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Thanks, Edwina, this is very helpful. I appreciate how much
you were able to gather.
Thanks, again, Mike.
On 9/16/2016 7:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky
wrote:
Mike - there are multiple sites...and
it's spread throughout his work. Let's see...
6.13 and on, where he talks about the
three theories of evolution - and rejects pure randomness. See
also 6.33 - where he discusses randomness moving into 'taking
of habits'
In 6.57 and on, he discusses 'everywhere
the main fact is growth and increasing complexity 6.58..."by
thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of the
universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained
within the narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal
departures from law continually and greaet ones with infinite
infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of
the universe" 6.59
6.102 'I have begun by showing that tychism
must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the
regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of
growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds
matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind"
Then, he continues on with his
explanation of synechism, the notion of continuity..."where
ideas tend to spread continuosly and to affect certain others
which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility.
In this spreading they lose intensity and especially the pow3r
of affecting others, but g ain generality and become welded
with other ideas' 6.104
So, see his outline in 6.202, where he
doesn't want his theory of the evolution of diversity [and
habits] to be simply tychism or chance, but, he considers that
'continuity or Thirdness...as well as Firstness and Secondness
play a role. Thirdness, .."this habit is a generalizing
tendency...and "it must have its origin in the original
continuity which is inherent in potentiality" 6.204
And, discussing his differences with
Hegal..6.218...'It is true that the whole universe and every
feature of it must be regarded as rational, that is as brought
about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it
is constrained to be as it is by the logic of
events, for the logic of evolution and of life need not be
supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely constrains
a given conclusion". Here - I think Peirce insists on the
reality of spontaneity, chance, freedom, along with the
operation of Reason.
And - 'protoplasm feels. It not only
feels but exercises all the functions of mind" 6.255
"Necessitarianism cannot logically stop
short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the
physical universe" 6.61...."we gain room to insert mind into
our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed,
into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing,
it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence;
and in so doing we resolve the problem of the connection of
soul and body" 6.61.
Then, his very clear and long outline of
'evolutionary love' See 6.293 and on..where he rejects the
mechanism of basic Darwinism...and discusses 'agapasm'. This
is all too long to quote here..but he discusses the 'agapastic
development of thought...by virtue of the continuity of mind"
6.306
-----------------------------
And of course, "Thought is not
necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of
bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world;
and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that
the colors, the shapes, etc. of objects are really there"
4.551...
Not only is thought in the
organic*world, but it develops there. But as there cannot be a
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be
thought without Signs" 4.551.
* I have seen this changed to inorganic,
which I think makes more sense, including that crystal.
---------------------
And his focus on the diversity of
nature, both its existential reality AND that this diversity
grows..
..."what is the most marked and
obtrusive character of nature? Of course, I mean the variety
of nature"1.159.
"Now, I don't know that it is logically
accurate to say that this marvellous and infinite diversity
and manifoldness of things is a sign of spontaneity......"
1.160. He goes on to say this it IS spontaneity...
And 1.162 and on, where he says that
"the universe is not a mere mechanical result of the
operation of blind law. The most obvious of all its characters
cannot be so explained. It is the multitudinous facts of all
experience that show us this.....
And on..1.174 where he writes that
'mechanical law can never produce diversification' [it can
only produce like consequents]..and on into 1.175
That is, he acknowledges 'chance,
freedom, spontaneity'..as well as the formation of habits'
----------------
Basically, he is outlining the action of
Mind in the development of both diversity and habits -
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, September 16,
2016 7:31 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L]
Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Hi Edwina,
On 9/16/2016 6:28 PM, Edwina
Taborsky wrote:
Harold, list: Thanks for your
comments.
I think one has to, as I said, first
define the term 'God'. If by that term, one means a
universal Reason or Mind, then, I acknowledge its reality,
and always have. One has only to, as Peirce said,
consider the intricate forms and interactions of nature on
this planet to acknowledge that randomness and natural
selection didn't create or maintain such intricate and
interactional complexity.
This interests me very much. Can you point to some references
where Peirce states this?
Thanks, Mike
And Anselm's argument seems to me to
be purely conceptual [if you think of it, then...] whereas
my acknowledgement of the reality of Mind, a rational
force of universal interactional and collaborative order
within the universe, relies actually on observation of
such an interactional order.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, September
16, 2016 7:01 PM
Subject: Fwd:
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
My previous message, attached below, didn't get
to the Peirce list but only apparently to Ben
Novak and Jerry Rhee. The latest exchange,
especially attacking Edwina for her personal
beliefs about the EXISTENCE of God, i.e., the
minority view of that small segment of the
inhabitants of the 7th Rock from the Sun, does not
interfere with her accepting the REALITY of THAT
God, as Peirce apparently did. But there is a
persistent confusion on the part of those who
apparently believe in the EXISTENCE of that God,
which there is no evidence that Peirce ever did,
with HIS REALITY. Perhaps the list members might
read Peirce's agreement, clearly expressed on
more than one occasion for his youthful friend,
Francis E. Abbot's view on the matter. Or of that
of James, Dewey and Mead.
