Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18807 ET:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18808 GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18810 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18811 JS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18812 BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18813
Ben, Edwina, Gary R, Jon S, all, I'll post this back under one of the earlier subject lines in hopes of returning to it someday, and also to reign in the scope of discussion to what I can handle at present. I read Peirce primarily for his insights into logic, mathematics, and science, which are considerable enough for several lifetimes, and I read him the same way I read other thinkers in those areas. Maybe some people read Peirce as Charles the Revelator, applying the principles of scriptural interpretation and chasing his tale around hermeneutic circles in hopes of cornering a sublime truth. Scientific texts are read a different way. There we have a line between two kinds of statements, those that serve as conjectures, heuristics, or suggestions and those that are proved (or proven). (One of my math lists just went through a long, punny discussion as to whether proved or proven is preferable, so take your pick.) To be continued ... Jon On 5/2/2016 1:27 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina, > > Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that > it seems precise in itself yet too vague in application. > > It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have > been treating categories as non-relational essences, at least > in any way that you would not also be accusing Peirce of doing. > If you think that Peirce went too far in that direction, please > say so. > > There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html > but also another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph > (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP 2.643, CLL 151-2) of > "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878) > > https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI > > in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories > on the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions. > Once again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second), > the inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive > conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of > the relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places > exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples. > > As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with > thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly > because of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce: > "Deduction proves that something _/must be/_; Induction shows that > something _/actually is/_ operative; Abduction merely suggests that > something _/may be/_." (CP 5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html . > > If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so. > It would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here. > You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share > Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago > that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your > basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the > irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which > regard you do agree with Peirce. > > Best, Ben > > On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> >> Jon A., List: >> >> I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided, >> but does that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us >> who are still interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will >> be a consensus that it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to >> rule/case/result at all … or that it makes no practical difference >> what assignments we make … or that the "correct" assignments depend >> on which aspect of the categories is in focus. Or maybe the outcome >> will be no consensus at all; the attempt might still be worthwhile >> anyway. >> >> I tend to "default" to the categories as possibility/actuality/necessity, >> and that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter. >> Others might lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or >> feeling/action/thought, or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve >> situations when these different characterizations of Peirce's >> three categories suggest different answers? Per your latest >> message, what exactly is the "critical question that has to >> be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we be >> asking it? >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM, >> Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Jon S., >>> >>> Most of the old timers on this List have already heard >>> and ignored this advice more times than I could care to >>> enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers >>> may not have heard it before, I will give it another try. >>> >>> Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations. >>> To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are >>> simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively, >>> have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the >>> issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity, >>> but it is critical to take the first approximation first before >>> attempting to deal with the second.) >>> >>> In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic >>> relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness >>> to any local domain or any given element that participates in that >>> relation. >>> >>> As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of >>> its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of >>> tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of >>> that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself >>> to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to >>> take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is >>> a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice. >>> >>> Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error >>> that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA). >>> As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion, >>> arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in >>> sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain >>> levels of structure. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >> > -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
