Mike - there are multiple sites...and it's spread throughout his work. Let's 
see...

6.13 and on, where he talks about the three theories of evolution - and rejects 
pure randomness. See also 6.33 - where he discusses randomness moving into 
'taking of habits'

In 6.57 and on, he discusses 'everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing 
complexity 6.58..."by thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of 
the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained within the narrow 
bounds by law, producing infinitesimal departures from law continually and 
greaet ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and 
diversity of the universe" 6.59

6.102 'I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary 
cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as 
products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to 
be mere specialized and partially deadened mind"

Then, he continues on with his explanation of synechism, the notion of 
continuity..."where ideas tend to spread continuosly and to affect certain 
others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this 
spreading they lose intensity and especially the pow3r of affecting others, but 
g ain generality and become welded with other ideas' 6.104

So, see his outline in 6.202, where he doesn't want his theory of the evolution 
of diversity [and habits] to be simply tychism or chance, but, he considers 
that 'continuity or Thirdness...as well as Firstness and Secondness play a 
role.  Thirdness, .."this habit is a generalizing tendency...and "it must have 
its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality" 6.204

And, discussing his differences with Hegal..6.218...'It is true that the whole 
universe and every feature of it must be regarded as rational, that is as 
brought about by the logic of events. But it does not follow that it is 
constrained to be as it is by the logic of events, for the logic of evolution 
and of life need not be supposed to be of that wooden kind that absolutely 
constrains a given conclusion".  Here - I think Peirce insists on the reality 
of spontaneity, chance, freedom, along with the operation of Reason.

And - 'protoplasm feels. It not only feels but exercises all the functions of 
mind" 6.255

"Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the 
mind a part of the physical universe" 6.61...."we gain room to insert mind into 
our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed, into the position 
which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy, that of 
the fountain of existence; and in so doing we resolve the problem of the 
connection of soul and body" 6.61.

Then, his very clear and long outline of 'evolutionary love' See 6.293 and 
on..where he rejects the mechanism of basic Darwinism...and discusses 
'agapasm'. This is all too long to quote here..but he discusses the 'agapastic 
development of thought...by virtue of the continuity of mind" 6.306
-----------------------------

And of course, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears 
in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout the purely physical world; and 
one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, 
etc. of objects are really there" 4.551...

Not only is thought in the organic*world, but it develops there. But as there 
cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought 
without Signs" 4.551.
* I have seen this changed to inorganic, which I think makes more sense, 
including that crystal.
---------------------
And his focus on the diversity of nature, both its existential reality AND that 
this diversity grows..
..."what is the most marked and obtrusive character of nature? Of course, I 
mean the variety of nature"1.159.
"Now, I don't know that it is logically accurate to say that this marvellous 
and infinite diversity and manifoldness of things is a sign of 
spontaneity......" 1.160. He goes on to say this it IS spontaneity...

And 1.162 and on, where he says that "the universe is not a mere mechanical 
result of the operation of blind law. The most obvious of all its characters 
cannot be so explained. It is the multitudinous facts of all experience that 
show us this.....

And on..1.174 where he writes that 'mechanical law can never produce 
diversification'  [it can only produce like consequents]..and on into 1.175

That is, he acknowledges 'chance, freedom, spontaneity'..as well as the 
formation of habits'
----------------
Basically, he is outlining the action of Mind in the development of both 
diversity and habits -

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Mike Bergman 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Harold Orbach ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Cc: jerryr...@gmail.com ; trevriz...@gmail.com ; Gary Richmond ; 
jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
  Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 7:31 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Hi Edwina,




  On 9/16/2016 6:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

    Harold, list: Thanks for your comments. 

    I think one has to, as I said, first define the term 'God'. If by that 
term, one means a universal Reason or Mind, then, I acknowledge its reality, 
and always have.  One has only to, as Peirce said, consider the intricate forms 
and interactions of nature on this planet to acknowledge that randomness and 
natural selection didn't create or maintain such intricate and interactional 
complexity.

  This interests me very much. Can you point to some references where Peirce 
states this?

  Thanks, Mike


    And Anselm's argument seems to me to be purely conceptual [if you think of 
it, then...] whereas my acknowledgement of the reality of Mind, a rational 
force of universal interactional and collaborative order within the universe, 
relies actually on observation of such an interactional order.

