“In the *1980s*, the study of abduction found a new home in Artificial Intelligence…Abduction has been used in a host of areas such as fault diagnosis…belief revision…as well as scientific discovery, legal reasoning: natural language understanding, and model-based reasoning…
…Gabbay and Woods advance their own formal model of abduction that aims to capture some of the nuances of Peirce’s later account. They treat abduction as a method to solve an ignorance-problem, where the latter is a problem not solvable by presently available cognitive resources. Given a *choice between surrender (leaving the problem unsolved) and subduance (looking for novel cognitive sources)*, Gabbay and Woods promote abduction as a middle way: ignorance is not (fully) removed, but becomes the basis for looking for resources upon which reasoned action can be based…. Circa 1897, Peirce wrote this: *The development of my ideas…but of course it is not I who have to pass judgment. It is not quite you, either, individual reader: it is experience and history (1.12).* Both experience and history have now spoken. Peirce’s theory of abduction still yields fruits and promises good harvests for many years to come.” ~Gabbay and Woods, Handbook of the History of Logic: Inductive Logic Perhaps it’s better for all of us, not as individual readers but as a community, to start with the sign but move to the object once a clear problem of subduance is formulated. But there also ought to be some clear expectation for what is expected of a clear formulation, otherwise, we'll end up having to learn how to put our pants on all over again, every time. Peirce gave us CP 5.189. But we read into it like we read into the gold doubloon. But which is true and relevant? Defining expectations for all who investigate is *hard*, and it must start *here*, at the... Hth, Jerry Rhee On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 10:16 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Gary F., List: > > I suppose that it is possible; I would have to go back and re-read her > paper, then give it some further thought. Inquiry vs. ingenuity is > probably more a difference in emphasis than anything terribly substantive. > > CSP: "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle > to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a > calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to > a belief in anything else." (CP 5.372) > > Peirce seems to be saying here that the *reason* why doubt is an > irritation is *because* it is "an uneasy and dissatisfied state," in > contrast to the "calm and satisfactory state" of belief. This suggests to > me that dissatisfaction is the more fundamental motivation, and > satisfaction is the more fundamental objective. We engage in inquiry > whenever we are dissatisfied with our current knowledge (or lack thereof); > my working hypothesis is that we engage in ingenuity whenever we are > dissatisfied with *any* aspect of the current situation. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, May 18, 2016 at 9:34 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, is it possible that your “logic of ingenuity” is Phyllis Chiasson’s >> “retroduction”? >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
