Hi list: Just to get ahead of some future problems when discussing claims of italic *nature*:
“The primeval notion of “custom” or “way” is split up into the notions of “nature,” on the one hand, and “convention,” on the other. The distinction between nature and convention, between *physis* and *nomos*, is therefore coeval with the discovery of nature and hence with philosophy.” ~Leo Strauss Best, Jerry R one, two, three...object, sign, interpretant...sign, object, interpretant... On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 4:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > I would like to offer one attempt at correction/clarification of my > earlier post. What I said was ... > > JS: This even makes some sense to me because the Sign's "influence" > (S-Id) is now connected with its actual nature (Id), while its "manner of > appeal" (S-If) is now connected with its purpose (If), rather than > vice-versa. > > > What I probably should have said, more precisely, was ... > > This even makes some sense to me because, rather than vice-versa, "the > Nature of the Influence of the Sign" (now S-Id) is associated with its > relation to the actual interpretant (Id), and the latter is divided > according to its own nature; while "the Manner of Appeal" of the Sign (now > S-If) is associated with its relation to the habitual interpretant (If), > and the latter is divided according to its purpose. > > > In other words, my proposed revision pairs the *nature *of the Sign's > influence with the *nature *of its actual effect, and the *manner *of its > appeal with the *purpose *of its habitual effect; and at the moment, this > makes more sense to me than the other way around, even though that is how > Peirce consistently had it. The result is that the nature of the Sign's > *actual > *effect determines the nature of its *influence*, and this then > determines the purpose of its *habitual *effect, which determines the > manner of its *appeal*. (Keep in mind that "determines" in this context > primarily means "constrains" with respect to Possible/Actual/Necessitant, > not "causes.") > > The disclaimer, of course, is that I must concede to many of you what > Peirce wrote to Lady Welby--these "trichotomies have to do with the > Interpretants, which you have, I imagine, studied much more thoroughly than > I have done." (CP 8.368) > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Mon, Aug 29, 2016 at 11:34 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> GF: Jon, to answer your question to me that’s embedded near the end of >> your post, yes, you’ve gone a long way here toward a schema of the >> interpretants that makes sense to me, and is entirely compatible with SS >> 111 (1909) (also included in your post), which to me is Peirce’s clearest >> statement of the matter. >> >> >> That is encouraging, thanks. >> >> GF: Based on that, I think we can say that the immediate interpretant is >> the least determinate of the three, and yet it determines the dynamic >> interpretant in the sense that it constrains (puts some vague limits >> around) the possible behavior resulting from the communication. >> >> >> I agree, and likewise the Dynamic Interpretant determines the Final >> Interpretant in the sense that it constrains the possible habits resulting >> from its repetition; at least, that is my hypothesis at the moment. >> >> GF: But I’m not sure how all this maps onto Jeff’s three-strata diagram. >> I’ll have to look into that further. >> >> >> It is consistent with it in terms of the sequence of the three >> interpretants. The next question is whether it adheres to what I have >> previously called the "rule of determination" as stipulated by Peirce--"It >> is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is >> equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a >> Necessitant" (EP 2.481). This is what makes three trichotomies result in >> only ten sign classes, rather than 27; and ten trichotomies result in only >> 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. In this case, if the Immediate >> Interpretant is a Possible--i.e., a range of possible feelings only--then >> the Dynamic and Final Interpretants must be an actual feeling and a habit >> of feeling, respectively. If the Final Interpretant is a >> Necessitant--i.e., a habit of thought--then the Immediate and Dynamic >> Interpretants must be a range of possible thoughts and an actual thought, >> respectively. The other potential combinations are constrained >> accordingly. I happen to think that this works just fine. >> >> GF: And maybe compare it with Vinicius Romanini’s “solenoid of >> semiosis,” http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/?p=30. which is a somewhat >> different attempt at a “minute” classification of sign types. >> >> >> I would argue that it is a *very *different attempt. Romanini >> postulates an eleventh trichotomy that Peirce never recognized (S-Od-Id), >> and puts all of them in a completely different sequence. Peirce quite >> clearly held that the first three are Od => Oi => S, but it gets quite a >> bit fuzzier when we come to the S-Od relation and the six trichotomies for >> the interpretants and their relations to the sign. The default in most of >> the literature seems to be S-Od => Ii => Id => If => S-Id => S-If => >> S-Od-If based on CP 8.367-374. >> >> Jeff's diagram is consistent with this, except that he has the three >> interpretants coming before the S-Od relation, presumably based on EP >> 2.481. The question here is whether an icon can produce an action or a >> thought, rather than being constrained to producing feelings only. If the >> former, then Jeff's sequence is correct; the interpretants can be Actuals >> (actions) or Necessitants (thoughts) even when the S-Od relation is a >> Possible (iconic). If the latter, then the more common sequence is >> correct; if the S-Od is a Possible (iconic), then all of the Interpretants >> must also be Possibles (feelings). I currently find the latter analysis >> more persuasive, especially since I see no reason why the interpretants >> should play any role in determining the S-Od relation; in fact, I think >> that Peirce took the contrary view. >> >> CSP: A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on >> the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring >> the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own >> relation to the object. I might say 'similar to its own' for a >> correspondence consists in a similarity; but perhaps correspondence is >> narrower. (CP 8.332; 1904) >> >> >> It seems to me that if the Sign determines the Interpretant to have the >> same (or at least similar) relation to its Object as itself, then that >> relation must also contribute to determining the Interpretant--i.e., all >> three Interpretants--rather than the other way around. >> >> As for the Sign-Interpretant relations, I previously pointed out Peirce's >> suggestion (CP 8.337-338; 1904) that S-If (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) precedes >> S-Id (presented/urged/submitted), as well as Short's concurrence that was >> accompanied by a table of the ten plausible sign classes that result from >> the ordering Ii => S-If => S-Id. Since a relation presumably cannot >> determine any of its constituents, this gives Ii => Id => If => S-If => >> S-Id => S-Od-If. If this is correct, and if I am right to define the Final >> Interpretant as the habit that would result from repetition of the Dynamic >> Interpretant, then a Rheme can be intended to produce any kind of habit >> (feeling, action, or thought), while an Argument can only be intended to >> produce a habit of thought. But that seems exactly backwards--an Argument >> should be able to produce any kind of habit, while a Rheme should only be >> able to produce a habit of feeling; yet the S-If relation presumably cannot >> determine the Final Interpretant, which is one of its constituents. >> >> The only alternative that I can see at the moment is the admittedly >> radical one of reassigning Rheme/Dicent/Argument to the S-Id relation, >> rather than the S-If relation; and likewise reassigning >> presented/urged/submitted to the S-If relation, rather than the S-Id >> relation. This even makes some sense to me because the Sign's "influence" >> (S-Id) is now connected with its actual nature (Id), while its "manner of >> appeal" (S-If) is now connected with its purpose (If), rather than >> vice-versa. The resulting sequence is Od => Oi => S => S-Od => Ii (range >> of possible feelings/actions/thoughts) => Id (actual feeling/action/thought >> produced) => S-Id (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) => If (habit of >> feeling/action/thought) => S-If (presented/urged/submitted) => Od-S-If >> (assurance of instinct/experience/form). This has the virtue of formal >> consistency in that each trichotomy for a relation always comes immediately >> after the last trichotomy for one of its constituents. >> >> But it is all getting rather speculative now, so once again I would >> welcome any feedback. I am especially interested in better understanding >> why Peirce linked his earlier trichotomy for interpretants in general with >> the Final Interpretant in particular, rather than the Dynamic Interpretant. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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