The existence of God amuses me. What about the nature of god. This was radically changed by Jesus who did not appear to accept him as a tribal deity, or the explicit ruler of history in an interventionist mode. etc. I have always assumed Peirce had a mystical experience in a church not far from where I write, and that his encounter was with a deity rather more benign than the one who inhabits the pages of most Scripture. I am merely commenting on the fact that the nature is more important than existence per se.
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 7:01 PM, Harold Orbach <[email protected]> wrote: > My previous message, attached below, didn't get to the Peirce list but > only apparently to Ben Novak and Jerry Rhee. The latest exchange, > especially attacking Edwina for her personal beliefs about the EXISTENCE of > God, i.e., the minority view of that small segment of the inhabitants of > the 7th Rock from the Sun, does not interfere with her accepting the > REALITY of THAT God, as Peirce apparently did. But there is a persistent > confusion on the part of those who apparently believe in the EXISTENCE of > that God, which there is no evidence that Peirce ever did, with HIS > REALITY. Perhaps the list members might read Peirce's agreement, clearly > expressed on more than one occasion for his youthful friend, Francis E. > Abbot's view on the matter. Or of that of James, Dewey and Mead. > > Harold L. Orbach > > Sent from my iPhone > > Begin forwarded message: > > *From:* <[email protected]> > *Date:* September 14, 2016 at 1:20:31 AM CDT > *To:* Ben Novak <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Jerry Rhee <[email protected]>, Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking* > > Pardon my intrusion into this unending mishmash: > > 1. Peirce's neglected argument is for the REALITY of God not the > EXISTENCE of God. > > 2. Anselm's ontological argument for the EXISTENCE of God is not "pretty > nearly the most famous argument in the history of philosophy," only in the > history of a small segment of the so-called WESTERN world, a minor part of > the total areas and populations of what is termed "the earth" that came to > dominate and "discover" most of the other areas for a few hundred years up > to the present compared with other civilizations or empires that had > dominance over larger and smaller areas for thousands of years. > > 3. Other lands and peoples have and have had different views on the > nature of God or Gods or Goddesses or if there are any that EXIST and how > anyone might come to know this. They also have and have had different > kinds of "things" that were believed to be gods or sacred. > > Harold L. Orbach > PhD, University of Minnesota Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology > Emeritus, Kansas State University > Sent from my iPhone > > On Sep 13, 2016, at 10:32 PM, Ben Novak <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Jerry, List: > > You ask two questions. First, what is Anselm's ontological argument. > Thankfully, that is easy to answer. It is short, and I append it to this > email at the end. > > Your second question is why "you are imposing the question on us, which > includes me [Jerry Rhee]? > > First. let me clarify for the record: I am not from Missouri, and only > used that phrase assuming everyone is familiar with it, in order to get to > the "show me" part. Further, I do not know whether everyone in Missouri has > heard of Anselm's ontological argument, though I assume not. > > However, I would expect (silly me!) that anyone with a Ph.D. would have > heard of it, since it is pretty nearly the most famous argument about God's > existence in the history of philosophy, and would be expected to be brought > up in any introductory, or history of, philosophy course or in any > conversation or study anytime anyone questions whether God exists. > > Further, since we are talking about Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the > Reality of God," Anselm's argument would naturally come to mind as soon as > anyone inquires into why Peirce thought his argument had been "neglected." > In other words, the very title of Peirce's paper points to other arguments > for God's existence in the context of which he is placing his. But it is > worth noting that Peirce did not claim that he had a *new* argument, but > suggests by his title that it may have arisen before and was merely > "neglected." So he was bringing a long neglected argument back into view. > At least I take that to be one possible interpretation of the suggestion in > his title.(On the other hand, I take Peirce's title to imply that he felt > his argument had been neglected because it was so simple!!!! that no one > thought to dignify it previously. Silly me.) > > Since the original questions that commenced this chain include "How > exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected with "the > hypothesis of God's reality"? I assumed that that was to be one of the > major questions dealt with in the discussion, which Jon thought to begin by > asking his four questions. > > Now, the ontological argument has evoked a stupendous literature in > philosophy and logic, because it seems to prove the existence of God by > a purely logical and non-empirical method. That is why it is called > ontological, i.e., the argument proceeds only from being (onto=being). > Philosophers agree that Anselm makes at least two different arguments