The existence of God amuses me. What about the nature of god. This was
radically changed by Jesus who did not appear to accept him as a tribal
deity, or the explicit ruler of history in an interventionist mode. etc. I
have always assumed Peirce had a mystical experience in a church not far
from where I write, and that his encounter was with a deity rather more
benign than the one who inhabits the pages of most Scripture. I am merely
commenting on the fact that the nature is more important than existence per
se.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU

On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 7:01 PM, Harold Orbach <h...@ksu.edu> wrote:

> My previous message, attached below, didn't get to the Peirce list but
> only apparently to Ben Novak and Jerry Rhee.  The latest exchange,
> especially attacking Edwina for her personal beliefs about the EXISTENCE of
> God, i.e., the minority view of that small segment of the inhabitants of
> the 7th Rock from the Sun, does not interfere with her accepting the
> REALITY of THAT God, as Peirce apparently did.  But there is a persistent
> confusion on the part of those who apparently believe in the EXISTENCE of
> that God, which there is no evidence that Peirce ever did, with HIS
> REALITY.  Perhaps the list members might read Peirce's agreement, clearly
>  expressed on more than one occasion for his youthful friend, Francis E.
> Abbot's view on the matter.  Or of that of James, Dewey and Mead.
>
> Harold L. Orbach
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> *From:* <h...@ksu.edu>
> *Date:* September 14, 2016 at 1:20:31 AM CDT
> *To:* Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com>
> *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>, Peirce-L <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking*
>
> Pardon my intrusion into this unending mishmash:
>
> 1.  Peirce's neglected argument is for the REALITY of God  not  the
> EXISTENCE of God.
>
> 2. Anselm's ontological argument for the EXISTENCE of God is not "pretty
> nearly the most famous argument in the history of philosophy," only in the
> history of a small segment of the so-called WESTERN world, a minor part of
> the total areas and populations of what is termed "the earth" that came to
> dominate and "discover" most of the other areas for a few hundred years up
> to the present compared with other civilizations or empires that had
> dominance over larger and smaller areas for thousands of years.
>
> 3.  Other lands and peoples have and have had different views on the
> nature of God or Gods or Goddesses or if there are any that EXIST and how
> anyone might come to know this.  They also have and have had different
> kinds of "things" that were believed to be gods or sacred.
>
> Harold L. Orbach
> PhD, University of Minnesota Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology
> Emeritus, Kansas State University
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Sep 13, 2016, at 10:32 PM, Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Dear Jerry, List:
>
> You ask two questions. First, what is Anselm's ontological argument.
> Thankfully, that is easy to answer. It is short, and I append it to this
> email at the end.
>
> Your second question is why "you are imposing the question on us, which
> includes me [Jerry Rhee]?
>
> First. let me clarify for the record: I am not from Missouri, and only
> used that phrase assuming everyone is familiar with it, in order to get to
> the "show me" part. Further, I do not know whether everyone in Missouri has
> heard of Anselm's ontological argument, though I assume not.
>
> However, I would expect (silly me!) that anyone with a Ph.D. would have
> heard of it, since it is pretty nearly the most famous argument about God's
> existence in the history of philosophy, and would be expected to be brought
> up in any introductory, or history of, philosophy course or in any
> conversation or study anytime anyone questions whether God exists.
>
> Further, since we are talking about Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the
> Reality of God," Anselm's argument would naturally come to mind as soon as
> anyone inquires into why Peirce thought his argument had been "neglected."
> In other words, the very title of Peirce's paper points to other arguments
> for God's existence in the context of which he is placing his. But it is
> worth noting that Peirce did not claim that he had a *new* argument, but
> suggests by his title that it may have arisen before and was merely
> "neglected." So he was bringing a long neglected argument back into view.
> At least I take that to be one possible interpretation of the suggestion in
> his title.(On the other hand, I take Peirce's title to imply that he felt
> his argument had been neglected because it was so simple!!!! that no one
> thought to dignify it previously. Silly me.)
>
> Since the original questions that commenced this chain include "How
> exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected with "the
> hypothesis of God's reality"? I assumed that that was to be one of the
> major questions dealt with in the discussion, which Jon thought to begin by
> asking his four questions.
