> But you’re quite right, there is more than one way to analyze these things, > and different analyses sometimes appear to describe semiosis differently. I > don’t think Peirce was ever satisfied to stick with a single mode of > analysis, and that the immediate/dynamic object distinction was a stage along > Peirce’s journey toward his later analysis where he “throws everything into > the subject” so that what we’re left with is the “continuous predicate,” > which thus preserves the irreducible continuity of the sign-function, while > also preserving the individuality of the relata which constitute the objects > brought into relation by the sign. I’ll insert below the part of Peirce’s > 1908 letter to Welby which explains this analysis. >
Gary, my sense is that we’re basically thinking the same thing but perhaps looking at different places of focus. In particular I think his later formulation of the “continuous predicate” is important and avoids some difficulties in his earlier works. But you do bring up some important point later on when you talk about habit. > My current answer goes like this: The “codes” are the rules governing the > “sign-system,” e.g. the language. They are of course habit-systems, symbolic > legisigns. “Collateral experience” (or observation or acquaintance) is > indexical, putting the subject of the experience into a “real relation” with > the object of the sign, that which is denoted by the proposition (or its > subject). The codes determine how the experience will be expressed (and > understood) in language; the collateral experience determines what the > expression will be understood to be about; the predicate of the proposition > signifies what is being said about the subject (while also acting as an icon > of the form of the proposition, according to Peirce’s late analysis). Acknowledging all of what you say, I think we have to distinguish the habits as habits from the habits as rules where are either representations or (if we go a more Wittgenstein route) appeals to judges. However as soon as we draw that distinction then the points I brought up apply. Going back to our original example of Peirce discussing the weather with his wife we can’t say it’s only habits that allows him to use words. There are those ideas of what is proper use that matter a great deal. If I write, “Peirce twld his wife it is cloudy outside” then what matters aren’t just yours and my habits and practices but my understanding of them. When I write “twld” instead of “told” that object of “told” seems inherently part of the sign. Now what I’ll fully confess is whether practices, comportments, expectations and habits can be an immediate object. I tend to assume they always are. Even if we recognize the immediate object to a certain kind of representation there’s inherent in it as a representation an index and an iconic component that make those practices and habits virtually present in the sign. In saying that I know Peirce in places talks of the immediate object as a representation. I’m just questioning what that means. In the Letter to Lady Welby I think it’s the hint that is key. The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its substance, is the Immediate Object. My sense, perhaps wrong, but I’m still confident enough to defend it, is that part of the immediate object must in practice therefore be the representation of the code, even if that code is represented in a more vague way in the background and environment of the speaker and interpreter. (In the sense that as I read these words I don’t consult a dictionary but there is still a representation of a sorts functioning alongside my habitual interpretation) If I’m correct, then simply putting these practices, comportments, expectations and so forth under the habits that allow the sign to function misses their representational character that is important in function of the sign. And if they are representations then as I understand it they are part of the immediate object even if a part we don’t usually concern ourselves with in typical analysis.
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