Jon, Gary F., List,
Jon asks: How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? In response, I think it might help to notice that Gary F did not say the immediate object lacks the efficiency to determine the sign. An immediate object might determine a sign in some respects, but still fail to "determine the signs to informed interpretants." I'll let Gary F decide whether or not he wants to spell out what he means by an informed interpretant. For my part, I think following passage, while rather challenging to interpret, might help a bit: "Two terms may be equal in their substantial breadth and depth, and differ in their essential breadth and depth. But two terms cannot have relations of substantial breadth and depth which are unknown in the state of information supposed, because in that state of information everything is known. In informed breadth and depth, two terms may be equal, and may have unknown relations. Any term, affirmative or negative, universal or particular, may have informed breadth or depth." (CP 2.416-7) In determining the sign to the "informed interpretant," I wonder what role the immediate object has in determining the relation between the sign and the immediate, dynamical and the normal interpretants. Notice that in the passage Gary F. has quoted, Peirce says: "The Immediate Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. The Dynamical Interpretant is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her. The Final Interpretant is the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. ]]." This presents us with a number of interesting questions. The one that catches my attention is: how can an immediate object determine a sign so that it is sufficient to determine the schema that Mrs. Peirce has formed in her imagination. On Peirce's account, this schema in the imagination has the character of a skeleton set (i.e. something like a kind of graph consisting of spots, branches and links). How can such a schema be sufficiently determined by the immediate object and sign that it, in turn can sufficiently determine the dynamical interpretant--and so on down the pathways of determination in the process of semiosis that we are able to arrive, finally, at something that looks like an adequate answer to the initial question: "What sort of day is it?" --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 8:04 AM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Gary F., List: JS: For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. Is that right? GF: I don’t think so. In that case, is it the other way around--the Dynamic Object is a virtual Immediate Object? Or is there no connection between "virtually contained" in this context and Peirce's dictionary definition of "virtual"? GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. How can the Immediate Object "lack the efficiency to determine signs" if it is precisely the Immediate Object that determines the Sign? Are we using "determine" in two different senses here? Thanks, Jon On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 9:20 AM, <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, regarding your question — [ My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. Is that right? ] I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — (as in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the specific example that Peirce gave in a 1909 letter to James is a good test case for applying these terminologies: [[ suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” This is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains. Whose Interpretant, as expressed, is the quality of the weather, but whose Dynamical Interpretant, is my answering her question. But beyond that, there is a third Interpretant. The Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it immediately expresses, which I have imperfectly restated above. The Dynamical Interpretant is the actual effect that it has upon me, its interpreter. But the Significance of it, the Ultimate, or Final, Interpretant is her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day. I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the character of it, but the identity of it. The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment. The Immediate Interpretant is the schema in her imagination, i.e. the vague Image or what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day. The Dynamical Interpretant is the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her. The Final Interpretant is the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. ]] “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE objects (they are what the interlocutors are paying attention to) but they lack the efficiency to determine the signs to informed interpretants. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>] Sent: 25-Aug-16 08:48 To: CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Cc: Peirce-L <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Clark, List: CG: Since the semiotic process is continuous there’s virtuality all the way back. JS: Just to confirm--is that a "yes" to my question, "Would it then be accurate to say that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, which virtually contains the Sign, which virtually contains the Immediate Intepretant, which virtually contains the Dynamic Interpretant, which virtually contains the Final Interpretant?" CG: Yes exactly. Any step in the semiotic chain going forward is contained virtually in what came before. Thanks for the confirmation. This seems to indicate that "virtually contains" is a synonym (or at least an aspect) of "determines" in this context. If X determines Y, then X virtually contains Y. My next question is how to translate this adverbial form into Peirce's dictionary definition of the adjective "virtual." If X virtually contains Y, is it then proper to say that Y is a virtual X--i.e., that Y is not an X, but has the efficiency of an X? For example, the Immediate Object is not a Dynamic Object, but it has the efficiency of a Dynamic Object; it is, so to speak, a virtual Dynamic Object, or perhaps just a virtual Object. Is that right? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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