>
> Now, the ontological argument has evoked a stupendous literature in
> philosophy and logic, because it seems to prove the existence of God by
> a purely logical and non-empirical method. That is why it is called
> ontological, i.e., the argument proceeds only from being (onto=being).
> Philosophers agree that Anselm makes at least two different arguments in
> chapters II and III, though some philosophers find three and even four
> separate arguments. Many logicians have wrestled with it, and some
> logicians see it as a "modal" argument.
>
> The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a very brief and readable
> description of Anselm's ontological argument: Be sure  to read sections 1,
> 2a, 3, and 4.
>
> http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/
>
> I hope that you will agree, after reading the brief account in the link
> above that Anselm is quite relevant to placing Peirce's "neglected"
> argument into context. The connection is that both Anselm and Peirce seek
> to prove God's existence purely from a thought process.
>
> Now, if you want to read a different take on Anselm's understanding of
> what is meant by "existence," I invite you to read my article entitled
> "Anselm on Nothing," *in the International Philosophical Quarterly*,
> Volume 48, Issue 3, September 2008, pages 305-320, which you may read on
> line here:
>
> https://www.academia.edu/13891780/Anselm_on_Nothing
>
> For this second link, it must be borne in mind that Anselm wrote two
> tracts relating to God's existence (or being), and the first link deals
> with his second work, the *Proslogion*, where his famous ontological
> argument is found (appended below), while the second link (my article)
> deals mostly with Anselm's arguments in his first work, the *Monologion.*
> (Understand, too, that my views though increasingly cited are nevertheless
> minority.)
>
> Understand too that Peirce's works were constantly on my mind throughout
> writing "Anselm on Nothing," and that I planned to write a second article
> on Peirce and Anselm, but was largely discouraged from doing so by the
> realization that Peirceans would disagree with just about everything a
> simple person like me would say about Peirce's thought---which is why I was
> so excited when Jon posted his questions that began this chain.For example,
> I thought the example I gave of simple firstness, secondness, and thirdness
> was safe, but I received a private email from an observer of this list that
> such is not the case:
>
> Echoing others, the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness ordering in your
> example is too linear. It should be Firstness-Thirdness-Secondness. That
> is, some shock meets your habitual conditioning which determines the
> reaction. How else could we have different reactions?
>
> So, I need a lot of enlightenment, which is why I appreciate this forum so
> much.
>
> In any event, appended below are Chapters II, III, and IV of the
> *Proslogion, *which contains Anselm's famous ontological argument;
>
>
> Ben
> Chapter II
>
> Therefore, O Lord, who grantest to faith understanding, grant unto me
> that, so far as Thou knowest it to be expedient for me, I may understand
> that Thou art, as we believe; and also that Thou art what we believe Thee
> to be. And of a truth we believe that Thou art somewhat than which no
> greater can be conceived. Is there then nothing real that can be thus
> described? for the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Yet surely
> even that fool himself when he hears me speak of somewhat than which
> nothing greater can be conceived under stands what he hears, and what he
> understands is in his understanding, even if he do not under stand that it
> really exists. It is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding, and
> another to understand that the thing really exists. For when a painter
> considers the work which he is to make, he has it indeed in his
> understanding; but he doth not yet understand that really to exist which as
> yet he has not made. But when he has painted his picture, then he both has
> the picture in his understanding, and also under stands it really to exist.
> Thus even the fool is certain that something exists, at least in his
> understanding, than which nothing greater can be conceived; because, when
> he hears this mentioned, he understands it, and whatsoever is understood,
> exists in the understanding. And surely that than which no greater can be
> conceived cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exist indeed in
> the understanding only, it can be thought to exist also in reality; and
> real existence is more than existence in the under standing only. If then
> that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding
> only, then that than which no greater can be conceived is something a
> greater than which can be conceived: but this is impossible. There fore it
> is certain that something than which no greater can be conceived exists
> both in the under standing and also in reality.
