional?
Is the presence of surprise to suspect combined with absence of B
intentional and how is it consistent with Peircean thought?
“That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression
of sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty…When the
sensation beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always
arises as a *predicate* ; that is, we think that something is
beautiful…Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in
place of a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfills the function
of an hypothesis.
…The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our
attention is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable
circumstances…”I do not understand you,” is the phrase of an angry
man. The indescribable, the ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly
excite the emotion; but nothing is *so chilling as a scientific
explanation* . Thus an emotion is always a simple predicate
substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly complicated
predicate.” ~CP 5.291-292
_________
My argument and accounts are the following:
CP 5.189 is a syllogism, that is, they share identity because:
Given B = surprise or suspect:
Conversion to deductive form of categorical syllogism (which requires
three terms and distributed constraints):
_*Abductive form* _
The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
_*Deductive form* _
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
_*Substitution gives:* _
A is C Rule
B is A Case
B is C Result
Subject B
Predicate C
Middle A
Major premise: A is C Rule if A were true, C matter of course
Minor premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect
that A is true.
Conclusion: B is C Result The surprising fact, C, is
observed;
_*Inversion gives:* _
C is A Rule A is C or *C is A*
A is B Case Suspicious is A or *A is suspicious*
C is B Result Surprising is C or *C is surprising*
Subject: C
Predicate B
Middle A
Major premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect
that A is true'. Minor premise: A is C Rule But if A were true, C
a matter of course. Conclusion: C is B Result The
surprising fact, C, is observed;
_______________
As for whether I can make a claim on whether something missing should
be allowed, I would refer to Leo Strauss and his distinction between
esotericism (writing for philosophical readers) and exotericism
(writing for vulgar readers).
For instance:
“The link between the two works is a negative one: the absence from
the Political Treatise of an extensive discussion of religion. But
Spinoza’s politicization of religion, when it is not explicitly
stated, can be deduced from his theory of human nature. The two
treatises are compatible with each other…
~ Strauss and Cropsey, Benedict Spinoza, History of Political Philosophy
“The hermeneutic principle that legitimates the whole argument and
thus blurs the fundamental difference between its heterogeneous parts,
is expressed by the assertion that, as a matter of principle, the
literal meaning of the Bible is its only meaning..
…“He who understands, should be silent…it suffices to indicate the
matter to the wise.”
~Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing
Best,
Jerry Rhee
On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
