Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina,
Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that
it seems precise in itself yet too vague in application.
It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have
been treating categories as non-relational essences, at least
in any way that you would not also be accusing Peirce of doing.
If you think that Peirce went too far in that direction, please
say so.
There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html
but also another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph
(EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP 2.643, CLL 151-2) of
"Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878)
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI
in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories
on the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions.
Once again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second),
the inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive
conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of
the relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places
exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples.
As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with
thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly
because of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce:
"Deduction proves that something _/must be/_; Induction shows that
something _/actually is/_ operative; Abduction merely suggests that
something _/may be/_." (CP 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html .
If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so.
It would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us
here.
You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't
share
Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty
years ago
that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were
your
basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the
irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which
regard you do agree with Peirce.
Best, Ben
On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jon A., List:
I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided,
but does that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us
who are still interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will
be a consensus that it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to
rule/case/result at all … or that it makes no practical difference
what assignments we make … or that the "correct" assignments depend
on which aspect of the categories is in focus. Or maybe the outcome
will be no consensus at all; the attempt might still be worthwhile
anyway.
I tend to "default" to the categories as
possibility/actuality/necessity,
and that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter.
Others might lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or
feeling/action/thought, or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve
situations when these different characterizations of Peirce's
three categories suggest different answers? Per your latest
message, what exactly is the "critical question that has to
be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we be
asking it?
Regards,
Jon S.
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]:
Jon S.,
Most of the old timers on this List have already heard
and ignored this advice more times than I could care to
enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers
may not have heard it before, I will give it another try.
Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations.
To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are
simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively,
have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the
issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity,
but it is critical to take the first approximation first before
attempting to deal with the second.)
In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic
relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness
to any local domain or any given element that participates in that
relation.
As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of
its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of
tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the
components of
that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends
itself
to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we
happen to
take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that
order is
a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our
choice.
Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error
that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA).
As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present
discussion,
arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in
sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain
levels of structure.
Regards,
Jon