    Edwina
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Harold Orbach 
      To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
      Cc: jerryr...@gmail.com ; trevriz...@gmail.com ; Gary Richmond ; 
tabor...@primus.ca ; jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
      Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 7:01 PM
      Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


      My previous message, attached below, didn't get to the Peirce list but 
only apparently to Ben Novak and Jerry Rhee.  The latest exchange, especially 
attacking Edwina for her personal beliefs about the EXISTENCE of God, i.e., the 
minority view of that small segment of the inhabitants of the 7th Rock from the 
Sun, does not interfere with her accepting the REALITY of THAT God, as Peirce 
apparently did.  But there is a persistent confusion on the part of those who 
apparently believe in the EXISTENCE of that God, which there is no evidence 
that Peirce ever did, with HIS REALITY.  Perhaps the list members might read 
Peirce's agreement, clearly  expressed on more than one occasion for his 
youthful friend, Francis E. Abbot's view on the matter.  Or of that of James, 
Dewey and Mead.


      Harold L. Orbach 


      Sent from my iPhone

      Begin forwarded message:


        From: <h...@ksu.edu>
        Date: September 14, 2016 at 1:20:31 AM CDT
        To: Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com>
        Cc: Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>, Peirce-L <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
        Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


        Pardon my intrusion into this unending mishmash:


        1.  Peirce's neglected argument is for the REALITY of God  not  the 
EXISTENCE of God.


        2. Anselm's ontological argument for the EXISTENCE of God is not 
"pretty nearly the most famous argument in the history of philosophy," only in 
the history of a small segment of the so-called WESTERN world, a minor part of 
the total areas and populations of what is termed "the earth" that came to 
dominate and "discover" most of the other areas for a few hundred years up to 
the present compared with other civilizations or empires that had dominance 
over larger and smaller areas for thousands of years.  


        3.  Other lands and peoples have and have had different views on the 
nature of God or Gods or Goddesses or if there are any that EXIST and how 
anyone might come to know this.  They also have and have had different kinds of 
"things" that were believed to be gods or sacred.


        Harold L. Orbach
        PhD, University of Minnesota Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology
        Emeritus, Kansas State University
        Sent from my iPhone

        On Sep 13, 2016, at 10:32 PM, Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com> wrote:


          Dear Jerry, List: 


          You ask two questions. First, what is Anselm's ontological argument. 
Thankfully, that is easy to answer. It is short, and I append it to this email 
at the end.


          Your second question is why "you are imposing the question on us, 
which includes me [Jerry Rhee]?



          First. let me clarify for the record: I am not from Missouri, and 
only used that phrase assuming everyone is familiar with it, in order to get to 
the "show me" part. Further, I do not know whether everyone in Missouri has 
heard of Anselm's ontological argument, though I assume not.


          However, I would expect (silly me!) that anyone with a Ph.D. would 
have heard of it, since it is pretty nearly the most famous argument about 
God's existence in the history of philosophy, and would be expected to be 
brought up in any introductory, or history of, philosophy course or in any 
conversation or study anytime anyone questions whether God exists.  



          Further, since we are talking about Peirce's "Neglected Argument for 
the Reality of God," Anselm's argument would naturally come to mind as soon as 
anyone inquires into why Peirce thought his argument had been "neglected." In 
other words, the very title of Peirce's paper points to other arguments for 
God's existence in the context of which he is placing his. But it is worth 
noting that Peirce did not claim that he had a new argument, but suggests by 
his title that it may have arisen before and was merely "neglected." So he was 
bringing a long neglected argument back into view. At least I take that to be 
one possible interpretation of the suggestion in his title.(On the other hand, 
I take Peirce's title to imply that he felt his argument had been neglected 
because it was so simple!!!! that no one thought to dignify it previously. 
Silly me.)


          Since the original questions that commenced this chain include "How 
exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically connected with "the hypothesis 
of God's reality"? I assumed that that was to be one of the major questions 
dealt with in the discussion, which Jon thought to begin by asking his four 
questions.


          Now, the ontological argument has evoked a stupendous literature in 
philosophy and logic, because it seems to prove the existence of God by a 
purely logical and non-empirical method. That is why it is called ontological, 
i.e., the argument proceeds only from being (onto=being).  Philosophers agree 
that Anselm makes at least two different arguments in chapters II and III, 
though some philosophers find three and even four separate arguments. Many 
logicians have wrestled with it, and some logicians see it as a "modal" 
argument.


          The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a very brief and 
readable description of Anselm's ontological argument: Be sure  to read 
sections 1, 2a, 3, and 4.


          http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/



          I hope that you will agree, after reading the brief account in the 
link above that Anselm is quite relevant to placing Peirce's "neglected" 
argument into context. The connection is that both Anselm and Peirce seek to 
prove God's existence purely from a thought process. 


