Hi Gary, Jon and list, In what sense are you using the term "complete" of *complete inquiry*? That is, are you using it colloquially or are you referring to something that ought to have a technical definition?
Thanks, Jerry R On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jon, list, > > Jon wrote: "I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already > know that you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program." > > Although, surely *de gustibus non est disputandum*, for me, as regards > music of the classical period, Mozart has no peer, and this particular > work, the Great Mass in C-minor, represents for me the highest achievement > in large scale composition for orchestra, chorus, and soloists in any era. > I just mention this because you singled out Mozart in your comment above; > so, FYI, here's an excellent Youtube video of a live performance of the > Massl. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTI_z714dOo > > I will later in this message make a remark about Mozart's approach to > composition which will, hopefully, connect him to some of the issues > brought up in this thread. But returning specifically to the topics of our > recent discussion, you quoted me and commented: > > GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to > this order [he comments on deduction 1st, then abduction, then induction]. > > JS: I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches > any particular significance to the order of the premisses within each > inferential process? > > But to reiterate what I earlier wrote, it seems to me that the reason that > Peirce attaches no particular significance to his analysis of the inference > patterns as analyzed in the passage from 'TLoM' is that he not explicitly > concerned there with methodeutic, specifically, the stages of a complete > inquiry. Rather, his subject is a piece--albeit a rather fundamental one, > imo--of critical logic. > > You also wrote: JS: what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least muddled, > if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process)? > > Jon , I just can't see it your way; believe me, I have tried to, but to > no avail. After decades of reflecting on Peirce's thinking about these > matter, and after (re)reading your various post on the topic, while for me > the *vector of process*, while perfectly expressing the ordering of a > complete inquiry (again, in methodeutic) does not categorially analyze > abductive inference. In short, and I suppose for the umpteeth time, I agree > with Peirce's analyses in those two different passages just mentioned (also > others), that which the CP editors connected in a footnote for a reason. > > In such places he offers abduction as the mirror of deduction, both > inference patterns *commencing at the rule*, deduction following what he > calls the *order of involution* n 'TMoL', abduction moving in the > opposite direction because it merely represents a 'guess', what the > theorist imagines may* possibly* be the rule,* the rule* nonetheless. > So, as you recently diagrammed it. > > JS: It appears to me that he then presents the second inferential process > as Rule/Result/Case (vector of representation) ... > > *Abduction* > > ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case > (1ns); > |> * first, the living law (3ns); > *** finally, the subsumption of that case and the condition of the law > (2ns). > > > What perhaps interests me most especially in this and the 'bean' > formulations of all three inference, and something which I think Peirce has > good reason to rather emphasize, is the *quintessential* importance of > the *rule* in all three patterns. In such diagrams as I've been > concentrating on, each inference either * commences* at the rule > (deduction & abduction) *or* *arrives* at the rule (induction). In your > result/rule/case formulation one merely *passes through* the rule, and I > must admit that that makes no logical sense to me, although I did entertain > it as a possibility for a few weeks after you introduced it as the path > abduction takes. > > Finally, > I promis > > ed to bring Mozart back into the discussion, and so I will > in just a moment. In order to prepare for that, y > ou will recall > that > in > my thought-experiment concerning deduction that > once > my two hands > were thrust > > into the bag of beans > (representing t > he rul > > e), they didn't even need to be removed from the bag for me to > > know that whatever bean sample (case, 2ns) > I > had grabbed would *necessarily* be white > (result/character, 1ns). > > > I then suggested that mirroring this example was the abductive > situation > whereas for whatever *good* reasons, that > I, > the theorist > , > hypothesized that > > the beans in the bag > (again, the rule) > might all be white. As in the deductive example, > my > two hands > were plunged into the bag. But now, unlike the situation of deduction > whereas I didn't even need to remove my hands from the bag and yet could be > certain that they were white, here, for abduction, the experiment *must *be > made. And so I remove my sample of beans to see if they are that which I've > guessed (or, possibly, retroduced) them to be, *possibly *white. Even > then there is no certainty the the entire bag is all which even if this > sample is. More sampling (experimentation) may be needed. > > OK, now, finally, the Mozart example. As I suggested in a recent post, > artists make abductions too and, indeed, there would appear to be an entire > literature growing around that proposition. Now Mozart was rather famous > for conceiving an entire work 'in a flash' and then fleshing it out, or > rather, "getting it down on manuscript paper" after that compositional > flash. There is even one famous story--the details of which I'll probably > get wrong--where Mozart was out at a pubt with some of his Masonic musician > buddies drinking beer and playing cards or darts (or something). A men's > chorus was needed for performance at an installation the next day, so > Mozart conceived that composition on the spot, then, as he continued to > drink and play, he at the same time wrote out all tthe parts (now that's > what I call multi-tasking!) My point is that his is a case of artistic > abduction, yet the rule (the composition) is quite complete, although the > (result/characters--the notes) will have to be set down; when they are > there will exist a completed of music (the case) conceived, however, > all-at-once-together. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> Gary R., List: >> >> I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that >> you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-) >> >> GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to >> this order. >> >> I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches any >> particular significance to the order of the premisses within each >> inferential process? Can we take CP 2.623 (1878) to be as authoritative in >> this regard as the much later NA (1908) with respect to the order of a >> complete inquiry? Again, what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least >> muddled, if we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of >> process)? >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, List, >>> >>> I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber >>> symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie >>> Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now >>> and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance). >>> You wrote: >>> >>> JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently >>> associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the >>> latter? An *actual *emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, >>> an experience that occurs over time. >>> >>> >>> Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes >>> it clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but >>> only suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is >>> given as an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of >>> pain (my toothache quite different in character from my backach, for >>> example). But I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it, >>> perhaps with some Peircean examples. >>> >>> I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post that >>> you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I believe, >>> quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of the three >>> inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of the >>> principal points I was trying to make. >>> >>> As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from 'The >>> Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any particular >>> significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the N.A.) follows, >>> as you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), followed by the >>> deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, and, finally, >>> the develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the actual inductive >>> testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) he gives a >>> rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much more than >>> analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's necessary >>> in critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a complete >>> inquiry certainly matters. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to >>> proof read this). >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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