Harold L. Orbach
Begin forwarded message:
Pardon my intrusion into this unending
mishmash:
1. Peirce's
neglected argument is for the REALITY of God
not the EXISTENCE of God.
2. Anselm's
ontological argument for the EXISTENCE of God
is not "pretty nearly the most famous argument
in the history of philosophy," only in the
history of a small segment of the so-called
WESTERN world, a minor part of the total areas
and populations of what is termed "the earth"
that came to dominate and "discover" most of
the other areas for a few hundred years up to
the present compared with other civilizations
or empires that had dominance over larger and
smaller areas for thousands of years.
3. Other lands and
peoples have and have had different views on
the nature of God or Gods or Goddesses or if
there are any that EXIST and how anyone might
come to know this. They also have and have
had different kinds of "things" that were
believed to be gods or sacred.
Harold L. Orbach
PhD, University of
Minnesota Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology
Emeritus, Kansas State University
Sent from my iPhone
Dear Jerry, List:
You ask two questions. First, what is
Anselm's ontological argument.
Thankfully, that is easy to answer. It
is short, and I append it to this email
at the end.
Your second question is why "you are imposing the
question on us, which includes me
[Jerry Rhee]?
First.
let me clarify for the record: I
am not from Missouri, and only used that
phrase assuming everyone is familiar
with it, in order to get to the "show
me" part. Further, I do not know whether
everyone in Missouri has heard of
Anselm's ontological argument, though I
assume not.
However, I would expect (silly
me!) that anyone with a Ph.D. would have
heard of it, since it is pretty nearly
the most famous argument about God's
existence in the history of philosophy,
and would be expected to be brought up
in any introductory, or history of,
philosophy course or in any conversation
or study anytime anyone questions
whether God exists.
Further, since we are talking about
Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God," Anselm's argument would
naturally come to mind as soon as anyone
inquires into why Peirce thought his
argument had been "neglected." In other
words, the very title of Peirce's paper
points to other arguments for God's
existence in the context of which he is
placing his. But it is worth noting that
Peirce did not claim that he had a new
argument, but suggests by his title that
it may have arisen before and was merely
"neglected." So he was bringing a long
neglected argument back into view. At
least I take that to be one possible
interpretation of the suggestion in his
title.(On the other hand, I take
Peirce's title to imply that he felt his
argument had been neglected because it
was so simple!!!! that no one thought to
dignify it previously. Silly me.)
Since the original questions that
commenced this chain include "How exactly is "this
theory of thinking" logically connected
with "the hypothesis of God's
reality"?
I assumed that that was to be one
of the major questions dealt with in
the discussion, which Jon thought to
begin by asking his four questions.
Now, the
ontological argument has evoked a
stupendous literature in philosophy
and logic, because it seems to
prove the existence of God by a purely
logical and non-empirical method. That
is why it is called ontological, i.e.,
the argument proceeds only from being
(_onto_=being). Philosophers agree that
Anselm makes at least two different
arguments in chapters II and III,
though some philosophers find three
and even four separate arguments. Many
logicians have wrestled with it, and
some logicians see it as a "modal"
argument.
The Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a
very brief and readable description of
Anselm's ontological argument: Be sure
to read sections 1, 2a, 3, and 4.
I hope that you will agree, after
reading the brief account in the link
above that Anselm is quite relevant to
placing Peirce's "neglected" argument
into context. The connection is that
both Anselm and Peirce seek to prove
God's existence purely from a thought
process.
Now, if you want to read a different
take on Anselm's understanding of what
is meant by "existence," I invite you to
read my article entitled "Anselm on
Nothing," in the International
Philosophical Quarterly, Volume
48, Issue 3, September 2008, pages
305-320, which you may read on line
here:
For this second link, it must be
borne in mind that Anselm wrote two
tracts relating to God's existence (or
being), and the first link deals with
his second work, the Proslogion,
where his famous ontological argument is
found (appended below), while the second
link (my article) deals mostly with
Anselm's arguments in his first work,
the Monologion.
(Understand, too, that my views though
increasingly cited are nevertheless
minority.)
Understand too that Peirce's works
were constantly on my mind throughout
writing "Anselm on Nothing," and that I
planned to write a second article on
Peirce and Anselm, but was largely
discouraged from doing so by the
realization that Peirceans would
disagree with just about everything a
simple person like me would say about
Peirce's thought---which is why I was so
excited when Jon posted his questions
that began this chain.For example, I
thought the example I gave of simple
firstness, secondness, and thirdness was
safe, but I received a private email
from an observer of this list that such
is not the case:
Echoing
others, the
Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness
ordering in your example is too
linear. It should be
Firstness-Thirdness-Secondness.
