Ben,
Thanks for that. Your explanation works for me but it also leaves me a
little unsettled.
First of all, is modus ponens simply indicated by switching the order of
the three lines?
That is,
“If *p* then *q*. = “But if A were true, C would be a matter of course”
* p*. = “The surprising fact C is observed”
Ergo, *q*. = “Hence there is reason to suspect that A is true”
The difference I see here is that p = A in the first line but p = C in line
2.
Similarly, q = C in the first line but q = A in line 3. So, they switch. In
like manner, the attitude of the inquirer switches from surprise to suspect.
Moreover, Randy Goebel gives the formulation,
*From P, and Q => P, infer Q*, which isn’t exactly the same as modus ponens.
Additionally, the motivation for the inference itself is a HUGE matter, one
that requires bringing attention to specific things (e.g., *black* beans
and not just beans because black beans to me is not surprising but to you,
it is) because if you don’t have the motivation, where is the inquiry
(c.f., fingers example in *Republic*)?
As you say, “The emotion of surprise mentioned in the abductive schema is
affected, and in particular, reduced or eliminated, by the abductive
inference itself.” But isn’t that what is being stated in the NA? “*The
inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena in all their aspects, in the
search of some point of view whence the wonder shall be resolved*.”
If Peirce is intending to treat “C & A without B because he is treating
abduction as a transformation of *modus ponens” *only, he could have simply
stated it as B & A instead of C & A since A and B are necessarily in
sequence. So, why A to C by leaving out B? That is a surprising fact that
I observed.
This goes to the overall hypothesis that the NA is simply a demonstration
of the abductive method. The Additament, if I recall correctly, gives a
fuller account of deduction and induction.
Thanks for your work on this and for providing such direct responses to my
questions throughout. I truly appreciate it.
Admittedly, I think I err in saying that CP 5.189 is a syllogism; that I am
taking too many liberties in saying that they are the same and not
respecting the history and rules of logic. There is also the matter that I
do not know that history and rules well enough to even speak on it. Yet,
this is the manner in which I pursue the inquiry. The two may not be
identical but my hypothesis is that the essence of syllogism is maintained
in CP 5.189 to be able to call it syllogism and to even claim a "technical"
correctness because:
“At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible *Explanation, by
which I mean a syllogism* exhibiting the surprising fact as necessarily
consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with the truth
of the credible conjecture, as premisses. *On account of this Explanation,
the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favour*.”
That is, by calling CP 5.189 a syllogism, it harmonizes Peirce's ideas in
unity.
With best wishes,
Jerry R
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 12:17 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> wrote:
> Jerry R., list
>
> Emotions, or emotion-producing characteristics, can be predicates, as you
> say. The emotion of surprise mentioned in some of Peirce's schemata of
> abductive inference is not among the terms (subject, middle, predicate)
> under consideration there. They pertain instead to the motivation of the
> inference itself. Different inference modes, different motivations. Keeping
> them in there even after you've retro-transformed the abduction to a
> deduction makes for confusion. The emotion of surprise mentioned in the
> abductive schema is affected, and in particular, reduced or eliminated, by
> the abductive inference itself. The inference is not about the
> surprisingness itself, but about the suprising phenomenon. An abductive
> inference could be about surprisingness as a phenomenon, but I figure it
> would take a pretty acrobatically "meta" inference to make the inference be
> about the very surprisingness which it decreases.
>
> Peirce considers just C & A without B because he is treating abduction as
> a transformation of *modus ponens*, a standard deductive logical form
> considering just two propositions taken simply and their compounding into a
> conditional:
>
> *Modus ponens:*
> If *p* then *q*.
> *p*.
> Ergo, *q*.
>
> On the other hand, the propositional form most similar to his term-level
> treatment of abductive inference would be:
>
> (Surprisingly) If *p* then *q*.
> If *r* then *q*.
> Ergo (plausibly) if *p* then *r*.
>
> Spelling out the resemblance:
>
> (Surprisingly) If *p* then *q*. (Likewise as "(Surprisingly), each
> thing is, *IF* one of these beans, *THEN* white").
> If *r* then *q*. (Likewise as "Each thing is, *IF* a bean from that
> bag, *THEN* white").
> Ergo (plausibly) if *p* then *r*. (Likewise as, "Ergo (plausibly), each
> thing is, *IF* one of these beans, *THEN* a bean from that bag").
