Jon S, List,
Jon quoted a snippet of my post and commented.
GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct
bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling
of satisfaction").
[JS] Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of
Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about
NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special
science.
But Peirce explicitly notes that one can loosen the strict rule banishing
psychology from logic in logic's third branch, namely, methodeutic (or
theoretical rhetoric). After all, inquiry is done by individual inquirers
within a community of inquiry, that is by people with psyches. It is they
who have 'feelings' of surprise, doubt, satisfaction, etc.
In any event, since Gary F's post has got me looking at 'The Logic of
Mathematics' again, I found this passage, which I'd more or less forgotten
about, although at one point it was crucial in my thinking about the three
inference patterns. I've added two trikonic diagrams to illustrate two of
the points Peirce makes, especially as regards deduction as you just
brought it up again, Jon.
Peirce writes (CP 1.485):
The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in truth;
the idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought which originally
put them together and recognizes they are together; from whence many things
result, especially a threefold inferential process. . .
*Three elements in truth*:
"The idea or predicate"
|> "The thought which originally put them together"
"The fact or subject"
. . . from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential
process.
[This inferential process] either first follows the order of involution
from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the condition
of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case;
*Deduction* ('order of involution'):
*** finally, to the predication of the idea of the law in that case.
|> * 1st, From the living thought or ruling law,
** then, through the existential case under the condition of the law;
or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of
that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the
condition of the law; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an
existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of
the idea of that law in that case to the living law itself * (CP 1.485)
The asterisk at the end of that quote is to the editorial note: "Cf. 2.620
ff" which is, of course, exactly where the three inference patterns
relating to the bean example are given.
So, for now, and most certainly for deduction, I'm going to stick with
Peirce's analysis in 'The Logic of Mathematics' paper and CP 2.620 ff. I've
had enough of revisionism in that matter at least!
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*
On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 2:16 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
wrote:
> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct
> bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling
> of satisfaction").
>
> Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of
> Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about
> NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special
> science.
>
> I am also wondering if there is a parallel way to describe deduction.
> Maybe something along these lines?
>
> The middle phase of inquiry is deduction, which occurs when a proposed
> belief-habit (3ns) is NOT confounded by any acts of imagination (2ns),
> which produces a feeling of suspicion (1ns).
>
> I am not entirely satisfied with this yet, but the idea is that the
> initial "testing" is virtual, rather than actual; e.g., manipulation of
> diagrams and observation of the results. The Secondness aspect is thus an
> "inward clash," rather than the "Outward Clash" as described by Peirce,
> which pertains to the induction phase. Suspicion here alludes to CP
> 5.189--"Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 12:03 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Jon S wrote:
>>
>> "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief."
>> (CP 5.374)
>>
>> The first phase of inquiry is abduction, which begins when an established
>> habit of expectation (3ns) is confounded by an act of observation (2ns),
>> which produces a feeling of surprise (1ns).
>>
>> The last phase of inquiry is induction, which concludes when a new
>> belief-habit (3ns) is NOT confounded by any acts of observation (2ns),
>> which produces a feeling of satisfaction (1ns).
>>
>>
>> Jon, I like your formulations very much and agree with the associated
>> categories you've provided. I think they clearly express these "phases of
>> inquiry," pointing to, imo, something slightly different, perhaps something
>> deeper in the logic of inquiry than the simple inversions of the deductive
>> syllogism Peirce offers at CP 2.623 (which I still see as valid).
>>
>> At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct bearing
>> on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling of
>> satisfaction").
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>
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