That is, some shock meets your
habitual conditioning which
determines the reaction. How else
could we have different reactions?
So, I need a
lot of enlightenment, which is why
I appreciate this forum so much.
In
any event, appended below are Chapters
II, III, and IV of the Proslogion, which
contains Anselm's famous ontological
argument;
Ben
Chapter II
Therefore, O Lord, who
grantest to faith understanding, grant
unto me that, so far as Thou knowest it
to be expedient for me, I may understand
that Thou art, as we believe; and also
that Thou art what we believe Thee to
be. And of a truth we believe that Thou
art somewhat than which no greater can
be conceived. Is there then nothing real
that can be thus described? for the fool
hath said in his heart, There is no God.
Yet surely even that fool himself when
he hears me speak of somewhat than which
nothing greater can be conceived under
stands what he hears, and what he
understands is in his understanding,
even if he do not under stand that it
really exists. It is one thing for a
thing to be in the understanding, and
another to understand that the thing
really exists. For when a painter
considers the work which he is to make,
he has it indeed in his understanding;
but he doth not yet understand that
really to exist which as yet he has not
made. But when he has painted his
picture, then he both has the picture in
his understanding, and also under stands
it really to exist. Thus even the fool
is certain that something exists, at
least in his understanding, than which
nothing greater can be conceived;
because, when he hears this mentioned,
he understands it, and whatsoever is
understood, exists in the understanding.
And surely that than which no greater
can be conceived cannot exist only in
the understanding. For if it exist
indeed in the understanding only, it can
be thought to exist also in reality; and
real existence is more than existence in
the under standing only. If then that
than which no greater can be conceived
exists in the understanding only, then
that than which no greater can be
conceived is something a greater than
which can be conceived: but this is
impossible. There fore it is certain
that something than which no greater can
be conceived exists both in the under
standing and also in reality.
Chapter II
Not only does this
something than which no greater can be
conceived exist, but it exists in so
true a sense that it cannot even be
conceived not to exist. For it is
possible to form the conception of an
object whose non-existence shall be
inconceivable; and such an object is of
necessity greater than any object whose
existence is conceivable: wherefore if
that than which no greater can be
conceived can be conceived not to exist;
it follows that that than which no
greater can be conceived is not that
than which no greater can be conceived
[for there can be thought a greater than
it, namely, an object whose
non-existence shall be inconceivable];
and this brings us to a contradiction.
And thus it is proved that that thing
than which no greater can be conceived
exists in so true a sense, that it
cannot even be conceived not to exist:
and this thing art Thou, O Lord our God!
And so Thou, O Lord my God, existest in
so true a sense that Thou canst not even
be conceived not to exist. And this is
as is fitting. For if any mind could
conceive aught better than Thee, then
the creature would be ascending above
the Creator, and judging the Creator;
which is a supposition very absurd. Thou
therefore dost exist in a truer sense
than all else beside Thee, and art more
real than all else beside Thee; because
whatsoever else existeth, existeth in a
less true sense than Thou, and therefore
is less real than Thou. Why then said
the fool in his heart, There is no God,
when it is so plain to a rational mind
that Thou art more real than any thing
else? Why, except that he is a fool
indeed?
Chapter IV
But how came the fool
to say in his heart that which he could
not conceive? or how came he to be able
not to conceive that which yet he said
in his heart? For it may be thought that
to conceive and to say in one’s heart
are one and the same thing. If it is
true—nay, because it is true, that he
conceived it, because he said it in his
heart; and also true that he did not say
it in his heart because he could not
conceive it; it follows that there are
two senses in which something may be
understood to be conceived or said in
the heart. For in one sense we are said
to have a conception of something, when
we have a conception of the word that
signifies it; and in another sense, when
we understand what the thing really is.
In the former sense then we may say that
God is conceived not to exist: but in
the latter, He cannot by any means be
conceived not to exist. For no man that
understandeth what fire and water mean,
can conceive that fire is really water;
though he may have this conception, as
far as the words go. Thus in like manner
no man that understandeth what God is
can conceive that God does not exist;
although he may say these words [that
God does not exist] either with no
meaning at all, or with some other
meaning than that which they properly
bear. For God is that than which no
greater can be conceived. He who well
under standeth what this is, certainly
understandeth it to be such as cannot
even be conceived not to exist.
Whosoever therefore understandeth in
this way that God exists, cannot
conceive that he does not exist. Thanks
be to Thee, O good Lord, thanks be to
Thee! because that which heretofore I
believed by Thy grace, I now by Thine
illumination thus understand, so that,
even though I should not wish to believe
in Thine existence, I cannot but
understand that Thou dost exist.
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