List ~
> * The surprising fact, C, is observed.
> * But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
> * Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.


All of that I agree with.  But it describes the activity that results in 
abduction. It is not a logical abduction.  Abduction is the understanding that 
results from the activity -- if the guess proves successful.  

Regards,
Tom Wyrick



On May 3, 2016, at 3:35 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:

Jerry,

Reviewing the many tangents of the last week --
I can't really think of anything better than
to repeat the advice that I gave below.

Regards,

Jon

> On 4/13/2016 5:01 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Jon, list:
> 
> I should have been more moderate in my response.
> 
> Given:
> 
> The surprising fact, C, is observed.
> 
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
> 
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
> 
> where,
> 
> C = icon, Peirce’s theory of abduction, semiotic or pragmatism,
> where pragmatism is “nothing else than the logic of abduction”,
> 
> and
> 
> A = index, “2 variants from NEM 4” *or* CP 5.189.
> 
> then,
> 
> My inference to the best explanation is CP 5.189 over NEM4 *because*
> is perceptual judgment, which is valued by spiritedness.  But this
> at stake; whether we have the right to say whether perceptual judgment
> is what ought to be valued in abduction in the first place.  This is
> decided as a matter of social principles because esthetics.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Jerry Rhee
> 
>> On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 1:17 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote:
>> 
>> “*Whether this be a correct account of the matter or not…that all
>> conceptions must be given substantially in perception, three objections
>> will be started.  Namely, in the first place, it may be said that even if
>> this be the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought
>> to conform*…”
>> 
>> ~ CP 5.189, EP 2, p.231
>> 
>> Jon,
>> 
>> my point here is to show that to determine the goodness of what a good
>> definition of abduction should consist in, we need to determine the class
>> membership of what C (Peirce's theory of abduction, semiotic) should entail
>> at the outset.  You do this in your response; that you are after the
>> “bare essentials of Peirce’s semiotics”.  But all you’re after is already
>> considered and contained in CP 5.189, in one, two, three..C, A, B.
>> 
>> Importantly, perceptual judgment is part of abduction, it ought to be,
>> regardless of whether you accuse it of being pithy or not.  If you
>> dismiss this part, you dismiss a major aspect of Peirce’s pragmaticism
>> because ethics depends on esthetics and logic on ethics; "spiritedness
>> privileged over appetite as the ally of reason” (paraphrased from Moss
>> and others, c.f., *Republic*).
>> 
>> As for its “pith”, why do you think I promote examining phi spiral
>> abduction where the icon, index and symbol is stated explicitly?
>> 
>> It is precisely in anticipation of criticisms of “pith”.  It is an
>> example that contains responses and imaginations to questions at its limit
>> for *all who investigate* before they even start but I’m supposed to
>> defend why it’s beyond your comprehension, too.  Why it isn't a matter of
>> genuine doubt to you because I can't make you see why this perception is
>> relevant.  So, you walk away and it’s my fault.  So goes the world…
>> 
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 8:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Inquiry Blog:
>>> •
>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/
>>> 
>>> Peirce List:
>>> •• http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569
>>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18634
>>> JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18635
>>> JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18636
>>> 
>>> Jerry, List,
>>> 
>>> For now I'm just focused on the bare essentials of Peirce's semiotics,
>>> specifically, the minimally adequate definition of a sign relation as
>>> it figures into Peirce's definition of logic along with the necessary
>>> concepts of triple correspondence and triadic determination on which
>>> all the rest depends.
>>> 
>>> To Wit:
>>> 
>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/
>>> 
>>> It would take a while to get from there to his full theory of inquiry,
>>> involving the interplay of abductive, deductive, and inductive styles
>>> of inference, but first things first, as they say.
>>> 
>>> Just as a side note, though, I'm sure every writer who ever attempted
>>> to introduce a complex subject to a new audience has tried the tactic
>>> of seeking out the simplest possible capsule summary of its main gist.
>>> The pithy epitome of abduction you cite below is a perfect example of
>>> just such a capsule and I have seen vast literatures in several areas
>>> spring from its pith and moment only to have their currents turn awry
>>> from its oversimpletonations.  Let's not get addicted to this capsule!
>>> 
>>> A better idea of the rich interplay among the three styles of reasoning
>>> and how they work in tandem to reinforce one another in genuine inquiry
>>> may be had from the study I carried out back when I was working to view
>>> Peirce's theories of inference, information, and inquiry from a systems
>>> analysis perspective on a systems engineering platform.
>>> 
>>> Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy
>>> 
>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 4/12/2016 4:48 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Hi Jon and list,
>>>> How about a test of our understanding?
>>>> If there is one statement that can determine what is meant by Peirce’s
>>>> theory of abduction, then is the following an over or
>>>> under-determination?
>>>> Is it exact and complete?
>>>> Is it perfect?
>>>> Why or why not?
>>>> The surprising fact, C, is observed.
>>>> But if A were true, then C would be a matter of course.
>>>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.  (CP 5.189)
>>>> Best,
>>>> Jerry R
>>>> 
>>>> On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 1:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Inquiry Blog:
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/
>>>>> 
>>>>> Peirce List:
>>>>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569
>>>>> JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18598
>>>>> 
>>>>> Jeff, List,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Let me go back to this point in the discussion and emphasize
>>>>> a few points that appear to have gotten lost in what followed.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I thought my first paragraph made it clear that I would be
>>>>> focusing on “the meaning of determination as it figures in
>>>>> Peirce's definition of a sign relation”.  If I get a chance
>>>>> to revise that second paragraph I'll add a word to reinforce
>>>>> that focus, say, as follows:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce
>>>>>> List, I think the most important and frequently missed point
>>>>>> is that concepts like correspondence and determination in
>>>>>> Peirce['s semiotics] refer to triadic forms of correspondence
>>>>>> and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic
>>>>>> structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Okay, I hope that much is clear now.
>>>>> 
>>>>> By “Peirce's definition of a sign relation” I really mean the
>>>>> select number of his best definitions, not mere descriptions,
>>>>> the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load of
>>>>> a consequential and consistent theory of sign relations.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The best candidates I can think of in that regard
>>>>> are the 2 variants from NEM 4, quoted on this page:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'll have to break here as I've got plumbers coming to fix some pipes
>>>>> ...
>>>>> 
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Jon
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 4/4/2016 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Peircers,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The subject of determination comes up from time to time.
>>>>>> Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected
>>>>>> back when I was first trying to understand the meaning
>>>>>> of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition
>>>>>> of a sign relation.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List,
>>>>>> I think the most important and frequently missed point is that
>>>>>> concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer
>>>>>> to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that
>>>>>> these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic
>>>>>> to the more reductionist paradigms.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including
>>>>>> correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on
>>>>>> all fall under the notion of constraint.  Constraint is present in
>>>>>> a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by
>>>>>> some mark from a larger set of choices.  That mark may distinguish
>>>>>> the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or
>>>>>> any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Jon

-- 

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA


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