Jerry R, Gary F, Jon S, list Jerry wrote: "“Agreeing to disagree” is not wise."
I do not necessarily at all agree, especially when a good faith effort has been made to examine the issue as fully as the discussants can at a given time. So, for example, it is sometimes necessary to agree to disagree because a--perhaps temporary--impasse has been reached despite the good faith efforts of both parties to have argued their positions as best they could, while at the same time having generously and respectfully considered the arguments of their interlocutor. I believe that as concerns the current discussion that Jon S and I have done this, and both onlist and off. In addition, sometimes one has to suspend an inquiry for reasons of time constraints, or to do additional research, or for a host of other quite legitimate reasons. If no agreement has been reached at that point, then it makes sense to agree to disagree until the time that the dialogue can again be taken up. So, agreeing to disagree to suspend a discussion at a given point, again, perhaps to take it up again at a later date, perhaps from a somewhat different angle, such as Gary Fuhrman's post today suggest to me (and may have suggested to Jon S), *that* to me would appear to me to be the *wisest* thing to do. By chance, Gary Fuhrman had an additional something relevant to add in his weekly blog post today linking to a passage on his website http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/05/meaning-holism/ which concluded with this astute comment on dialogic. GF: The viable path of discourse or dialog avoids both the obvious and the irrelevant. But then, the various participants in the dialog may differ in their judgments of obviousness and relevance, and no one who has ears to hear will consider his own implicit judgments infallible. Inquiry is ongoing, but it isn't always necessarily continuous in consideration of the progress of any given discourse. Yet, such interruptions can prove valuable as, for example, arguments sink in, new information is gathered, etc. In a word, I think it is unwise to call such, sometimes necessary interruputions, "unwise." Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Sun, May 15, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear list, > > > > “Agreeing to disagree” is not wise. Rather, it is a situation we wish to > avoid. Wisdom has to do with justice, and agreeing to disagree is > against justice because while we do well, we do not fare well. > > > > There appears to be a general problem of not knowing which evidence counts > more than another. > > > > Why not look to Plato for consistency or is it the case that Peirce and > Plato are talking about different things? > > > > "What do you people want of one another?" they would be unable to > explain…human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire > and pursuit of the whole is called *eros*.” (193a) > > > > “First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which > enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the > mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, and the > Third is the conception which is then called for. The Third is that which > bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them > into relationship.” ~Peirce > > > > “I think the second proof can be found in the correspondence between the > basic structure of the tripartite city and the tripartite soul…In each case > the three parts are characterized by three distinctive pleasures and three > distinctive desires or appetites. And they are governed by three > distinctive codes.” (580d) > > > > “Therefore, I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of > semeiotic, and I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as > well as a logic of symbols” ~Peirce > > > > one, two, three…C, A, B…spiritedness, desire, reason…icon, index, symbol. > > > > The surprising fact, icon derived through spiritedness is observed. > > But if index derived from desire is true… > > Hence, there is reason to suspect… > > > > A great and careful writer composed CP 5.189. Why else, then, would he > have chosen these and not other words? Is this, then, the thing that > Peirce has worked out as *a logic of vagueness with something like a > completeness*? > > > > “Then we concluded that the temperate man is one in whom the three > elements are in harmony. There are no quarrels among the parts because > there is agreement among them that the rational element should govern the > whole.” (442c-d). > > > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > On Sun, May 15, 2016 at 9:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon Alan, Gary R and list, >> >> >> >> I think there is an alternative to agreeing to disagree on this question. >> >> >> >> If one thinks of inquiry as a *cycle,* more or less as I’ve presented it >> in *Turning Signs* (especially Chapter 9, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm >> ), then it becomes clear that the choice of starting point of the process >> is somewhat arbitrary, or at least depends on the purpose of the analysis. >> It also becomes clearer that the boundaries of parts of the process are not >> precisely fixed. Does abduction *include* the “surprising fact” which >> calls for a hypothesis to explain it? Does it include the judgment of >> plausibility or testability of the hypothesis? The fact that inquiry >> proceeds in a definite order does not fully determine how we divide it into >> parts or how we name the parts. The *completeness* of a cycle is >> likewise ambiguous, given that it does not stop but continues with another >> cycle, and sometimes the process will ‘loop back’ to an earlier stage >> before proceeding to the next. >> >> >> >> Another question is whether, or to what extent, we see the process of >> artistic creation as similar to the process of scientific inquiry. In the >> case of Mozart, for instance, a particular composition begins not with >> observation of a surprising fact, but with a commission, or some less >> determinate artistic niche to be filled. But in the practice of the artist, >> this too is a cycle: his commissioned work gets performed, the audience >> like what they hear or see, and this attracts more commissions and more >> audiences. Once the cycle is established, it may continue even if parts of >> it are missing — I think Mozart’s last three symphonies were not >> commissioned, but (we might say) resulted from the momentum of his >> creativity. (There’s a possible analogy here to the momentum that carried >> Peirce’s inquiry into the roots of logic in the years after the Cambridge, >> Harvard and Lowell lectures, when his continuing work was providing him >> almost no income.) >> >> >> >> I wouldn’t want to push the analogy between art and inquiry too far, for >> instance into the question of what role deductive inference plays in >> artistic creativity, but I do think this cyclic pattern runs very deep in >> all semiosis and in life itself. (Which reminds me that I first came across >> this pattern and diagram in Robert Rosen’s book *Life Itself* — but >> that’s another story.) >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 14-May-16 23:08 >> *To:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns >> >> >> >> Gary R., List: >> >> >> >> I am probably as big a fan of Mozart's music as there is, but I am >> struggling to understand your assignment of Peirce's inference terminology >> to one of his compositions. Maybe I just need to ponder it for a bit. For >> now, I want to focus on what I think is the crux of our disagreement here. >> >> GR: In such places he offers abduction as the mirror of deduction, both >> inference patterns *commencing at the rule ...* >> >> This is what bothers me, right here--abduction DOES NOT commence at the >> Rule! Rather, per CP 5.189, it commences with the observation of a >> surprising fact--the Result. Only then do we start *searching* for a >> Rule that would explain it when combined with the conjecture that what we >> observed is a Case under that Rule. Peirce's bean example makes this very >> clear--we come upon these white beans on the table, go looking for a bag in >> the room that contains *only* white beans, find one, and guess that >> these beans came from that bag. >> >> >> >> Your alternative bean example, on the other hand, does not fit this >> pattern at all. In fact, it seems much more like induction than abduction >> to me--by taking samples from the bag, you are now *testing* the >> hypothesis that all of the beans in it are white. What surprising fact did >> you observe that prompted this particular conjecture in the first place? >> >> >> >> Admittedly, one reason why I lean toward Result/Rule/Case for abduction >> is because I simply find it more aesthetically satisfying to keep the >> propositions in the same sequence for all three inference forms. If we >> then present them in the order of a complete inquiry, some interesting >> patterns are evident. >> >> >> >> Abduction = Result/Rule/Case >> >> Deduction = Rule/Case/Result >> >> Induction = Case/Result/Rule >> >> >> >> * | Abduction | Deduction | Induction |* >> >> *Abduction | Result | Rule | Case | * >> >> *Deduction | Rule | Case | Result | * >> >> *Induction | Case | Result | Rule | * >> >> >> >> Notice also that each inference form now starts with the proposition that >> has the same categoriality--abduction, Result, 1ns; deduction, Rule, 3ns; >> induction, Case, 2ns. Attributing the same vector to abduction as to a >> complete inquiry makes some sense in light of Phyllis Chiasson's suggestion >> to use the term "retroduction" for the latter, rather than the former ( >> http://www.commens.org/encyclopedia/article/chiasson-phyllis-abduction-aspect-retroduction >> ). >> >> >> >> I am not sure if any of these observations should carry much weight, but >> there they are. Perhaps we will finally just have to agree to disagree. >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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