Clark, list: Here is a nice presentation by Burger that melts into our current problem with no mention of Peirce:
cf., starting at 5:22 and on... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GWaM__oRlA Best, Jerry R On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 3:46 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > Clark, list: > > In your response, there's no mention of the object that is outside of us, > and in my opinion, no respect for what that object can teach us. > > We point but we point at an object. Moreover, we argue over what is > involved in that object, which is outside us. The goal is to come to a > complete agreement about what we say that object is and whether our > conception is actually that object. > > How about the case of the copula, then. If it is simply that the > copula = Being, then what constitutes that moment, that absolute moment, > when we all agree that the concept = the real; > when *ens necessarium* = *ens realissimum*? > > "The word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable > proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*[1] > <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God#cite_note-1>; > in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.” ~Peirce > > > > “God is the supremely good and all-powerful > will that guarantees the realization of the highest good. The ens > realissimum now becomes the summum bonum, its nature and will are > determined by the moral law, which for that very reason is referred to it > as law giver and judge.” > > ~ Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine > > > From what I see, we're at a stage where the conditions for coming to > agreement is so ambiguous, things appear hopeless. Yet, the prescription > appears to be maxims of pragmaticism. So, how do you use that? > > > Also, if the question/problem is being treated as some general only, then > it shouldn't matter the context. The generals should suffice. Does it? > > > Best, > > Jerry R > > PS. I just discovered this manuscript, "Reason’s Rules", transcribed by > Miguel > Ángel Fernández. > > > > http://www.unav.es/gep/ReasonRules599.html > > > > Included are some very nice treatments of distinctions between icon, index > and logic. Together, they confirm what you say. They illustrate the > inherent difficulty of discussing hierarchical complexity using only > generals. > > > > “An *icon* is a pure image, not necessarily visual. Being a pure image it > involves no profession of being a sign; because such profession would be a > sign not of the nature of an image. There is no known cause making it an > image of its object; for if there were it would in part have a significant > character of the Indexical type. I take ship and sail into the tropics for > the first time… > > > > It will be observed that an *Icon* represents whatever *object* it may > represent by virtue of its own quality, and determines whatever > interpretant it may determine by virtue of its own quality; while an > *Index* represents its object by virtue of a real relation with it and > determines whatever interpretant may be in a real relation with it and the > object. A *Symbol *differs from both of those types of sign inasmuch as > it represents its object solely by virtue of being represented to represent > it by the interpretant which it determines.” > > > > > > > On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 2:11 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On Jun 21, 2016, at 12:47 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> You said, "If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via >> icons." >> >> What, then, distinguishes indices from icons in a context for logic of >> indices? >> _______ >> >> Does, then, a logic of icons work via indices? The question naturally >> follows, what distinguishes icons from indices in a context for logic of >> icons? >> >> >> Again I’m not quite sure what you’re asking. Could you be more specific >> about context? I think the answer depends upon the type of analysis you are >> doing. >> >> To the degree an icon involves similarity there’s a sort of indexical >> relationship. (Both objects can be taken in a derived fashion as pointing >> to each other) But when you ask about logic you’re asking about something >> more specific that that I assume. It’s important to keep in mind the icons >> and indices are both types of signs. >> >> Are you speaking with your question to the context of “On the Algebra of >> Logic”? >> >> My sense is that we have to apply the pragmatic maxim to understand these >> questions. To ask what distinguishes icons from indexes we must ask how >> we’d measure such differences. There it seems to me the answer is one works >> by resemblance relative to some quality whereas the other works by >> directing us (either directly such as with a gesture or indirectly). Now as >> soon as we start talking about indirect indices then of course things get >> complex quickly. However the basic difference we are keeping at hand seems >> to be the difference between resemblance and pointing/gesturing. >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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