in > chapters II and III, though some philosophers find three and even four > separate arguments. Many logicians have wrestled with it, and some > logicians see it as a "modal" argument. > > The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a very brief and readable > description of Anselm's ontological argument: Be sure to read sections 1, > 2a, 3, and 4. > > http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/ > > I hope that you will agree, after reading the brief account in the link > above that Anselm is quite relevant to placing Peirce's "neglected" > argument into context. The connection is that both Anselm and Peirce seek > to prove God's existence purely from a thought process. > > Now, if you want to read a different take on Anselm's understanding of > what is meant by "existence," I invite you to read my article entitled > "Anselm on Nothing," *in the International Philosophical Quarterly*, > Volume 48, Issue 3, September 2008, pages 305-320, which you may read on > line here: > > https://www.academia.edu/13891780/Anselm_on_Nothing > > For this second link, it must be borne in mind that Anselm wrote two > tracts relating to God's existence (or being), and the first link deals > with his second work, the *Proslogion*, where his famous ontological > argument is found (appended below), while the second link (my article) > deals mostly with Anselm's arguments in his first work, the *Monologion.* > (Understand, too, that my views though increasingly cited are nevertheless > minority.) > > Understand too that Peirce's works were constantly on my mind throughout > writing "Anselm on Nothing," and that I planned to write a second article > on Peirce and Anselm, but was largely discouraged from doing so by the > realization that Peirceans would disagree with just about everything a > simple person like me would say about Peirce's thought---which is why I was > so excited when Jon posted his questions that began this chain.For example, > I thought the example I gave of simple firstness, secondness, and thirdness > was safe, but I received a private email from an observer of this list that > such is not the case: > > Echoing others, the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness ordering in your > example is too linear. It should be Firstness-Thirdness-Secondness. That > is, some shock meets your habitual conditioning which determines the > reaction. How else could we have different reactions? > > So, I need a lot of enlightenment, which is why I appreciate this forum so > much. > > In any event, appended below are Chapters II, III, and IV of the > *Proslogion, *which contains Anselm's famous ontological argument; > > > Ben > Chapter II > > Therefore, O Lord, who grantest to faith understanding, grant unto me > that, so far as Thou knowest it to be expedient for me, I may understand > that Thou art, as we believe; and also that Thou art what we believe Thee > to be. And of a truth we believe that Thou art somewhat than which no > greater can be conceived. Is there then nothing real that can be thus > described? for the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. Yet surely > even that fool himself when he hears me speak of somewhat than which > nothing greater can be conceived under stands what he hears, and what he > understands is in his understanding, even if he do not under stand that it > really exists. It is one thing for a thing to be in the understanding, and > another to understand that the thing really exists. For when a painter > considers the work which he is to make, he has it indeed in his > understanding; but he doth not yet understand that really to exist which as > yet he has not made. But when he has painted his picture, then he both has > the picture in his understanding, and also under stands it really to exist. > Thus even the fool is certain that something exists, at least in his > understanding, than which nothing greater can be conceived; because, when > he hears this mentioned, he understands it, and whatsoever is understood, > exists in the understanding. And surely that than which no greater can be > conceived cannot exist only in the understanding. For if it exist indeed in > the understanding only, it can be thought to exist also in reality; and > real existence is more than existence in the under standing only. If then > that than which no greater can be conceived exists in the understanding > only, then that than which no greater can be conceived is something a > greater than which can be conceived: but this is impossible. There fore it > is certain that something than which no greater can be conceived exists > both in the under standing and also in reality. > Chapter II > > Not only does this something than which no greater can be conceived exist, > but it exists in so true a sense that it cannot even be conceived not to > exist. For it is possible to form the conception of an object whose > non-existence shall be inconceivable; and such an object is of necessity > greater than any object whose existence is conceivable: wherefore if that > than which no greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist; it > follows that that than which no greater can be conceived is not that than > which no greater can be conceived [for there can be thought a greater than > it, namely, an object whose non-existence shall be inconceivable]; and this > brings us to a contradiction. And thus it is proved that that thing