Gary, list:
That’s very interesting. I wonder, though, how many Peirceans even know what Prigogine means by pluralism in physical laws, never mind physicists. Best, Jerry R On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 8:57 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Edwina wrote: And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, > declaring that Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for > physics. > > This might very well have been Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical > chemist who won the Nobel prize for his work in complex systems, > irreversibility and what, perhaps, he's become best known for, dissipative > structures in thermodynamic systems far from equilibrium. > > Several years ago I briefly discussed how he was influenced by Peirce as, > for example, he discussed it in *Order Out of Chaos* (1984) which he > co-authored with Isabel Stengers (Jaime Nubiola commented on the list that > Prigogine was probably introduced to Peirce by Stengers who, apparently, > knew his work well). > > “Peirce’s [work]. . . appears to be a pioneering step towards the > understanding of the pluralism involved in physical laws." Prigogine > > Best, > > Gary R > > > . > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 7:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Again, I am presuming that all of you know of the work being done in >> biosemiotics - so, frankly, using Peircean analysis in these areas - >> biology, physico-chemistry, AI, computers..isn't new! There are journals; >> there are books; there are conferences devoted to these issues. Google >> 'biosemiotics' on your own. >> >> And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, declaring that >> Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for physics. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Ben Novak <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >> <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:52 PM >> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >> >> Dear Ben, list: >> >> >> >> I think yours is a wonderful idea. >> >> To think Peirce could impose himself in all disciplines. >> >> >> >> If we take the disciplines to be embedded in the three Universes, then it >> should be matter of course that it would. Isn’t that what ancestry of >> pragmatism means? A river of pragmatism…a link in a venerable chain? >> >> >> >> So, what’s stopping us? Sure there are examples but they're not of the >> kind that I would say is terribly convincing. That is, I don't know of >> serious scientists that go around thinking what they do is Peircean before >> they call it physics or biology or embryology or computer science or AI or >> ... >> >> >> That is, I could open my mouth about the nuances of his work but what >> quantum physicist would take me seriously when I know zip about what >> they’re saying and vice versa? So much work...reputations at >> stake...crazy...It would appear good integration will require a miracle…or >> at least something divine to which we can all affix our attention. >> >> >> >> In any case, count me a believer, >> >> Jerry R >> >> >> >> PS. As for an actual step toward integrating the different ideas, here >> is a suggestion from On a New List of Categories. We should correct his >> terminology but the structure appears correct: >> >> >> >> BEING >> >> Quality (Reference to a Ground), >> Relation (Reference to a Correlate), >> Representation (Reference to an Interpretant), >> >> SUBSTANCE >> >> >> >> one two three…Substance, Being, Truth. >> >> On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 5:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> Ben - you probably know that Peircean concepts are vigorously explored >>> in biology [biosemiotics], physics and chemistry [pansemiosis]...as well as >>> in AI and computers. Peirce, in my view, is exactly right for these areas; >>> after all, his own references to the biological and physico-chemical realm >>> support this. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Ben Novak <[email protected]> >>> *To:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> >>> *Cc:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> ; Helmut Raulien >>> <[email protected]> ; Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> ; >>> Peirce-L <[email protected]> >>> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 6:16 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >>> >>> Dear List: >>> >>> I would like to come back into this discussion, but first let me thank >>> Jon for his concise correction of my multitudinous errors. Second, let me >>> thank you all for the liveliness of this discussion. >>> >>> But back to Jon, I ended my first post on this discussion with: "I am >>> not sure I am expressing this well, but my point is concerned with adding >>> being (and beings) into the mix as necessary to understand existence and >>> reality." You did not seem to respond to this, so let me raise it >>> again, since the term being has raised its head in recent posts. >>> >>> I am fascinated by the discussion of what Peirce means relative to the >>> variety of terms discussed, and I appreciate that the purpose of Peirce-L >>> is to focus on Peirce's thought. But if often seems that we are in a >>> semantic bubble, focusing almost exclusively on Peirce's terms, leading me >>> to wonder how and whether his thought can be brought into conversation with >>> other thinkers, and other thought on similar subjects. >>> >>> Specifically, I am interested in how Peirce's thought relates to the >>> concepts of being and beings, especially as these relate to Heidegger or >>> postmodernists, or even Thomists. I often think of Peirce in relation to >>> Heidegger with the idea that Heidegger would be a lot clearer if he had >>> known of Peirce's thought. >>> >>> Second, I wonder whether Peirce's thought and terms would at all help in >>> the issues and problem of ontology in quantum physics. Here I am >>> specifically referring to Peter J. Lewis, *Quantum Ontology*: >>> https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Ontology-Guide-Metaphysics-Me >>> chanics/dp/0190469811 >>> or Bernard d'Espaçant, *On Quantum Physics and Philosophy* >>> https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691119643/ref=pd_cp_0_1?i >>> e=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=9ZY3BJJES420C4R4AKEK or the much earlier but easier >>> to read and follow *Quantum Reality*, by Nick Herbert >>> https://www.amazon.com/Quantum-Reality-Beyond-New-Physics/dp >>> /0385235690/ref=sr_1_6?