> Chapter II
>
> Not only does this something than which no greater can be conceived exist,
> but it exists in so true a sense that it cannot even be conceived not to
> exist. For it is possible to form the conception of an object whose
> non-existence shall be inconceivable; and such an object is of necessity
> greater than any object whose existence is conceivable: wherefore if that
> than which no greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist; it
> follows that that than which no greater can be conceived is not that than
> which no greater can be conceived [for there can be thought a greater than
> it, namely, an object whose non-existence shall be inconceivable]; and this
> brings us to a contradiction. And thus it is proved that that thing than
> which no greater can be conceived exists in so true a sense, that it cannot
> even be conceived not to exist: and this thing art Thou, O Lord our God!
> And so Thou, O Lord my God, existest in so true a sense that Thou canst not
> even be conceived not to exist. And this is as is fitting. For if any mind
> could conceive aught better than Thee, then the creature would be ascending
> above the Creator, and judging the Creator; which is a supposition very
> absurd. Thou therefore dost exist in a truer sense than all else beside
> Thee, and art more real than all else beside Thee; because whatsoever else
> existeth, existeth in a less true sense than Thou, and therefore is less
> real than Thou. Why then said the fool in his heart, There is no God, when
> it is so plain to a rational mind that Thou art more real than any thing
> else? Why, except that he is a fool indeed?
> Chapter IV
>
> But how came the fool to say in his heart that which he could not
> conceive? or how came he to be able not to conceive that which yet he said
> in his heart? For it may be thought that to conceive and to say in one’s
> heart are one and the same thing. If it is true—nay, because it is true,
> that he conceived it, because he said it in his heart; and also true that
> he did not say it in his heart because he could not conceive it; it follows
> that there are two senses in which something may be understood to be
> conceived or said in the heart. For in one sense we are said to have a
> conception of something, when we have a conception of the word that
> signifies it; and in another sense, when we understand what the thing
> really is. In the former sense then we may say that God is conceived not to
> exist: but in the latter, He cannot by any means be conceived not to exist.
> For no man that understandeth what fire and water mean, can conceive that
> fire is really water; though he may have this conception, as far as the
> words go. Thus in like manner no man that understandeth what God is can
> conceive that God does not exist; although he may say these words [that God
> does not exist] either with no meaning at all, or with some other meaning
> than that which they properly bear. For God is that than which no greater
> can be conceived. He who well under standeth what this is, certainly
> understandeth it to be such as cannot even be conceived not to exist.
> Whosoever therefore understandeth in this way that God exists, cannot
> conceive that he does not exist. Thanks be to Thee, O good Lord, thanks be
> to Thee! because that which heretofore I believed by Thy grace, I now by
> Thine illumination thus understand, so that, even though I should not wish
> to believe in Thine existence, I cannot but understand that Thou dost exist.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 5:11 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Ben,
>>
>> What is Anselm's ontological argument, for it is my opinion that someone
>> from Missouri is expected to know it.
>>
>> If I, being from Missouri, is not expected to know about Anselm's
>> ontological argument, then why are you imposing the question on us, which
>> includes me?
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:05 PM, Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Dear Jon Alan Schmidt:
>>>
>>> I would like to go back to the point that this chain of emails began.
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt asked about something he found Peirce had said in the 
>>> *Neglected
>>> Argument*, which had been omitted in the version published in the *Essential
>>> Peirce*:
>>>
>>>
>>> CSP:  Among the many pertinent considerations which have been crowded
>>> out of this article, I may just mention that it could have been shown that
>>> the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion
>>> as it may seem.  On the contrary, it is connected so with a theory of the
>>> nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that.  Now there is no such
>>> difficulty in tracing experiential consequences of this theory of thinking
>>> as there are in attempting directly to trace out other consequences of
>>> God's reality.
>>>
>>>
>>> Jon said that raised "a few interesting questions," namely:
>>>
>>>    1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of
>>>    the nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and 
>>> their
>>>    "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or
>>>    something else?
>>>    2. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected
>>>    with "the hypothesis of God's reality"?
>>>    3. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
>>>    thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, 
>>> deductively
>>>    trace and inductively test?
