Gary R., List: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an experience that occurs over time.
Regarding CP 1.485, I agree that Peirce presents the first inferential process as Rule/Case/Result (vector of analysis). *Deduction* *** finally, the predication of the idea of the law in that case (1ns). |> * first, living thought or ruling law (3ns); ** then, existential case under the condition of the law (2ns); It appears to me that he then presents the second inferential process as Rule/Result/Case (vector of representation) ... *Abduction* ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case (1ns); |> * first, the living law (3ns); *** finally, the subsumption of that case and the condition of the law (2ns). ... and the third inferential process as Case/Result/Rule (vector of determination). *Induction* ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in that case (1ns); |> *** finally, the living law itself (3ns). * first, the subsumption of an existential case under the condition of a living law (2ns); Is this right? What (if any) significance should we attach to the sequence of the three inferential processes here--first deduction, second abduction, third induction? What (if anything) is incorrect, or at least muddled, if we recast abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process) in accordance with CP 5.189 as compared to CP 2.718? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > Jon quoted a snippet of my post and commented. > > GR: At the moment I am imagining that they might have a rather direct > bearing on the psychology of inquiry ("a feeling of surprise;" "a feeling > of satisfaction"). > > [JS] Does "feeling," understood in this context as a manifestation of > Firstness, entail psychology? Of course, Peirce was very concerned about > NOT grounding any aspect of logic in psychology or any other special > science. > > > But Peirce explicitly notes that one can loosen the strict rule banishing > psychology from logic in logic's third branch, namely, methodeutic (or > theoretical rhetoric). After all, inquiry is done by individual inquirers > within a community of inquiry, that is by people with psyches. It is they > who have 'feelings' of surprise, doubt, satisfaction, etc. > > In any event, since Gary F's post has got me looking at 'The Logic of > Mathematics' again, I found this passage, which I'd more or less forgotten > about, although at one point it was crucial in my thinking about the three > inference patterns. I've added two trikonic diagrams to illustrate two of > the points Peirce makes, especially as regards deduction as you just > brought it up again, Jon. > > Peirce writes (CP 1.485): > > The triadic clause of the law of logic recognizes three elements in truth; > the idea, or predicate, the fact or subject, the thought which originally > put them together and recognizes they are together; from whence many things > result, especially a threefold inferential process. . . > > > *Three elements in truth*: > > "The idea or predicate" > |> "The thought which originally put them together" > "The fact or subject" > > . . . from whence many things result, especially a threefold inferential > process. > > [This inferential process] either first follows the order of involution > from living thought or ruling law, and existential case under the condition > of the law to the predication of the idea of the law in that case; > > > *Deduction* ('order of involution'): > > *** finally, to the predication of the idea of the law in that case. > |> * 1st, From the living thought or ruling law, > ** then, through the existential case under the condition of the law; > > or second, proceeds from the living law and the inherence of the idea of > that law in an existential case, to the subsumption of that case and to the > condition of the law; or third, proceeds from the subsumption of an > existential case under the condition of a living law, and the inherence of > the idea of that law in that case to the living law itself * (CP 1.485) > > > The asterisk at the end of that quote is to the editorial note: "Cf. 2.620 > ff" which is, of course, exactly where the three inference patterns > relating to the bean example are given. > > So, for now, and most certainly for deduction, I'm going to stick with > Peirce's analysis in 'The Logic of Mathematics' paper and CP 2.620 ff. I've > had enough of revisionism in that matter at least! > > Best, > > Gary R >
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