Gary R., List: I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-)
GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to this order. I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches any particular significance to the order of the premisses within each inferential process? Can we take CP 2.623 (1878) to be as authoritative in this regard as the much later NA (1908) with respect to the order of a complete inquiry? Again, what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least muddled, if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process)? Jon S. On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber > symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie > Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now > and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance). > You wrote: > > JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently > associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the > latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an > experience that occurs over time. > > > Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes it > clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but > only suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is > given as an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of > pain (my toothache quite different in character from my backach, for > example). But I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it, > perhaps with some Peircean examples. > > I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post that > you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I believe, > quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of the three > inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of the > principal points I was trying to make. > > As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from 'The > Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any particular > significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the N.A.) follows, > as you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), followed by the > deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, and, finally, > the develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the actual inductive > testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) he gives a > rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much more than > analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's necessary > in critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a complete > inquiry certainly matters. > > Best, > > Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to proof > read this). >
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