>
> However, that propositional schema seems less illuminating than 5.189,
> which is explicit about some of reasoner's emotion. Bringing in some more
> of the structure of 5.189, such that "C" = "if *p* then *q*" and "A" =
> "if *p* then *r*"we can get:
>
> (Surprisingly) it is observed that C {If *p* then *q*}.
> But if A {if *p* then *r*} were true, then (of course) C {if *p* then *q*}
> would be true (since If *r* then *q*).
> Ergo (plausibly) if *p* then *r*.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 4/25/2016 7:18 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>
> Ben, Gary, and others, thank you for your inputs.
>
> I hope you will agree that this situation is ironic. If forced to respond
> with either an affirmative or negative to the simple question of whether
> the icon “CP 5.189” is or isn’t the index “syllogism”, a community of
> inquirers who study Peirce can’t come up with consensus on which is correct
> but the reasons are becoming clearer.
>
> How important is transforming minds to Peirce?
>
> Can emotions or sensations be predicates?
>
> Why does he only include (C and A) instead of (B and A)?
>
> That is, why C and not B?
>
> Was the exclusion of B intentional?
>
> Is the presence of surprise to suspect combined with absence of B
> intentional and how is it consistent with Peircean thought?
>
> “That a sensation is not necessarily an intuition, or first impression of
> sense, is very evident in the case of the sense of beauty…When the
> sensation beautiful is determined by previous cognitions, it always arises
> as a *predicate* ; that is, we think that something is
> beautiful…Accordingly, a sensation is a simple predicate taken in place of
> a complex predicate; in other words, it fulfills the function of an
> hypothesis.
>
> …The emotions, as a little observation will show, arise when our attention
> is strongly drawn to complex and inconceivable circumstances…”I do not
> understand you,” is the phrase of an angry man. The indescribable, the
> ineffable, the incomprehensible, commonly excite the emotion; but nothing
> is *so chilling as a scientific explanation* . Thus an emotion is always
> a simple predicate substituted by an operation of the mind for a highly
> complicated predicate.” ~CP 5.291-292
>
> _________
>
> My argument and accounts are the following:
>
> CP 5.189 is a syllogism, that is, they share identity because:
>
> Given B = surprise or suspect:
>
> Conversion to deductive form of categorical syllogism (which requires
> three terms and distributed constraints):
>
> *Abductive form *
>
> The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
>
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
>
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
>
>
> *Deductive form *
>
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Rule
>
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true'. Case
>
> The surprising fact, C, is observed; Result
>
>
> *Substitution gives: *
>
> A is C Rule
>
> B is A Case
>
> B is C Result
>
> Subject B
>
> Predicate C
>
> Middle A
>
> Major premise: A is C Rule if A were true, C matter of course
>
> Minor premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect
> that A is true.
>
> Conclusion: B is C Result The surprising fact, C, is
> observed;
>
> *Inversion gives: *
>
> C is A Rule A is C or *C is A*
>
> A is B Case Suspicious is A or *A is suspicious*
>
> C is B Result Surprising is C or *C is surprising*
>
>
> Subject: C
>
> Predicate B
>
> Middle A
>
> Major premise: B is A Case Hence, there is reason to suspect that A
> is true'. Minor premise: A is C Rule But if A were true, C a matter
> of course. Conclusion: C is B Result The surprising fact, C,
> is observed;
>
> _______________
>
> As for whether I can make a claim on whether something missing should be
> allowed, I would refer to Leo Strauss and his distinction between
> esotericism (writing for philosophical readers) and exotericism (writing
> for vulgar readers).
>
> For instance:
>
> “The link between the two works is a negative one: the absence from the
> Political Treatise of an extensive discussion of religion. But Spinoza’s
> politicization of religion, when it is not explicitly stated, can be
> deduced from his theory of human nature. The two treatises are compatible
> with each other…
>
> ~ Strauss and Cropsey, Benedict Spinoza, History of Political Philosophy
>
> “The hermeneutic principle that legitimates the whole argument and thus
> blurs the fundamental difference between its heterogeneous parts, is
> expressed by the assertion that, as a matter of principle, the literal
> meaning of the Bible is its only meaning..
>
> …“He who understands, should be silent…it suffices to indicate the matter
> to the wise.”
>
> ~Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
