Dear list members,
here is some thoughts, of which I dont know whether they may help to solve the disagreement, but who knows.
Starting from the form of deduction:
 
Rule: All beans from the bag are white
Case: These beans are from the bag
Result: These beans are white,
 
and turning it into abduction:
 
Result: These beans are white
Rule: All beans from the bag are white
Case: These beans are from the bag,
 
I wonder, if it only then is an abduction, if the last line is (mis)taken for a conclusion of certainty, i.e. is a belief.
But if it is supplemented with a "possibly", like: "Possibly these beans are from the bag"- is it a deduction then? I had tried, but had not managed to show that. Perhaps it would be necessary to say, that the nature of this possibility is not a universal possibility, but a personal one: the person who does the inquiry has reason to guess that the beans are from the bag. But then this personal aspect perhaps should appear in one of the premisses as well, like:
 
Premiss 1: Person "A" sees that these beans are white
Premiss 2: Person "A" knows, that all beans from the bag are white
Conclusion: Person "A" has reason to guess, that these beans are from the bag.
 
Now, to make a deduction with the sequence "Rule-case-result" out of it, the two premisses may either be interchanged, like:
 
Rule: All beans from the bag are white (and Person "A" knows that)
Case: Person "A" (suddenly, surprisedly...) sees, that these beans are white
Result: Person "A" has reason to guess, that these beans are from the bag.
 
Or, "These beans are white" may be regarded as rule, because it is the only universal (nonpersonal) situation/term:
 
Rule: These beans are white
Case: It (suddenly, surprisingly) comes into the mind of person "A", that all beans from the bag are white
Result: Now for person "A", after having looked at the sample of white means, it is possible, that these beans are from the bag.
 
Well, whatever- helpful or confusing this was...
 
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Montag, 16. Mai 2016 um 03:29 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]>
An: [email protected]
Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Gary F., List:
 
Your points are well-taken, especially given my thinking on the "logic of ingenuity" as employed by engineers--where there is a cycle of abduction/deduction/induction (analysis) nested within another (design).  And like artistic creation, engineering does not (usually) begin with the observation of a surprising fact.  What I have posited is that both inquiry and ingenuity are motivated more fundamentally by dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs--doubt in one case, which is resolved by attaining a state of belief; and uncertainty in the other, which is resolved by attaining a state of decision.
 
Regards,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Sun, May 15, 2016 at 9:00 AM, <[email protected]> wrote:

Jon Alan, Gary R and list,

 

I think there is an alternative to agreeing to disagree on this question.

 

If one thinks of inquiry as a cycle, more or less as I’ve presented it in Turning Signs (especially Chapter 9, http://gnusystems.ca/TS/mdl.htm ), then it becomes clear that the choice of starting point of the process is somewhat arbitrary, or at least depends on the purpose of the analysis. It also becomes clearer that the boundaries of parts of the process are not precisely fixed. Does abduction include the “surprising fact” which calls for a hypothesis to explain it? Does it include the judgment of plausibility or testability of the hypothesis? The fact that inquiry proceeds in a definite order does not fully determine how we divide it into parts or how we name the parts. The completeness of a cycle is likewise ambiguous, given that it does not stop but continues with another cycle, and sometimes the process will ‘loop back’ to an earlier stage before proceeding to the next.

 

Another question is whether, or to what extent, we see the process of artistic creation as similar to the process of scientific inquiry. In the case of Mozart, for instance, a particular composition begins not with observation of a surprising fact, but with a commission, or some less determinate artistic niche to be filled. But in the practice of the artist, this too is a cycle: his commissioned work gets performed, the audience like what they hear or see, and this attracts more commissions and more audiences. Once the cycle is established, it may continue even if parts of it are missing — I think Mozart’s last three symphonies were not commissioned, but (we might say) resulted from the momentum of his creativity. (There’s a possible analogy here to the momentum that carried Peirce’s inquiry into the roots of logic in the years after the Cambridge, Harvard and Lowell lectures, when his continuing work was providing him almost no income.)

 

I wouldn’t want to push the analogy between art and inquiry too far, for instance into the question of what role deductive inference plays in artistic creativity, but I do think this cyclic pattern runs very deep in all semiosis and in life itself. (Which reminds me that I first came across this pattern and diagram in Robert Rosen’s book Life Itself — but that’s another story.)

 

Gary f.

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