Clark, list: In your response, there's no mention of the object that is outside of us, and in my opinion, no respect for what that object can teach us.
We point but we point at an object. Moreover, we argue over what is involved in that object, which is outside us. The goal is to come to a complete agreement about what we say that object is and whether our conception is actually that object. How about the case of the copula, then. If it is simply that the copula = Being, then what constitutes that moment, that absolute moment, when we all agree that the concept = the real; when *ens necessarium* = *ens realissimum*? "The word "God," so "capitalised" (as we Americans say), is *the* definable proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*[1] <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God#cite_note-1>; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience.” ~Peirce “God is the supremely good and all-powerful will that guarantees the realization of the highest good. The ens realissimum now becomes the summum bonum, its nature and will are determined by the moral law, which for that very reason is referred to it as law giver and judge.” ~ Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine From what I see, we're at a stage where the conditions for coming to agreement is so ambiguous, things appear hopeless. Yet, the prescription appears to be maxims of pragmaticism. So, how do you use that? Also, if the question/problem is being treated as some general only, then it shouldn't matter the context. The generals should suffice. Does it? Best, Jerry R PS. I just discovered this manuscript, "Reason’s Rules", transcribed by Miguel Ángel Fernández. http://www.unav.es/gep/ReasonRules599.html Included are some very nice treatments of distinctions between icon, index and logic. Together, they confirm what you say. They illustrate the inherent difficulty of discussing hierarchical complexity using only generals. “An *icon* is a pure image, not necessarily visual. Being a pure image it involves no profession of being a sign; because such profession would be a sign not of the nature of an image. There is no known cause making it an image of its object; for if there were it would in part have a significant character of the Indexical type. I take ship and sail into the tropics for the first time… It will be observed that an *Icon* represents whatever *object* it may represent by virtue of its own quality, and determines whatever interpretant it may determine by virtue of its own quality; while an *Index* represents its object by virtue of a real relation with it and determines whatever interpretant may be in a real relation with it and the object. A *Symbol *differs from both of those types of sign inasmuch as it represents its object solely by virtue of being represented to represent it by the interpretant which it determines.” On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 2:11 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Jun 21, 2016, at 12:47 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > > You said, "If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via > icons." > > What, then, distinguishes indices from icons in a context for logic of > indices? > _______ > > Does, then, a logic of icons work via indices? The question naturally > follows, what distinguishes icons from indices in a context for logic of > icons? > > > Again I’m not quite sure what you’re asking. Could you be more specific > about context? I think the answer depends upon the type of analysis you are > doing. > > To the degree an icon involves similarity there’s a sort of indexical > relationship. (Both objects can be taken in a derived fashion as pointing > to each other) But when you ask about logic you’re asking about something > more specific that that I assume. It’s important to keep in mind the icons > and indices are both types of signs. > > Are you speaking with your question to the context of “On the Algebra of > Logic”? > > My sense is that we have to apply the pragmatic maxim to understand these > questions. To ask what distinguishes icons from indexes we must ask how > we’d measure such differences. There it seems to me the answer is one works > by resemblance relative to some quality whereas the other works by > directing us (either directly such as with a gesture or indirectly). Now as > soon as we start talking about indirect indices then of course things get > complex quickly. However the basic difference we are keeping at hand seems > to be the difference between resemblance and pointing/gesturing. > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
