Helmut, list Your comments point to exactly the problem with mechanical reductionism, i.e., where one tries to reduce a dynamic process [the semiosic process] which is always triadic, into 'bit parts' that somehow mechanically interact. That's the opposite of the Peircean semiosis.
That's why I don't consider that thought, as a semiosic process, is confined to Thirdness. After all, Peirce analyzed THREE modes of thinking, of reasoning - and such could not be the case if all three were similar; i.e., just operating in Thirdness. Instead, their vitality and strength derives from their use of Firstness and Secondness as well as Thirdness. Thirdness is the vital process of developing generalities, habits-of-formation. But, I read Peirce as considering that Thought as a generative force requires all three categorical modes. I use the term of Sign [capital S] to refer to the triad, the classes. After all, nothing exists except within a triadic interaction! That includes a molecule, a cell, an insect, a word. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: [email protected] Cc: Jerry Rhee ; Peirce-L Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 9:51 AM Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking Jon, Gary, Edwina,..., list, I find it interesting, that Peirce later replaced "Quality, relation, representation" with "Quality, reaction, mediation". Might it be better to say "mediation is always thirdness" instead of "mediation is only thirdness"? "Only" I find confusing, because I think "only" only fits firstness, as thirdness is based on, and contains, first- and secondness too (and secondness firstness). What also is confusing again and again is, that on one hand a sign is always thirdness, because it is a mediation, but on the other hand eg. a qualisign somehow is not thirdness. I think we have to distinguish between the sign, and the sign class (or think of better terms for this distinction). The sign as looked at as some entity in itself is thirdness, mediation. But the sign as looked as what kind of meaning it conveys or generates, in which way it mediates (of which class it is) is only complete thirdness, if it is an argument. Or maybe it would be better to say that the distinction is between the function of the sign and its class: the function of the sign is to mediate, to bring a perception to mind, to generate thought. That is thirdness. But if there is no thought generated except eg. that the perception is conveyed to the mind, then this generation is not as complete as it is in other signs, it is degenerate. So the function "mediation" is thirdness, but there is not much action of the mind, thought, thirdness, achieved by this mediation, when the sign is not of the proper class for that. Can you say what I mean more simply? Best, Helmut 10. September 2016 um 04:36 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" <[email protected]> wrote: Jerry, List: I was asking Edwina, because I am trying to get a better handle on where it is that our interpretations of Peirce diverge. But since you posed a direct, coherent question ... I had passages like this one in mind. CSP: Why should there be three principles of reasoning, and what have they to do with one another? This question, which was connected with other parts of my schedule of philosophical inquiry that need not be detailed, now came to the front. Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This search resulted in what I call my categories. I then named them Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two; for this reason Reaction is a better term. Moreover, I did not then know enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word representation serve for an idea so much more general than any it habitually carried, was injudicious. The word mediation would be better. Quality, reaction, and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, are to be preferred as being entirely new words without any false associations whatever. (CP 4.3; 1898) I suppose that we could reformulate the three bullets in accordance with Peirce's comments here. a.. All thought takes place by means of signs. b.. Every sign mediates between an object and an interpretant. c.. Mediation is (only) Thirdness. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 8:12 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: Jon, list: This is the bizarre one: a.. Representation is (only) Thirdness. Where, exactly, does Peirce state this? Give me the name, date and serial number! :) Best, Jerry R ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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