> On Jun 13, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > <[email protected]> wrote: > > The recent mention by Clark of Parker’s book, “Continuity…” > re-opens the question of how Parker categorized CSP’s writings. > > Of particular interest is Parker’s division of the three periods of meanings: > Fig. 6.2: 1865-1885 > Fig. 6.3: 1885-1902 > Fig. 6.4: 1902-1914 > > in relation to CSP's conceptualization of the meaning of logic. > > In particular, Parker’s separation of the logic of the semeiotic into: > > The logic of icons > The logic of indices > The logic of symbols. > > My questions are: > > How do Parker's separation of the forms of CSP logics relate to FS's views of > Natural Propositions? > > Can one find an illation between Parker’s reading of CSP and FS’s reading of > CSP’s propositional functions?
My apologies on not having time to comment on this after you asked. Hopefully tonight (knock on wood). To your point about propositional functions, do you mean rhemes in Peirce’s 10 fold taxonomy of signs? I just wanted to be clear what you mean. That is rereading your question I confess I’m not quite sure what you’re asking. (Undoubtedly my fault but it’d be nice if you could flesh this out a bit) If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via icons. If I understand what FS was getting at he was primarily focused on propositions which in Peirce’s terminology was dicisigns not rhemes. Now all of these are part of the class of legisigns. Getting back to the distinction between KP and FS I wonder if this is tied to the two different taxonomy Peirce uses of signs (10 in some places, 27 in others). Quoting from Parker’s The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought (157) he quotes Peirce about this distinction: > Any sign involves some combination of object, representamen, and interpretant > in one relation. If all combinations were possible, we would obtain > twenty-seven classes of signs from the three trichotomies . . . However, not > all combinations of object, representamen, and interpretant are possible. The > nature of the object limits the kind of representatmen that may possibly > represent it, and the nature of the representamen limits limits the kind of > object it may represent to an interpretant (CP 8.177) [,,,] In short, there > are rules limiting the combination of object, representamen, and > interpretant. A /possible/ can determine nothing but a /possible/ and a > /general/ can be determined by nothing but a /general/. Parker mentions CP 2.235-7 which says the following: > We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any > triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is > regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of > the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that > nature. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of > the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and > not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. The Second > Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling > complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either > mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is > of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the > Second Correlate is an actual existence. Triadic relations are in three ways > divisible by trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third > Correlate, respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. > These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into > ten classes. These ten classes will have certain subdivisions according as > the existent correlates are individual subjects or individual facts, and > according as the correlates that are laws are general subjects, general modes > of fact, or general modes of law. Again I confess I’m not entirely sure if this answers your question though. I think we have to keep clear what we’re talking about and without your referring to clearer issues in KP or FS it’s hard to say much. I think we have to distinguish between the 9 sign types, 10 sign classes, or (later and more controversially) expanded 66 classes of signs. My experience is that so long as we’re clear and unpack what we’re talking about there’s little chance for error. It’s when we don’t make explicit what we’re talking about that confusion can pop up. Not a criticism of you mind you — I’d be a hypocrite were I to complain. Just something I’ve found in my own errors. I know rhemes and propositional functions were part of prior discussions about the semiotics of chemistry but I have to confess I didn’t have time to follow that discussion closely. My guess is that what’s going on is a confusion between sign taxonomies and which are rhemes. In particular I think FS’ book does a good job showing that certain types/classes of signs are themselves made up functionally of fairly complex relationships of signs. Again the dicisign is a great example of this.
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