Clark, Jon, Gary, Jeff, Edwina, List, Concurrent with following this most interesting and valuable discussion, I'm reading a new book by the *New York Times* critic, A.O.Scott: *Better Living Through Criticism*. Some of what he says here about "subjective universality" may be useful in getting a clearer understanding of at least one piece of the puzzle, that, as in the rainy day example, the immediate object is in the sign itself, not in the 'head' of the individual communicating.
At this point in his discussion, Scott quotes a bit from Kant's Critique of Judgment. Kant says that when someone judges something 'beautiful' (the second of his three part aesthetic hierarchy, the first being "the agreeable," this being ". . .a private feeling. . . restricted merely to himself personally") that "He judges not merely for himself, but for all men, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things." But seemingly paradoxically he adds: [T]he judgment of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest. . . must do so apart from universality attached to objects, i.e., there must be coupled with it a claim to *subjective universality*" [emphasis added by me]. Scott then remarks: "Kant will conclude that 'the judgment of taste cannot rest on any subjective end as its ground,' because such judgment always refers to an object and its properties" (52). Of course in our own time we aren't comfortable with Kant's notion of 'subjective universality', but neither can we complete give it up, or how would we explain the "niches and coteries" we do form around certain artists and artifacts? There must be *something* about them or they wouldn't have a following. (But that is an entirely different discussion.) Well, these remarks on aesthetic judgment may seem rather far from the present discussion, and I offer them only as, perhaps, an oblique approach to understanding the "immediate object" as *not* subjective. I would add that in art, science, and ordinary life that it through collateral knowledge that we can even begin to consider "an object and its properties" for the purposes of communication. "I reply, let us suppose: “It is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine,—not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it." CSP Clark wrote: We say the immediate object is internal to the sign because it’s in understanding in use. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 1:41 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant > to the use. > > > How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the > Sign? > > > I don’t see the problem. Don’t confuse the sign with the sign-vehicle. So > in the sign of water the substance water is the dynamic object, the > immediate object is the average understanding of water in the speaker, the > sign-vehicle is the word “water”, the immediate interpretant is what comes > to mind when someone says water, the final interpretant is the final > understanding about water by the ideal community. > > We say the immediate object is internal to the sign because it’s in > understanding in use. > > A simple way of thinking what is internal versus external in Peirce’s use > is that what’s internal can’t distinguish between what is real from what is > fictitious whereas what is external to the sign can. An other way of > putting it is that what’s external can’t “lie.” (Eco is quite fond of > talking of signs in terms of lying as a function - while I think he goes > overboard it’s an useful way of distinguishing many elements) > > I rather like how Joe Ransdell put it in “Another Interpretation of > Peirce’s Semiotic." > > I have said that the object is essential in all semiosis. By this I mean > the immediate object. The real object is not essential because there is > semiosis which does not concern itself with reality, such as imaginative or > fictive semiosis. <27> I believe that Peirce regards this type of semiosis > as logically more complex than semiosis involving a real object (in virtue > of being parasitical upon it), but I will not pursue that difficult point > here. The important point for our purposes is that all cases of semiosis do > involve an immediate object at least. <28> The reason is this. > Any actual sign is a phenomenal manifestation of something. It has the form > of a fact, a subject‑predicate form, and is not a mere possibility or > "First." <29> That it has the form of a fact is true even of a fictional > sign, for it is one of Peirce's fundamental principles that whether > something is real or not cannot be determined by anything internal to the > sign. The form of a real and of a fictitious fact are identical. In Kantian > terms, "reality is not a predicate." <30> A sign is also something > which occasions interpretation. It can occasion interpretation because of > the applicability of some rule which permits the conclusion, the logical > movement, to a further fact. This conclusion is the interpretant, which > also has the form of a fact, i.e. a subject‑predicate form. <31> Now, > the interpretant is not an interpretation of that particular sign‑occurrence > (as distinct from some other occurrence of the same sort of sign) unless > the sign and interpretant are about the same object, i.e. unless they have > the same subject. But since the predicative aspect of sign and interpretant > are not in general identical, while the subject must be, the subject must > be some third thing, the identity of which is not constituted by the > identity of the sign or the identity of the interpretant. It must therefore > be |106| separately identifiable. The identity of the subject > is established by the immediate object. <32> Therefore, there must be an > immediate object if the sign is actually to function as a sign by being > interpreted. > > > > CG: Likewise semiotically water the substance determines water the > universal which in turn determines all these things. (H2O is a possible > representation of the water-subtance and thus is virtually within water as > the substance and a dynamic object) > > > How do we reconcile this with "water the substance" being an actual and > "water the universal" being a necessitant? Once we get over that hump, I > assume that "H2O" the symbol (not just any particular instantiation > thereof) is determined by "water the universal," both of which are > necessitants. > > > Again I don’t see the problem. Could you clarify somewhat? > > And if "H2O ... is virtually within water," which is the virtual X and > which is the X in Peirce's dictionary definition? > > > Depends upon the analysis in question, but in common speech the X is the > water being spoken about (which might be a particular body of water or > might actually be the universal of water) > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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