Jeff, List: Thank you very much for your thoughtful. It is a fruitful synthesis of many strands of reasoning and I appreciate your efforts in seeking a coherent perspective of CSP’s writings in relation to Parker’s writings.
I am still processing you comments and will respond if anything of general significance arise. I remain deeply puzzled with respect to the nature of the proper form of the propositional functions of Russell and Whitehead. Cheers Jerry > On Jun 17, 2016, at 5:41 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hello, > > Unlike Jerry R. and Kristi, I find Peirce's lifelong efforts to develop a > classification of signs to be a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. In any > area of inquiry (e.g., chemistry, biology, psychology) it will be quite > difficult to provide any sort of adequate account of the laws governing the > phenomena in the absence of a sufficiently developed natural classification > of the different kinds of things that constitute the objects of inquiry. What > is true for each of the special sciences is especially true when it comes to > the normative science of logic as semiotic. Prior to Peirce's groundbreaking > work in logic, we really didn't have an adequate account of the laws that > govern synthetic forms of inference--or of the inter-relationships between > synthetic inference patterns and the different forms of deductive inference. > > The division between the main areas of study in the theory of semiotics is, > on Peirce's account, based on the following: > > Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and especially > of Symbols. As such, it has three departments. Obsistent logic, logic in the > narrow sense, or Critical Logic, is the theory of the general conditions of > the reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, > it is the theory of the conditions of truth. Originalian logic, or > Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general conditions of symbols and > other signs having the significant character. It is this department of > general logic with which we are, at this moment, occupying ourselves. > Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what > goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. It is the > doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other > Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. . . ." (CP, 2.93) > > So, for the sake of clarity, let's note that each of the three main areas of > semiotics is focused on a different set of questions: > > 1. Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general conditions of symbols > and other signs having the significant character. > 2. Critical Logic is the theory of the general conditions of the reference of > Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, it is the theory > of the conditions of truth. > 3. Speculative Rhetoric is the doctrine of the general conditions of the > reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to > determine. > > For the sake of providing a more adequate account of the laws governing > abductive, inductive and deductive patterns of inference, Peirce thought that > he needed a considerably richer classification of the different kinds of > signs that function as the parts of those different patterns of inference. A > cursory look at the different theories of logic that have dominated the > philosophical discussion in the 20th century strongly confirms, I believe, > the need for a more robust classification of signs based on the nature of the > signs, objects and interpretants that function in different sorts of > inference patterns--and the different sorts of relations that hold between > those signs, objects and interpretants. > > Jerry C. has asked a set of questions about the relations that hold between > Peirce's division between icon, index and symbol, and his account of the > proposition. He finds it puzzling that Parker suggests there is a different > sort of logic that holds for the icon, and another that holds for indices and > another that holds for symbols--and he doesn't see how these three sorts of > "logics" might be mapped onto the interpretation of the proposition that > Stjernfelt provides in Natural Propositions. > > Let us recall that, on the one hand, the division between icon, index and > symbol is based on the relations between signs and the dynamical objects. On > the other hand, the division between rheme, dicisign and argument is based > on the relations between signs and their normal interpretants. Peirce makes > it clear in a number of places (e.g., Nomenclature and Division of Triadic > Relations) that the tri-fold divisions in the classification of signs is > grounded on the differences between signs, objects and interpretants (or the > things to which they refer) having the character of possibilities, > actualities or necessities. > > So, to simplify matters, let's consider the 10-fold classification of signs > that Peirce provides in the essay mentioned above, and let's focus on the > most straightforward cases where the three correlates in the sign relations > are all possibilities, and where they are all actualities, and where they are > all necessities. In these three simplest cases, we have the following > division: > > 1. The three correlates are all possibilities: qualisign, icon, rheme > 2. The three correlates are all actualities: sinsign, index, dicisign > 3. The three correlates are all necessities: legisign, symbol, argument > > One of the really helpful things that Peirce suggests is that we can think of > these three sorts of cases (1, 2, 3) as being three "strata," (i.e., layers > or levels) of relations. (CP 2.94) > > This doesn't provide any kind of full answer to the question that Jerry C. > has raised, but I think that a fuller answer can be fleshed out by > considering