Hello, list!
What Edwina said is so sensible as to be Greek. There is a one over many in semiosis. That is, one has to cut and situate oneself in a horizon while discussing one two three…One. For example, there is also a fourth and a fifth that are assumed but don’t get talked about; a fourth and fifth that is not Fourthness or Fifthness, even though there is a distinct quality about them, which makes it deserving of a –ness moniker. See how confusing that is? Here is something to help: “*First* is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else.”~Peirce “All these are called *substance* because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them… Therefore, as in *syllogisms*, substance is the starting-point of everything.” ~Aristotle (Could he be talking about CP 5.189? But Aristotle wrote 2400 years ago and Peirce only a century…but Peirce read Aristotle and was immensely influenced by him. But where does he say “This idea, viz., CP 5.189, was inspired by the philosopher, viz., Aristotle!”) ____ “Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are brought into relation.” ~Peirce So, instead of “quality, relation, representation”, why not try “quality, representation, relation”? There is not a ‘wrong’ here but a ‘better’. It is more an issue of how one attends to the matter. This mind that situates is *always* present and simply assumed. The mind can be called utterer, interpreter or commens or in fifth, *sub specie aeternitatis*. The perspective of the eternal is an *objective* mind. But in what way can a mind be objective? _______ “The *origin* of things, considered not as leading to anything, but in itself, contains the idea of First, the *end* of things that of Second, the process mediating between them that of Third.” ~Peirce “Again (3) of quanta that have a *beginning and a middle and an end,* those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes.” So, what is it, a thing invented by Peirce with a beginning a middle and end with features of syllogism, which can be used as a tool to unite the parts as One? one, two, three…C, A, B…beginning, end, middle…CP 5.189…One… “‘A whole’ means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in *two senses*-either as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them.” _________ Peirce touches on the theme of Edwina’s comment in the following: “A philosophy which emphasizes the idea of the One is generally a dualistic philosophy in which the conception of Second receives exaggerated attention; for this One (though of course involving the idea of First) is always the other of a manifold which is not one. The idea of the Many, because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any Secondness, has for its principal component the conception of First.” Finally, Peirce closes a section on Hegel (a triadic philosophy in that Hegel states the syllogism, God/Son/Spirit, although it ought to be Father/Son/Spirit…God) with: “In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is First, heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters become fixed is Third. Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. [from CP 6.31-4]” https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/peirce3.htm Here, you can see that one, two, three is simply a heuristic (he even admits in one of the Ransdell manuscripts that it is an exercise of which he wished to divest himself but couldn’t because it *proved* to him to be correct after years of testing). There is no right or wrong here but always a better. What we argue over is whether it is a *best* because there might even be a *best*. But where is the proof for a community? “That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous conceptions of proof.” Hth, Jerry Rhee On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut, list > Your comments point to exactly the problem with mechanical reductionism, > i.e., where one tries to reduce a dynamic process [the semiosic process] > which is always triadic, into 'bit parts' that somehow mechanically > interact. That's the opposite of the Peircean semiosis. > > That's why I don't consider that thought, as a semiosic process, is > confined to Thirdness. After all, Peirce analyzed THREE modes of thinking, > of reasoning - and such could not be the case if all three were similar; > i.e., just operating in Thirdness. Instead, their vitality and > strength derives from their use of Firstness and Secondness as well as > Thirdness. Thirdness is the vital process of developing generalities, > habits-of-formation. But, I read Peirce as considering that Thought as a > generative force requires all three categorical modes. > > I use the term of *S*ign [capital S] to refer to the triad, the classes. > After all, nothing exists except within a triadic interaction! That > includes a molecule, a cell, an insect, a word. > > Edwina > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *To:* jonalanschm...@gmail.com > *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 9:51 AM > *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jon, Gary, Edwina,..., list, > I find it interesting, that Peirce later replaced "Quality, relation, > representation" with "Quality, reaction, mediation". Might it be better to > say "mediation is always thirdness" instead of "mediation is only > thirdness"? "Only" I find confusing, because I think "only" only fits > firstness, as thirdness is based on, and contains, first- and secondness > too (and secondness firstness). What also is confusing again and again is, > that on one hand a sign is always thirdness, because it is a mediation, but > on the other hand eg. a qualisign somehow is not thirdness. I think we have > to distinguish between the sign, and the sign class (or think of better > terms for this distinction). The sign as looked at as some entity in itself > is thirdness, mediation. But the sign as looked as what kind of meaning it > conveys or generates, in which way it mediates (of which class it is) is > only complete thirdness, if it is an argument. Or maybe it would be better > to say that the distinction is between the function of the sign and its > class: the function of the sign is to mediate, to bring a perception to > mind, to generate thought. That is thirdness. But if there is no thought > generated except eg. that the perception is conveyed to the mind, then this > generation is not as complete as it is in other signs, it is degenerate. So > the function "mediation" is thirdness, but there is not much action of the > mind, thought, thirdness, achieved by this mediation, when the sign is not > of the proper class for that. Can you say what I mean more simply? > Best, > Helmut > > 10. September 2016 um 04:36 Uhr > "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > I was asking Edwina, because I am trying to get a better handle on where > it is that our interpretations of Peirce diverge. But since you posed a > direct, coherent question ... I had passages like this one in mind. > > > CSP: Why should there be three principles of reasoning, and what have > they to do with one another? This question, which was connected with other > parts of my schedule of philosophical inquiry that need not be detailed, > now came to the front. Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of > triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some > fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions > were. This search resulted in what I call my categories. I then named > them Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that > undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two; > for this reason Reaction is a better term. Moreover, I did not then know > enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word > representation serve for an idea so much more general than any it > habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation would be better. > Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, > Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, are to be preferred as being entirely > new words without any false associations whatever. (CP 4.3; 1898) > > > I suppose that we could reformulate the three bullets in accordance with > Peirce's comments here. > > - All thought takes place by means of signs. > - Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. > - Mediation is (only) Thirdness. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:12 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Jon, list: >> >> This is the bizarre one: >> >> - Representation is (only) Thirdness. >> >> Where, exactly, does Peirce state this? >> Give me the name, date and serial number! >> >> :) >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/ > peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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