Gary F., List: JS: Since a relation presumably cannot determine any of its constituents, this gives Ii => Id => If => S-If => S-Id => S-Od-If. If this is correct, and if I am right to define the Final Interpretant as the habit that would result from repetition of the Dynamic Interpretant, ...
GF: I have my doubts about that relation between the Dynamic and Final Interpretants, because of passages like this in Peirce: [[ Now it is of the essence of the Sign to determine certain Ideas, i.e. certain Possibles; and it is the essence of any Tendency to determine Occurrences. Therefore, an Actisign or a Potisign may be a Copulative. But no Occurrence or collection of occurrences can logically determine a Habit or other Tendency. … It is true that physiological and some other habits are determined by what has been done; but not by those occurrences of themselves, but only because there is a special Tendency by virtue of which what has been done will be done oftener than what has not been done. In general, it is of the essence of a Real Tendency that no Actual Occurrence can of itself determine it in any way. ] EP2:487-8 ] As far as I can tell this is compatible with the rule that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible and a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant, but not compatible with the idea that Id determines If. I would suggest that the "special Tendency" to which Peirce refers here is precisely what facilitates the development of persistent habits (Final Interpretant) from individual occurrences (Dynamic Interpretant) along the lines that he discussed in what I quoted a few days ago from MS 318. This brings up once again the need to distinguish Possible/Actual/Necessitant as the modes of each trichotomy vs. Immediate/Dynamic/Final as the possible/actual/habitual interpretants. In this particular passage, Peirce is clearly referring to the former, not the latter; and I am now wondering if such terminology is perhaps only appropriate for dividing the Dynamic and Immediate Objects. In other words, the trichotomies for the two Objects are both Possible/Actual/Necessitant, but the trichotomy for Signs is more like Quality/Occurrence/Law, and the trichotomies for the three Interpretants are all Feeling/Action/Thought. Hence when I say, in this context, that the Dynamic Interpretant "determines" the Final Interpretant, what I mean is simply the following. - If the Dynamic Interpretant is an actual thought, then repeating it can develop a habit of feeling, action, or thought. - If the Dynamic Interpretant is an actual action, then repeating it can develop a habit of feeling or action, but not a habit of thought. - If the Dynamic Interpretant is an actual feeling, then repeating it can develop a habit of feeling, but not a habit of action or thought. I am not sure whether or how we should also consider relabeling the modes of the trichotomies of relations, especially S-If (Peirce) or S-Id (me) as Rheme/Dicent/Argument and S-Id (Peirce) or S-If (me) as presented/urged/submitted. Menno Hulswit has suggested that S-Od as Icon/Index/Symbol is Formal/Efficient/Final based on the dominant type of causation involved, and clearly Od-S-If as Assurance of Instinct/Experience/Form is essentially Abduction/Induction/Deduction. Another option that seems initially plausible is to assign Quality/Occurrence/Law to S-Od, Possible/Actual/Necessitant to S-Id and S-If, and Feeling/Action/Thought to Od-S-If; or maybe all of the relations are Quality/Occurrence/Law, since they all involve the Sign. Obviously this all remains very speculative on my part. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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