than > which no greater can be conceived exists in so true a sense, that it cannot > even be conceived not to exist: and this thing art Thou, O Lord our God! > And so Thou, O Lord my God, existest in so true a sense that Thou canst not > even be conceived not to exist. And this is as is fitting. For if any mind > could conceive aught better than Thee, then the creature would be ascending > above the Creator, and judging the Creator; which is a supposition very > absurd. Thou therefore dost exist in a truer sense than all else beside > Thee, and art more real than all else beside Thee; because whatsoever else > existeth, existeth in a less true sense than Thou, and therefore is less > real than Thou. Why then said the fool in his heart, There is no God, when > it is so plain to a rational mind that Thou art more real than any thing > else? Why, except that he is a fool indeed? > Chapter IV > > But how came the fool to say in his heart that which he could not > conceive? or how came he to be able not to conceive that which yet he said > in his heart? For it may be thought that to conceive and to say in one’s > heart are one and the same thing. If it is true—nay, because it is true, > that he conceived it, because he said it in his heart; and also true that > he did not say it in his heart because he could not conceive it; it follows > that there are two senses in which something may be understood to be > conceived or said in the heart. For in one sense we are said to have a > conception of something, when we have a conception of the word that > signifies it; and in another sense, when we understand what the thing > really is. In the former sense then we may say that God is conceived not to > exist: but in the latter, He cannot by any means be conceived not to exist. > For no man that understandeth what fire and water mean, can conceive that > fire is really water; though he may have this conception, as far as the > words go. Thus in like manner no man that understandeth what God is can > conceive that God does not exist; although he may say these words [that God > does not exist] either with no meaning at all, or with some other meaning > than that which they properly bear. For God is that than which no greater > can be conceived. He who well under standeth what this is, certainly > understandeth it to be such as cannot even be conceived not to exist. > Whosoever therefore understandeth in this way that God exists, cannot > conceive that he does not exist. Thanks be to Thee, O good Lord, thanks be > to Thee! because that which heretofore I believed by Thy grace, I now by > Thine illumination thus understand, so that, even though I should not wish > to believe in Thine existence, I cannot but understand that Thou dost exist. > > > > > > > > *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* > 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 > Telephone: (814) 808-5702 > > *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts > themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar > of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a > sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear > accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 5:11 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Ben, >> >> What is Anselm's ontological argument, for it is my opinion that someone >> from Missouri is expected to know it. >> >> If I, being from Missouri, is not expected to know about Anselm's >> ontological argument, then why are you imposing the question on us, which >> includes me? >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:05 PM, Ben Novak <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Dear Jon Alan Schmidt: >>> >>> I would like to go back to the point that this chain of emails began. >>> Jon Alan Schmidt asked about something he found Peirce had said in the >>> *Neglected >>> Argument*, which had been omitted in the version published in the *Essential >>> Peirce*: >>> >>> >>> CSP: Among the many pertinent considerations which have been crowded >>> out of this article, I may just mention that it could have been shown that >>> the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion >>> as it may seem. On the contrary, it is connected so with a theory of the >>> nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that. Now there is no such >>> difficulty in tracing experiential consequences of this theory of thinking >>> as there are in attempting directly to trace out other consequences of >>> God's reality. >>> >>> >>> Jon said that raised "a few interesting questions," namely: >>> >>> 1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of >>> the nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and >>> their >>> "logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or >>> something else? >>> 2. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected >>> with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? >>> 3. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of >>> thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, >>> deductively >>> trace and inductively test? >>> 4. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the >>> nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would >>> thereby also be "proved"? >>> >>> I have some tentative thoughts about these matters, including a couple >>> of ideas that I found in the secondary literature, but would appreciate >>> seeing what others have to say initially. >>> >>> So, let me respond. >>> >>> I thought I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness when our >>> discussion began. This is the example I had in mind. I am a student >>> sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture, when suddenly an >>> explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind the professor's >>> desk, or a truck wreck on the street right outside the classroom windows. >>> The sound of true explosion, whatever it is, is sudden, unexpected, and >>> immediate. The sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute >>> firstness--I feel them. Secondness is what my body does in reaction, which >>> is to immediately and involuntarily, raise my head, flinch, and commence >>> other bodily reactions to the explosion waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs >>> next, when my mind begins to wonder what just happened. All this can >>> happen in far less than the blink of an eye. Peirce's analysis of it by >>> breaking it down in this way was thought to be a fertile way of beginning >>> to understand thinking, or to begin a theory of thinking. >>> >>> Please correct me again, Jon, if that is not an elementary example of >>> firstness, etc. >>> >>> However, I soon got lost in the subsequent discussion of these, where >>> thirdness became intertwined with secondness and firstness, and so on, in >>> the subsequent emails. I do not doubt that all of you are correct that >>> Peirce did take this rudimentary example to far heights of thinking which I >>> may just be constitutionally unable to rise to. But my reading of Peirce >>> suggests that he was a very pragmatic person who appreciated someone from >>> Missouri showing up and saying "show me." In any event, so much of the >>> subsequent discussion involved concepts going back and forth with no >>> examples that allowed them to be brought to earth for examination. At >>> least, that is what it seemed to me. >>> >>> So, is it possible to get back to the original question. Remember that >>> Peirce thought that all this became clear to him his daily walks through >>> the woods, and he wrote this essay suggesting that its thinking would be >>> available to anyone of ordinary intelligence who pondered the three >>> universes suggested on their own daily walks through the woods. >>> >>> So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I think >>> he is on to something: >>> >>> 1. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" *logically *connected >>> with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? >>> 2. What would be some "experiential consequences of this theory of >>> thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, >>> deductively >>> trace and inductively test? >>> 3. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of the >>> nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would >>> thereby also be "proved"? >>> >>> In response, some raised the ontological argument of St. Anselm. But the >>> raising of it was not followed through. Here is my question (which I hope >>> "nests" all three of Jon's questions): >>> >>> What would Anselm's ontological argument look like if it were restated >>> in Peirce's terms? In other words, could Anselm have discovered the same >>> argument as Peirce? Would this give us any insight into the theory of >>> thinking? Peirce says that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, >>> deductively and inductively test such a theory of thinking. Someone from >>> Missouri might say, "Show me." >>> >>> Ben Novak >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>* >>> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142 >>> Telephone: (814) 808-5702 >>> >>> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the >>> arts themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the >>> last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored >>> canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the >>> last ear accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler >>> >>> On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote: >>>> >>>> I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science >>>> courses in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian >>>> issues both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the >>>> last was accepted enthusiastically, I continually got grumblings about how >>>> was not teaching the Standard View properly. >>>> >>>> Maybe things have improved, with more naturalistic approaches becoming >>>> more prevalent, but the culture wars really made a mess of trying to bring >>>> in Peircean ideas because the view that science was a mere social construct >>>> seemed to be supported by naïve interpretations of Peirce. So I found >>>> myself apparently fighting myself at some times. >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, the culture wars (which are still with us) are rather annoying. >>>> Not just because of how they try to make science into something we can >>>> control and thereby reject but because of how often they just read >>>> philosophers so badly. Lots of figures who make more careful subtle >>>> distinctions about science’s social aspects are appropriated for tasks >>>> they’d be aghast at. (Kuhn is the classic example although it’s not hard to >>>> find others) >>>> >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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