List: Once again, I will look at the issues from the perspective of the influence of chemical logic on CSP’s writings about logic.
The logic of chemistry demands that from a set of atoms, one constructs a molecule of a specific form that matches the specific properties of the stuff at hand. Further, the stuff at hand must be reducible to the chemical elements from which it was made. Multiple graphs may represent the same set of atoms in different forms (isomers). The consequences of this logic is profound from the perspective of the grammar of symbolic logic. The form of the molecule must be abducted from the situation / circumstances at hand and interpreted in one particular way. The verb for the abductive molecular sentence must be in the optative mood in all cases except for binary compounds since the order of the terms in the identity graph is necessary for the truth of the conclusion. For example, the handedness of Pastuer’s tartartic acid crystals. The abducted form must be reducible to the origin elements by deduction. The abducted form must be synthesized from the elements by induction. Consider the following passage: Abduction merely suggests that something may be. Its only justification is that from its suggestion deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be brought about.4 .171-172 Is this passage consistent with the chemical methodology? Does abduction bind the logic of atoms to the atoms of logic? (And, hence, CSP’s views toward Cantor, Kemp and Russell?) Cheers jerry > On May 14, 2016, at 5:04 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Jon, list, > > Jon wrote: "I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already > know that you will, because a Mozart piece is on the program." > > Although, surely de gustibus non est disputandum, for me, as regards music of > the classical period, Mozart has no peer, and this particular work, the Great > Mass in C-minor, represents for me the highest achievement in large scale > composition for orchestra, chorus, and soloists in any era. I just mention > this because you singled out Mozart in your comment above; so, FYI, here's an > excellent Youtube video of a live performance of the Massl. > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTI_z714dOo > <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTI_z714dOo> > > I will later in this message make a remark about Mozart's approach to > composition which will, hopefully, connect him to some of the issues brought > up in this thread. But returning specifically to the topics of our recent > discussion, you quoted me and commented: > > GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to this > order [he comments on deduction 1st, then abduction, then induction]. > > JS: I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches any > particular significance to the order of the premisses within each > inferential process? > > But to reiterate what I earlier wrote, it seems to me that the reason that > Peirce attaches no particular significance to his analysis of the inference > patterns as analyzed in the passage from 'TLoM' is that he not explicitly > concerned there with methodeutic, specifically, the stages of a complete > inquiry. Rather, his subject is a piece--albeit a rather fundamental one, > imo--of critical logic. > > You also wrote: JS: what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least muddled, if > we instead present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process)? > > Jon , I just can't see it your way; believe me, I have tried to, but to no > avail. After decades of reflecting on Peirce's thinking about these matter, > and after (re)reading your various post on the topic, while for me the vector > of process, while perfectly expressing the ordering of a complete inquiry > (again, in methodeutic) does not categorially analyze abductive inference. In > short, and I suppose for the umpteeth time, I agree with Peirce's analyses in > those two different passages just mentioned (also others), that which the CP > editors connected in a footnote for a reason. > > In such places he offers abduction as the mirror of deduction, both inference > patterns commencing at the rule, deduction following what he calls the order > of involution n 'TMoL', abduction moving in the opposite direction because it > merely represents a 'guess', what the theorist imagines may possibly be the > rule, the rule nonetheless. > So, as you recently diagrammed it. > > JS: It appears to me that he then presents the second inferential process as > Rule/Result/Case (vector of representation) ... > > Abduction > ** then, the inherence of the idea of that law in an existential case (1ns); > |> * first, the living law (3ns); > *** finally, the subsumption of that case and the condition of the law (2ns). > > What perhaps interests me most especially in this and the 'bean' formulations > of all three inference, and something which I think Peirce has good reason to > rather emphasize, is the quintessential importance of the rule in all three > patterns. In such diagrams as I've been concentrating on, each inference > either commences at the rule (deduction & abduction) or arrives at the rule > (induction). In your result/rule/case formulation one merely passes through > the rule, and I must admit that that makes no logical sense to me, although I > did entertain it as a possibility for a few weeks after you introduced it as > the path abduction takes. > > Finally, I promised to bring Mozart back into the discussion, and so I > will in just a moment. In order to prepare for that, you will recall that > in my thought-experiment concerning deduction that once my two hands > were thrust into the bag of beans (representing the rule), they > didn't even need to be removed from the bag for me to know that whatever > bean sample (case, 2ns) I had grabbed would necessarily be white > (result/character, 1ns). > > I then suggested that mirroring this example was the abductive situation > whereas for whatever *good* reasons, that I, the theorist, hypothesized > that the beans in the bag (again, the rule) might all be white. As in the > deductive example, my two hands were plunged into the bag. But now, unlike > the situation of deduction whereas I didn't even need to remove my hands from > the bag and yet could be certain that they were white, here, for abduction, > the experiment must be made. And so I remove my sample of beans to see if > they are that which I've guessed (or, possibly, retroduced) them to be, > possibly white. Even then there is no certainty the the entire bag is all > which even if this sample is. More sampling (experimentation) may be needed. > > OK, now, finally, the Mozart example. As I suggested in a recent post, > artists make abductions too and, indeed, there would appear to be an entire > literature growing around that proposition. Now Mozart was rather famous for > conceiving an entire work 'in a flash' and then fleshing it out, or rather, > "getting it down on manuscript paper" after that compositional flash. There > is even one famous story--the details of which I'll probably get wrong--where > Mozart was out at a pubt with some of his Masonic musician buddies drinking > beer and playing cards or darts (or something). A men's chorus was needed for > performance at an installation the next day, so Mozart conceived that > composition on the spot, then, as he continued to drink and play, he at the > same time wrote out all tthe parts (now that's what I call multi-tasking!) My > point is that his is a case of artistic abduction, yet the rule (the > composition) is quite complete, although the (result/characters--the notes) > will have to be set down; when they are there will exist a completed of music > (the case) conceived, however, all-at-once-together. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 <tel:718%20482-5690> > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > I would express hope that you enjoy the concert, but I already know that you > will, because a Mozart piece is on the program. :-) > > GR: I don't really think Peirce attaches any particular significance to this > order. > > I agree; but that being the case, how sure can we be that he attaches any > particular significance to the order of the premisses within each inferential > process? Can we take CP 2.623 (1878) to be as authoritative in this regard > as the much later NA (1908) with respect to the order of a complete inquiry? > Again, what (if anything) is incorrect, or at least muddled, if we instead > present abduction as Result/Rule/Case (vector of process)? > > Jon S. > > On Fri, May 13, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I'm running off to hear the New Orchestra present one of the chamber > symphonies of Schoenberg and the Great C-minor Mass of Mozart at Carnegie > Hall in a very few minutes, so I'll just drop a comment or two here for now > and try to say more (and add some textual citations when I get a chance). You > wrote: > > JS: Are we perhaps conflating feeling with emotion? Peirce consistently > associates the former with Firstness, but is that appropriate for the latter? > An actual emotion seems more like an example of Secondness, an experience > that occurs over time. > > Peirce offers examples of emotion as examples of 1ns, although he makes it > clear that such examples can never be pure (there are no pure 1nses) but only > suggestive. Even something pain, typically spread out over time, is given as > an example of 1ns, for one can distinguish various qualities of pain (my > toothache quite different in character from my backach, for example). But > I'll have to think more about this and get back to you on it, perhaps with > some Peircean examples. > > I gave only the 1st inference form as a trikonic diagram in my post that > you're responding to, but the others as you diagrammed them are, I believe, > quite correct and not different in order from my diagramming of the three > inference patterns in the bean example. In fact, that's one of the principal > points I was trying to make. > > As for the order of the three inference patterns in my excerpt from 'The > Logic of Mathematics', I don't rea;;u think Peirce attaches any particular > significance to this order. A 'complete inquiry' (as in the N.A.) follows, as > you know, the order abduction (hypothesis formation), followed by the > deduction of the implication of the hypothesis for testing, and, finally, the > develop of a test from that deduction, and finally the actual inductive > testing of the hypothesis. But in the N.A. (and elsewhere) he gives a > rationale for this order, whereas I don't see him doing much more than > analyzing the three patterns in the LofM; and that's all that's necessary in > critical logic, while in methodeutic the precise ordering of a complete > inquiry certainly matters. > > Best, > > Gary R (please forgive any errors in the above as I haven't time to proof > read this). > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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