Jon, list:
I'm not sure but I beginning to think that your confinement of terms to ONE
meaning is creating problems.
Firstness is pure sensation - without awareness. It is a state-of-pure-sensual
experience...Peirce himself uses the term of 'sensation' in his discussion of
Firstness...See his outline 1.308 and on, where he talks about the sensation of
color.
Secondness is the experience of a dyad; of A interacting with B - a 'mutual
action between two things regardless of any sort of third or medium" 1.322.
To go further and define existence as Secondness is to ignore that Thirdness
plays a vital role in this existentiality. I doubt if that insect could exist
without the laws of matter that make up its form. Existence, however, does
operate in what some of us call 'Perfect' time [linear, Newtonian time] as
differentiated from the 'Present' time of Firstness - and differentiated from
the continuity of time that is Thirdness.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Bev Corwin ; Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 3:02 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina, List:
I am having some trouble with your use of terminology again.
ET: I have to have the mode of Firstness, or sensation, where I can feel .
What do I feel?
Feeling is Firstness or Quality, but sensation is not--sensation is
Secondness or Reaction.
ET: Third, I have to exist, in my own personal existentiality, within the
laws of Thirdness, which provides me with the infrastructural form of my insect
form or paramecium form.
I think I see what you mean here, but just to be clear--existence is
Secondness, not Thirdness.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 12:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Bev, list: Identity and personal identity do not require consciousness;
i.e., I, as an insect or paramecium, [a Dynamic Object when in an interaction
with other 'things')...I do not have to have a consciousness of my self as this
Dynamic Object. But, I do have to operate within the three categorical modes.
I have to have the mode of Firstness, or sensation, where I can feel .
What do I feel?
I have to have the mode of Secondness, accompanying this Firstness, which
enables me to have a brute sensation of my finiteness and thus feel external
stimuli within my horizons [these external stimuli which I feel are the
Immediate Objects of that external stimulip...and also, feel the extent of my
own materiality.
Third, I have to exist, in my own personal existentiality, within the laws
of Thirdness, which provides me with the infrastructural form of my insect form
or paramecium form.
But- even though I have no consciousness of this I do have a personal
identity such that I exist as 'this' rather than 'that' [insect or
paramecium]..and can react to external stimuli [Dynamic Objects]...which
sensations become Immediate Objects within my senses.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Bev Corwin
To: Jon Alan Schmidt
Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 12:06 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and
Determination/Causation
Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not
consistently. Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in
situational case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply some of
these Peirce "Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation" ideas to a
concept like "identity"? In particular, personal identity? Thanks in advance.
Best wishes, Bev
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