Gary F., List: JS: For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. Is that right?
GF: I don’t think so. In that case, is it the other way around--the Dynamic Object is a virtual Immediate Object? Or is there no connection between "virtually contained" in this context and Peirce's dictionary definition of "virtual"? GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? Are we using "determine" in two different senses here? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 9:20 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, regarding your question — > > [ My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's > dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains > Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an > X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is > not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, > so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. > Is that right? ] > > > > I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — > (as in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the > Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the > specific example that Peirce gave in a 1909 letter to James is a good test > case for applying these terminologies: > > > > [[ suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she > wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* is a sign, > whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose > Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived from > peeping between the window-curtains.* Whose Interpretant, as expressed, > is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is *my > answering her question.* But beyond that, there is a *third* > Interpretant. The *Immediate Interpretant* is what the Question > expresses, *all* that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly > restated above. The *Dynamical Interpretant* is the actual effect that it > has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the *Ultimate,* > or *Final, Interpretant* is her *purpose* in asking it, what effect its > answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us > suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate > Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to > her mind and mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. > The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* > meteorological conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is > the *schema* in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in > common to the different Images of a stormy day. The *Dynamical > Interpretant* is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once > has upon her. The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of the *Lessons* of the > reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. ]] > > > > “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE > objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they > lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] > *Sent:* 25-Aug-16 08:48 > *To:* CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > > > Clark, List: > > CG: Since the semiotic process is continuous there’s virtuality all the > way back. > > > > JS: Just to confirm--is that a "yes" to my question, "Would it then be > accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the Immediate > Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which virtually contains the > Immediate Intepretant, which virtually contains the Dynamic Interpretant, > which virtually contains the Final Interpretant?" > > > > CG: Yes exactly. Any step in the semiotic chain going forward is > contained virtually in what came before. > > Thanks for the confirmation. This seems to indicate that "virtually > contains" is a synonym (or at least an aspect) of "determines" in this > context. If X determines Y, then X virtually contains Y. > > > > My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's > dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains > Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an > X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is > not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, > so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. > Is that right? > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
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