Jeff, List: I must confess that I have never found the passage that Gary F. quoted very helpful in understanding the two Objects and three Interpretants. In fact, I find myself disagreeing with aspects of Peirce's own analysis, which worries me very much! For example, how can "disappointment" (Dynamic Interpretant) *determine *"the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc." (Final Interpretant)?
Thanks, Jon On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 10:29 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Gary F., List, > > Jon asks: How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine > signs" if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? > > In response, I think it might help to notice that Gary F did not say the > immediate object lacks the efficiency to determine the sign. An immediate > object might determine a sign in some respects, but still fail to "determine > the signs to informed interpretants." I'll let Gary F decide whether or not > he wants to spell out what he means by an informed interpretant. For my > part, I think following passage, while rather challenging to > interpret, might help a bit: > > "Two terms may be equal in their substantial breadth and depth, and differ in > their essential breadth and depth. But two terms cannot have relations of > substantial breadth and depth which are unknown in the state of > information supposed, because in that state of information everything is > known. In informed breadth and depth, two terms may be equal, and may > have unknown relations. Any term, affirmative or negative, universal or > particular, may have informed breadth or depth." (CP 2.416-7) > > In determining the sign to the "informed interpretant," I wonder what role > the immediate object has in determining the relation between the sign and > the immediate, dynamical and the normal interpretants. Notice that in the > passage Gary F. has quoted, Peirce says: "The *Immediate Interpretant* is > the *schema* in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in > common to the different Images of a stormy day. The *Dynamical > Interpretant* is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once > has upon her. The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of the *Lessons* of the > reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. ]]." > > This presents us with a number of interesting questions. The one that > catches my attention is: how can an immediate object determine a sign so > that it is sufficient to determine the *schema* that Mrs. Peirce has > formed in her imagination. On Peirce's account, this schema in the > imagination has the character of a skeleton set (i.e. something like a kind > of graph consisting of spots, branches and links). How can such a schema be > sufficiently determined by the immediate object and sign that it, in turn > can sufficiently determine the dynamical interpretant--and so on down the > pathways of determination in the process of semiosis that we are able > to arrive, finally, at something that looks like an adequate answer to the > initial question: "What sort of day is it?" > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 25, 2016 8:04 AM > *To:* Gary Fuhrman > *Cc:* Peirce-L > > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > Gary F., List: > > JS: For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has > the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic > Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. Is that right? > > GF: I don’t think so. > > > In that case, is it the other way around--the Dynamic Object is a virtual > Immediate Object? Or is there no connection between "virtually contained" > in this context and Peirce's dictionary definition of "virtual"? > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE > objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they > lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. > > > How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if > it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? Are we > using "determine" in two different senses here? > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 9:20 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon, regarding your question — >> >> [ My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's >> dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains >> Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an >> X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is >> not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, >> so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. >> Is that right? ] >> >> >> >> I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — >> (as in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the >> Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the >> specific example that Peirce gave in a 1909 letter to James is a good test >> case for applying these terminologies: >> >> >> >> [[ suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards >> she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* is a sign, >> whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose >> Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived from >> peeping between the window-curtains.* Whose Interpretant, as expressed, >> is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is *my >> answering her question.* But beyond that, there is a *third* >> Interpretant. The *Immediate Interpretant* is what the Question >> expresses, *all* that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly >> restated above. The *Dynamical Interpretant* is the actual effect that >> it has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the >> *Ultimate,* or *Final, Interpretant* is her *purpose* in asking it, what >> effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, >> let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate >> Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to >> her mind and mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. >> The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity* of the actual and *Real* >> meteorological conditions at the moment. The *Immediate Interpretant* is >> the *schema* in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is >> in common to the different Images of a stormy day. The *Dynamical >> Interpretant* is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once >> has upon her. The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of the *Lessons* of >> the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. ]] >> >> >> >> “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, >> because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without >> being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE >> objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they >> lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]] >> *Sent:* 25-Aug-16 08:48 >> *To:* CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and >> Determination/Causation >> >> >> >> Clark, List: >> >> CG: Since the semiotic process is continuous there’s virtuality all the >> way back. >> >> >> >> JS: Just to confirm--is that a "yes" to my question, "Would it then be >> accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the Immediate >> Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which virtually contains the >> Immediate Intepretant, which virtually contains the Dynamic Interpretant, >> which virtually contains the Final Interpretant?" >> >> >> >> CG: Yes exactly. Any step in the semiotic chain going forward is >> contained virtually in what came before. >> >> Thanks for the confirmation. This seems to indicate that "virtually >> contains" is a synonym (or at least an aspect) of "determines" in this >> context. If X determines Y, then X virtually contains Y. >> >> >> >> My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's >> dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains >> Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an >> X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is >> not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, >> so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. >> Is that right? >> >> >> >> Regards, >> >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >
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