>>>    4. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the
>>>    nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would
>>>    thereby also be "proved"?
>>>
>>> I have some tentative thoughts about these matters, including a couple
>>> of ideas that I found in the secondary literature, but would appreciate
>>> seeing what others have to say initially.
>>>
>>> So, let me respond.
>>>
>>> I thought I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness when  our
>>> discussion began. This is the example I had in mind.  I am a student
>>> sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture, when suddenly an
>>> explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind the professor's
>>> desk, or a truck wreck on the street right outside the classroom windows.
>>> The sound of true explosion, whatever it is, is  sudden, unexpected, and
>>> immediate.  The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute
>>> firstness--I feel them. Secondness is what my body does in reaction, which
>>> is to  immediately and involuntarily, raise my head, flinch, and commence
>>> other bodily reactions to the explosion waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs
>>> next, when my mind begins to wonder what just happened. All this  can
>>> happen in far less than the blink of an eye.  Peirce's analysis of it by
>>> breaking it down in this way was thought to be a fertile way of beginning
>>> to understand thinking, or to begin a theory of thinking.
>>>
>>> Please correct me again, Jon, if that is not an elementary example of
>>> firstness, etc.
>>>
>>> However, I soon got lost in the subsequent discussion of these, where
>>> thirdness became intertwined with secondness and firstness, and so on, in
>>> the subsequent emails.  I do  not doubt that all of you are correct that
>>> Peirce did take this rudimentary example to far heights of thinking which I
>>> may just be constitutionally unable to rise to. But my reading of Peirce
>>> suggests that he was a very pragmatic person who appreciated someone from
>>> Missouri showing up and saying "show me." In any event, so much of the
>>> subsequent discussion involved concepts going back and forth with no
>>> examples that allowed them to be brought to earth for examination. At
>>> least, that is what it seemed to me.
>>>
>>> So, is it possible to get back to the original question. Remember that
>>> Peirce thought that all this became clear to him his daily walks through
>>> the woods, and he wrote this essay suggesting that its thinking would be
>>> available to anyone of ordinary intelligence who pondered the three
>>> universes suggested on their own daily walks through the woods.
>>>
>>> So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I think
>>> he  is on to something:
>>>
>>>    1. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected
>>>    with "the hypothesis of God's reality"?
>>>    2. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of
>>>    thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, 
>>> deductively
>>>    trace and inductively test?
>>>    3. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the
>>>    nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would
>>>    thereby also be "proved"?
>>>
>>> In response, some raised the ontological argument of St. Anselm. But the
>>> raising of it was not followed through. Here is my question (which I hope
>>> "nests" all three of Jon's questions):
>>>
>>> What would Anselm's ontological argument look like if it were restated
>>> in Peirce's terms? In other words, could Anselm have discovered the same
>>> argument as Peirce? Would this give us any insight into the theory of
>>> thinking? Peirce says that we could, with comparatively little difficulty,
>>> deductively and inductively test such a theory of thinking. Someone from
>>> Missouri might say, "Show me."
>>>
>>> Ben Novak
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>*
>>> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
>>> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>>>
>>> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the
>>> arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the
>>> last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored
>>> canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the
>>> last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science
>>>> courses in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian
>>>> issues both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the
>>>> last was accepted enthusiastically, I continually got grumblings about how
>>>>  was not teaching the Standard View properly.
>>>>
>>>> Maybe things have improved, with more naturalistic approaches becoming
>>>> more prevalent, but the culture wars really made a mess of trying to bring
>>>> in Peircean ideas because the view that science was a mere social construct
>>>> seemed to be supported by naïve interpretations of Peirce. So I found
>>>> myself apparently fighting myself at some times.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, the culture wars (which are still with us) are rather annoying.
>>>> Not just because of how they try to make science into something we can
>>>> control and thereby reject but because of how often they just read
>>>> philosophers so badly. Lots of figures who make more careful subtle
>>>> distinctions about science’s social aspects are appropriated for tasks
>>>> they’d be aghast at. (Kuhn is the classic example although it’s not hard to
>>>> find others)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> -----------------------------
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
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