Clark, List: Just to clarify, I am actually the one who wrote what is quoted below from Gary F.'s subsequent reply.
CG: What Peirce wants to argue is that ultimately a kind of convergence at infinity happens ... it seems to me that Peirce did imagine the semiotic equivalent of the heat death of the universe where everything becomes habitual. I just can’t quite see how he can reconcile that to the place of chance in his thought. My impression is that for Peirce this is a regulative ideal, rather than a genuine future outcome. It would only happen at the "end" of indefinite inquiry by an infinite community. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 11:59 AM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Aug 30, 2016, at 10:37 AM, <[email protected]> <[email protected]> > wrote: > > I agree, and likewise the Dynamic Interpretant determines the Final > Interpretant in the sense that it constrains the possible habits resulting > from its repetition; at least, that is my hypothesis at the moment > > > I think that was Peirce’s view. At least it sure reads that way. I confess > this is a place that I don’t think it works. > > Peirce wants to introduce an element of chance but by its very nature > chance can go beyond. What Peirce wants to argue is that ultimately a kind > of convergence at infinity happens. Yet of course not all equations > converge in that way. By way of analogy I’d think that would entail some > dynamic interpretants with unstable habits never become final interpretants. > > I don’t think that a problem ultimately for Peirce’s semiotics. It just > means that some things won’t become true. But it seems to me that Peirce > did imagine the semiotic equivalent of the heat death of the universe where > everything becomes habitual. I just can’t quite see how he can reconcile > that to the place of chance in his thought. > > But maybe I’m missing something obvious in Peirce’s arguments. >
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