Clark, list:
I'm not referring to the action of communication but to the triadic semiosic
process of developing meaning.
Let's say that I hear a frog. That frog or rather, the sound of the frog, is
the Dynamic Object. [The frog's croak it itself the Dynamic Interpretant of the
frog].
The sense-data that is 'inputted' to me, via my sense capacities - is the
Immediate Object. It is subjective or limited to my physiological capacities to
hear. Now, the Representamen, as mediation, then goes to work, so to speak, and
transforms those sounds - according to its knowledge base and logic - to
produce an Immediate Interpretant or 'unarticulated meaning' of a frog's
croaking. I may even, or may not, move into the Dynamic Interpretant phase and
tell myself 'that's a frog'. I don't need to communicate it to anyone. In
fact, I'd say that a great deal of daily semiosis 'finishes' with the Immediate
Interpretant - eg, the almost automatic actions that take place when one is
walking or driving a car...
I think that commonality rests within the Representamen and of course, only
within Thirdness - and since the Representamen is involved in ALL Relations
within the semiosic triad - then, it provides the commonality in every case.
i simply don't see that the Immediate Object 'contains' commonality, unless one
defines such as pertaining to the species. That is, a dog's capacity to hear
that frog is different from a bird or a human or...and their Immediate Object
content would therefore possibly be 'common' to their species. But - how do we
explain the problem of Witnesses to the Same Event - where each Witness has a
different perception.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 5:22 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Clark, list - thanks, I see your point, but my quibble is with the
interpretation of the 'Immediate Object'.
I see it as a personal rather than common meaning. That is - you define the
immediate object as the average nature' whereas I define it as strictly
personal and limited to my own limitations of both sensation and experience.
Well it has to be both as I see it for the sign to be able to function. I can
only communicate what I know in some sense and communication only works if
there’s common knowledge with the person I’m communicating with. Yet at the
same time the object as represented to me in the sign will have unique features
- as you noted earlier a certain ‘feel’ will be part of that.
So I’m not disputing that the immediate object can’t be purely shared, but
neither can it be purely personal.
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