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1473543476&sr=1- >>> >>> I realize, and appreciate that PeirceL is to discuss Peirce. Bujt it >>> would seem that his concepts might be easier to understand (and perhaps >>> easier to discuss) if they were related to concepts and problems in >>> other sciences and disciplines. >>> >>> In simple terms, are Peirce's ideas of firstness, secondness, and >>> thirdness; reality and existence related to, usable in, or translatable >>> into problems discussed elsewhere? >>> >>> It would seem that this is particularly relevant to Peirce's theory of >>> thinking--or at least to our quest to discover it. >>> >>> Ben N. >>> >>> >>> *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* >>> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 >>> Telephone: (814) 808-5702 >>> >>> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the >>> arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the >>> last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored >>> canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the >>> last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler >>> >>> On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 1:58 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Hello, list! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What Edwina said is so sensible as to be Greek. >>>> >>>> There is a one over many in semiosis. That is, one has to cut and >>>> situate oneself in a horizon while discussing one two three…One. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> For example, there is also a fourth and a fifth that are assumed but >>>> don’t get talked about; a fourth and fifth that is not Fourthness or >>>> Fifthness, even though there is a distinct quality about them, which makes >>>> it deserving of a –ness moniker. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> See how confusing that is? Here is something to help: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “*First* is the conception of being or existing independent of >>>> anything else.”~Peirce >>>> >>>> “All these are called *substance* because they are not predicated of >>>> a subject but everything else is predicated of them… >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Therefore, as in *syllogisms*, substance is the starting-point of >>>> everything.” ~Aristotle >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> (Could he be talking about CP 5.189? But Aristotle wrote 2400 years >>>> ago and Peirce only a century…but Peirce read Aristotle and was immensely >>>> influenced by him. But where does he say “This idea, viz., CP 5.189, was >>>> inspired by the philosopher, viz., Aristotle!”) >>>> >>>> ____ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of >>>> reaction with, something else. >>>> >>>> Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first and second are >>>> brought into relation.” ~Peirce >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So, instead of “quality, relation, representation”, why not try >>>> “quality, representation, relation”? There is not a ‘wrong’ here but a >>>> ‘better’. >>>> >>>> It is more an issue of how one attends to the matter. This mind that >>>> situates is *always* present and simply assumed. The mind can be >>>> called utterer, interpreter or commens or in fifth, *sub specie >>>> aeternitatis*. The perspective of the eternal is an *objective* >>>> mind. But in what way can a mind be objective? >>>> >>>> _______ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “The *origin* of things, considered not as leading to anything, but in >>>> itself, contains the idea of First, the *end* of things that of >>>> Second, the process mediating between them that of Third.” ~Peirce >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “Again (3) of quanta that have a *beginning and a middle and an end,* >>>> those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, >>>> and those to which it does, wholes.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So, what is it, a thing invented by Peirce with a beginning a middle >>>> and end with features of syllogism, which can be used as a tool to unite >>>> the parts as One? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> one, two, three…C, A, B…beginning, end, middle…CP 5.189…One… >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “‘A whole’ means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of >>>> which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains >>>> the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in *two >>>> senses*-either >>>> as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between >>>> them.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _________ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Peirce touches on the theme of Edwina’s comment in the following: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “A philosophy which emphasizes the idea of the One is generally a >>>> dualistic philosophy in which the conception of Second receives exaggerated >>>> attention; for this One (though of course involving the idea of First) is >>>> always the other of a manifold which is not one. The idea of the Many, >>>> because variety is arbitrariness and arbitrariness is repudiation of any >>>> Secondness, has for its principal component the conception of First.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Finally, Peirce closes a section on Hegel (a triadic philosophy in that >>>> Hegel states the syllogism, God/Son/Spirit, although it ought to be >>>> Father/Son/Spirit…God) with: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of reaction Second, General >>>> conception Third, or mediation. In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting >>>> is First, heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters >>>> become fixed is Third. Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take >>>> habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. [from >>>> CP 6.31-4]” >>>> >>>> https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ >>>> us/peirce3.htm >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Here, you can see that one, two, three is simply a heuristic (he even >>>> admits in one of the Ransdell manuscripts that it is an exercise of which >>>> he wished to divest himself but couldn’t because it *proved* to him to >>>> be correct after years of testing). >>>> >>>> >>>> There is no right or wrong here but always a better. What we argue >>>> over is whether it is a *best* because there might even be a *best*. >>>> But where is the proof for a community? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> “That the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very >>>> important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous >>>> conceptions of proof.” >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Hth, >>>> Jerry Rhee >>>> >>>> On Sat, Sep 10, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Helmut, list >>>>> Your comments point to exactly the problem with mechanical >>>>> reductionism, i.e., where one tries to reduce a dynamic process [the >>>>> semiosic process] which is always triadic, into 'bit parts' that somehow >>>>> mechanically interact. That's the opposite of the Peircean semiosis. >>>>> >>>>> That's why I don't consider that thought, as a semiosic process, is >>>>> confined to Thirdness. After all, Peirce analyzed THREE modes of thinking, >>>>> of reasoning - and such could not be the case if all three were similar; >>>>> i.e., just operating in Thirdness. Instead, their vitality and >>>>> strength derives from their use of Firstness and Secondness as well as >>>>> Thirdness. Thirdness is the vital process of developing generalities, >>>>> habits-of-formation. But, I read Peirce as considering that Thought as a >>>>> generative force requires all three categorical modes. >>>>> >>>>> I use the term of *S*ign [capital S] to refer to the triad, the >>>>> classes. After all, nothing exists except within a triadic interaction! >>>>> That includes a molecule, a cell, an insect, a word. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >>>>> *To:* [email protected] >>>>> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >>>>> <[email protected]> >>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, September 10, 2016 9:51 AM >>>>> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >>>>> >>>>> Jon, Gary, Edwina,..., list, >>>>> I find it interesting, that Peirce later replaced "Quality, relation, >>>>> representation" with "Quality, reaction, mediation". Might it be better to >>>>> say "mediation is always thirdness" instead of "mediation is only >>>>> thirdness"? "Only" I find confusing, because I think "only" only fits >>>>> firstness, as thirdness is based on, and contains, first- and secondness >>>>> too (and secondness firstness). What also is confusing again and again is, >>>>> that on one hand a sign is always thirdness, because it is a mediation, >>>>> but >>>>> on the other hand eg. a qualisign somehow is not thirdness. I think we >>>>> have >>>>> to distinguish between the sign, and the sign class (or think of better >>>>> terms for this distinction). The sign as looked at as some entity in >>>>> itself >>>>> is thirdness, mediation. But the sign as looked as what kind of meaning it >>>>> conveys or generates, in which way it mediates (of which class it is) is >>>>> only complete thirdness, if it is an argument. Or maybe it would be better >>>>> to say that the distinction is between the function of the sign and its >>>>> class: the function of the sign is to mediate, to bring a perception to >>>>> mind, to generate thought. That is thirdness. But if there is no thought >>>>> generated except eg. that the perception is conveyed to the mind, then >>>>> this >>>>> generation is not as complete as it is in other signs, it is degenerate. >>>>> So >>>>> the function "mediation" is thirdness, but there is not much action of the >>>>> mind, thought, thirdness, achieved by this mediation, when the sign is not >>>>> of the proper class for that. Can you say what I mean more simply? >>>>> Best, >>>>> Helmut >>>>> >>>>> 10. September 2016 um 04:36 Uhr >>>>> "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jerry, List: >>>>> >>>>> I was asking Edwina, because I am trying to get a better handle on >>>>> where it is that our interpretations of Peirce diverge. But since you >>>>> posed a direct, coherent question ... I had passages like this one in >>>>> mind. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> CSP: Why should there be three principles of reasoning, and what have >>>>> they to do with one another? This question, which was connected with >>>>> other >>>>> parts of my schedule of philosophical inquiry that need not be detailed, >>>>> now came to the front. Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of >>>>> triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some >>>>> fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the >>>>> conceptions >>>>> were. This search resulted in what I call my categories. I then named >>>>> them Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that >>>>> undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two; >>>>> for this reason Reaction is a better term. Moreover, I did not then know >>>>> enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word >>>>> representation serve for an idea so much more general than any it >>>>> habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation would be better. >>>>> Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, >>>>> Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, are to be preferred as being >>>>> entirely >>>>> new words without any false associations whatever. (CP 4.3; 1898) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I suppose that we could reformulate the three bullets in accordance >>>>> with Peirce's comments here. >>>>> >>>>> - All thought takes place by means of signs. >>>>> - Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. >>>>> - Mediation is (only) Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:12 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon, list: >>>>>> >>>>>> This is the bizarre one: >>>>>> >>>>>> - Representation is (only) Thirdness. >>>>>> >>>>>> Where, exactly, does Peirce state this? >>>>>> Give me the name, date and serial number! >>>>>> >>>>>> :) >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> Jerry R >>>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >>>>> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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