more of the relations that Peirce works out in the larger 66-fold > classification of signs. If we keep the idea of the three strata as a kind > of guiding figure, then we can consider the different sorts of assurance that > are provided in various sorts of inferences. Some inferences are > self-controlled arguments, and the assurance in the triadic relation is a > matter of form. Other inferences lack such self-control, and the assurance > in the triadic relation is a matter of experience. Yet other inferences are > still less self-controlled, and the assurance in the triadic relation is a > matter of instinct. If we line this division between the types of assurance > up with the 3 strata in the relations between signs, objects and > interpretants, then we'll see that assurance of instinct belongs on the level > of possibility, the assurance of experience belongs on the level of > actuality, and the assurance of form belongs on the level of necessity. > > So, the more direct answer to Jerry's C. questions is that Kelly Parker's > remarks about the "logic of icons," "logic of indices" and "logic of symbols" > is better (because it is more complete) thought of as three levels of sign > relations, where the iconic sort of relation that holds between sign and > object is assured--in its relationships to the normal interpretant--by a > matter of instinct, whereas the indexical sort of relation is assured by a > matter of experience, and whereas the symbol sort of relation is assured by a > matter of form. > > This, I think, gets a the heart of Peirce's aim in providing a more general > theory of what is really necessary for different sorts of signs to function > in valid inference patterns. His aim is to see what kind of logic might hold > when we move from the relatively straightforward and clear case of the level > of necessities (3 above) to the levels of actualities and possibilities. The > tricky part comes in when we need to consider all the relations (e.g., of > determination, or of representation) that hold between the three levels. > > Hope that helps. > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > From: Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> > Sent: Friday, June 17, 2016 1:38 PM > To: Jerry LR Chandler > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's > categories of Logic > > Sounds good Jerry C. > > I will simply leave you with: > > "I have never found divisions of signs (trichotomies) of much use. And I > cannot see how they could work with proposisional functions. So I cannot be > of help in your questions. > Kirsti" > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 3:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jerry R: > > Thank you for your thoughts. > > We seem to operate on different wave lengths. > > The purpose of poising a specific question was to seek specific suggestions. > > As I understand your approach, you appear to have a well-honed set of > philosophical generalities which are, for your purposes, applicable > universally. > > So, I suggest we not waste list-reader’s time and close out this thread. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > >> On Jun 17, 2016, at 3:22 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Jerry C, list: >> >> The propositional functions are embedded but you have to recognize the >> beauty to induce the labor. >> >> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number >> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them? >> Yes.” ~Republic >> >> “This difficulty is to some extent overcome by the fact that one virtue is >> the highest, and that virtue is called knowledge or science… by conceiving >> of knowledge as the calculation of pleasures. We all seek only pleasure, >> that is the assumption. We want a maximum of pleasure without any moral >> conversion, merely by greater shrewdness and calculation, i.e., by greater >> intelligence, by science, a calculus of pleasures. This is the theme of the >> Protagoras.” >> ~Leo Strauss on Plato’s Symposium >> >> one, two, three…love of honor, love of goodness, love of truth…logic of >> icon, logic of index, logic of symbol… >> >> Hth, >> Jerry Rhee >> >> On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jerry R: >> >> >>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 11:47 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Does this qualify? >>> >>> C = phi spiral and not M51, poet, promise >>> A = FEM model and not Netlogo, scientist, >>> performance >>> B = Structural optimization of corneal stroma, philosopher, truth >>> >> >> Your attempts to decipher the meaning of this critical logic term by >> throwing conjectures at it are a most unusual approach, to say the least. >> >> May I suggest you take a day or two and study the origin and meaning of the >> term “propositional function”? Such a study could add substantially to your >> understanding of your own work. >> >> Cheers >> Jerry C. >> >> >> >>> Best, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Hi Jerry R: >>>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 1:57 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I've never read FS but if the question is what is it that is being >>>> interpreted by two different interpreters for that which is claimed to be >>>> different but assumed to belong to the same whole, then you ought to >>>> consider the following from Strauss, Bloom and Benardete: >>>> >>> >>> >>> Thank you for considering the query. >>> >>> But, that is not my question. >>> >>> I seek a premise, a propositional function. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. 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More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >> >> >> >> > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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