My outline of the same situation brings in the categories, where
1) The Dynamic Object is the existential nature of the weather - which
interacts with my eyes [both are dynamic objects]; both are interacting in the
Mode of Secondness [as well as the other two categories..or there would be no
such thing as 'weather' or 'eyes'].
2) The Immediate Object would be my internal sensation of feeling the impact of
this data-So, it operates in a degenerate Secondness [in a mode of 2-1).
3) This feeling is then transformed by the Representamen - operating in all
three modes of Thirdness -3-3 [my learned memory of weather], 3-2 [my
anticipation of truth], 3-1 [the commonality of awareness of the
situation])...and I come up with an internal Immediate Interpretant or specific
consciousness of non-verbalized 'cloudiness'...
4) which is then articulated, [using the norms of my language -3-3] as the word
'cloudy' as the Dynamic Interpretant - which is in a mode of Secondness in
itself as a word or symbol to attach to that Dynamic Object.
That is as far as i go in this interaction. Again, this is non-linear and
complex. I think that each nodal site might have other interactions affecting
the outcome as well. That is, when I view the external Dynamic Object - I might
be at the same time experiencing other Dynamic Objects - [eg, the cold, the
sounds of rain..etc...]...which will affect not only my Internal Immediate
Object - for these will add data to my experience...but..will affect the
Representamen and thus, the Interpretants.
And so- we come up with the fact that multiple witnesses each see the same
thing - and interpret it differently.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:53 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
wrote:
in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the
immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the present weather so far as
this is common to her mind and mine”) will partially determine what words he
will choose to refer to what he sees outside the window.
Given that the immediate object is internal to the sign, it’s hard to see
how it could determine the whole sign to determine an interpretant; all it can
do is determine some subsidiary aspects of it, such as the verbal aspects. When
the Sign is a proposition, as it is here, it is determined by its Object to
determine an Interpretant by denoting its object and signifying something by
connecting a predicate to its subject. It’s only when we analyze the process
further that we find an immediate object carrying one part of the determination
load.
That’s a good example. However I think when you say determines the word it
raises some issues. This is where I think Peirce sometimes isn’t as clear as he
could be and later semiotic writers like Eco help clarify things (even if they
confuse other matters). Eco introduces the notion of a code which governs not
only interpreting sign-vehicles (like a word) but also choosing them in a
conversation. A way to think of this then is that there are two immediate
objects. The first is the immediate object in the sense of the object we’re
attempting to represent. In this case the weather outside as understood by
speakers in the conversation. The second is the code or in Peirce’s term the
words, their denotations and connotations as understood by speakers.
So if Peirce says to his wife, “it’s cloud out,” this requires not just some
common understanding of the weather outside, but common understanding of
weather across experiences as well as the meaning of the word “cloud” as it
relates to those experiences.
The immediate object of the weather outside as understood can’t determine the
word choice of “cloudy” except to the degree it’s associated with the general
notion of cloudiness and the general notion of the word “cloudy.” In a sense
all of these together are the immediate object. But in an other sense only the
cloudiness outside as understood is the immediate object.
This confusion between the object being represented and the code used to
choose a sign to represent it is what I suspect leads to the misunderstanding.
That’s why I like Eco’s notion of code even if one can deal with it all in more
Peircean terms if one wishes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
