Clark, list: You said, "If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via icons."
What, then, distinguishes indices from icons in a context for logic of indices? _______ Does, then, a logic of icons work via indices? The question naturally follows, what distinguishes icons from indices in a context for logic of icons? _______ Can we expect a solution/consensus agreement to such questions by talking strictly in general terms? Best, J On Tue, Jun 21, 2016 at 1:06 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Jun 13, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < > [email protected]> wrote: > > The recent mention by Clark of Parker’s book, “Continuity…” > re-opens the question of how Parker categorized CSP’s writings. > > Of particular interest is Parker’s division of the three periods of > meanings: > Fig. 6.2: 1865-1885 > Fig. 6.3: 1885-1902 > Fig. 6.4: 1902-1914 > > in relation to CSP's conceptualization of the meaning of logic. > > In particular, Parker’s separation of the logic of the semeiotic into: > > The logic of icons > The logic of indices > The logic of symbols. > > My questions are: > > How do Parker's separation of the forms of CSP logics relate to FS's views > of Natural Propositions? > > Can one find an illation between Parker’s reading of CSP and FS’s reading > of CSP’s propositional functions? > > > My apologies on not having time to comment on this after you asked. > Hopefully tonight (knock on wood). > > To your point about propositional functions, do you mean rhemes in > Peirce’s 10 fold taxonomy of signs? I just wanted to be clear what you > mean. That is rereading your question I confess I’m not quite sure what > you’re asking. (Undoubtedly my fault but it’d be nice if you could flesh > this out a bit) > > If I understand Peirce, then the logic of indices works via icons. > > If I understand what FS was getting at he was primarily focused on > propositions which in Peirce’s terminology was dicisigns not rhemes. Now > all of these are part of the class of legisigns. > > Getting back to the distinction between KP and FS I wonder if this is tied > to the two different taxonomy Peirce uses of signs (10 in some places, 27 > in others). Quoting from Parker’s *The Continuity of Peirce’s Thought *(157) > he > quotes Peirce about this distinction: > > Any sign involves some combination of object, representamen, and > interpretant in one relation. If all combinations were possible, we would > obtain twenty-seven classes of signs from the three trichotomies . . . > However, not all combinations of object, representamen, and interpretant > are possible. The nature of the object limits the kind of representatmen > that may possibly represent it, and the nature of the representamen limits > limits the kind of object it may represent to an interpretant (CP 8.177) > [,,,] In short, there are rules limiting the combination of object, > representamen, and interpretant. A /possible/ can determine nothing but a > /possible/ and a /general/ can be determined by nothing but a /general/. > > > Parker mentions CP 2.235-7 which says the following: > > We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any > triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is > regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of > the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of > that nature. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded > as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a > law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that > nature. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as > of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to > being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the > Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of > different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. Triadic > relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as the > First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere > possibility, an actual existent, or a law. These three trichotomies, taken > together, divide all triadic relations into ten classes. These ten classes > will have certain subdivisions according as the existent correlates are > individual subjects or individual facts, and according as the correlates > that are laws are general subjects, general modes of fact, or general modes > of law. > > > Again I confess I’m not entirely sure if this answers your question > though. I think we have to keep clear what we’re talking about and without > your referring to clearer issues in KP or FS it’s hard to say much. I think > we have to distinguish between the 9 sign types, 10 sign classes, or (later > and more controversially) expanded 66 classes of signs. My experience is > that so long as we’re clear and unpack what we’re talking about there’s > little chance for error. It’s when we don’t make explicit what we’re > talking about that confusion can pop up. Not a criticism of you mind you — > I’d be a hypocrite were I to complain. Just something I’ve found in my own > errors. > > I know rhemes and propositional functions were part of prior discussions > about the semiotics of chemistry but I have to confess I didn’t have time > to follow that discussion closely. My guess is that what’s going on is a > confusion between sign taxonomies and which are rhemes. In particular I > think FS’ book does a good job showing that certain types/classes of signs > are themselves made up functionally of fairly complex relationships of > signs. Again the dicisign is a great example of this. > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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