          Now, if you want to read a different take on Anselm's understanding 
of what is meant by "existence," I invite you to read my article entitled 
"Anselm on Nothing," in the International Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 48, 
Issue 3, September 2008, pages 305-320, which you may read on line here:


          https://www.academia.edu/13891780/Anselm_on_Nothing



          For this second link, it must be borne in mind that Anselm wrote two 
tracts relating to God's existence (or being), and the first link deals with 
his second work, the Proslogion, where his famous ontological argument is found 
(appended below), while the second link (my article) deals mostly with Anselm's 
arguments in his first work, the Monologion. (Understand, too, that my views 
though increasingly cited are nevertheless minority.)


          Understand too that Peirce's works were constantly on my mind 
throughout writing "Anselm on Nothing," and that I planned to write a second 
article on Peirce and Anselm, but was largely discouraged from doing so by the 
realization that Peirceans would disagree with just about everything a simple 
person like me would say about Peirce's thought---which is why I was so excited 
when Jon posted his questions that began this chain.For example, I thought the 
example I gave of simple firstness, secondness, and thirdness was safe, but I 
received a private email from an observer of this list that such is not the 
case: 


          Echoing others, the Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness ordering in your 
example is too linear. It should be Firstness-Thirdness-Secondness. That is, 
some shock meets your habitual conditioning which determines the reaction. How 
else could we have different reactions?



          So, I need a lot of enlightenment, which is why I appreciate this 
forum so much. 


          In any event, appended below are Chapters II, III, and IV of the 
Proslogion, which contains Anselm's famous ontological argument;




          Ben
          Chapter II
          Therefore, O Lord, who grantest to faith understanding, grant unto me 
that, so far as Thou knowest it to be expedient for me, I may understand that 
Thou art, as we believe; and also that Thou art what we believe Thee to be. And 
of a truth we believe that Thou art somewhat than which no greater can be 
conceived. Is there then nothing real that can be thus described? for the fool 
hath said in his heart, There is no God. Yet surely even that fool himself when 
he hears me speak of somewhat than which nothing greater can be conceived under 
stands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, even if 
he do not under stand that it really exists. It is one thing for a thing to be 
in the understanding, and another to understand that the thing really exists. 
For when a painter considers the work which he is to make, he has it indeed in 
his understanding; but he doth not yet understand that really to exist which as 
yet he has not made. But when he has painted his picture, then he both has the 
picture in his understanding, and also under stands it really to exist. Thus 
even the fool is certain that something exists, at least in his understanding, 
than which nothing greater can be conceived; because, when he hears this 
mentioned, he understands it, and whatsoever is understood, exists in the 
understanding. And surely that than which no greater can be conceived cannot 
exist only in the understanding. For if it exist indeed in the understanding 
only, it can be thought to exist also in reality; and real existence is more 
than existence in the under standing only. If then that than which no greater 
can be conceived exists in the understanding only, then that than which no 
greater can be conceived is something a greater than which can be conceived: 
but this is impossible. There fore it is certain that something than which no 
greater can be conceived exists both in the under standing and also in reality.

          Chapter II
          Not only does this something than which no greater can be conceived 
exist, but it exists in so true a sense that it cannot even be conceived not to 
exist. For it is possible to form the conception of an object whose 
non-existence shall be inconceivable; and such an object is of necessity 
greater than any object whose existence is conceivable: wherefore if that than 
which no greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist; it follows 
that that than which no greater can be conceived is not that than which no 
greater can be conceived [for there can be thought a greater than it, namely, 
an object whose non-existence shall be inconceivable]; and this brings us to a 
contradiction. And thus it is proved that that thing than which no greater can 
be conceived exists in so true a sense, that it cannot even be conceived not to 
exist: and this thing art Thou, O Lord our God! And so Thou, O Lord my God, 
existest in so true a sense that Thou canst not even be conceived not to exist. 
And this is as is fitting. For if any mind could conceive aught better than 
Thee, then the creature would be ascending above the Creator, and judging the 
Creator; which is a supposition very absurd. Thou therefore dost exist in a 
truer sense than all else beside Thee, and art more real than all else beside 
Thee; because whatsoever else existeth, existeth in a less true sense than 
Thou, and therefore is less real than Thou. Why then said the fool in his 
heart, There is no God, when it is so plain to a rational mind that Thou art 
more real than any thing else? Why, except that he is a fool indeed?

          Chapter IV
          But how came the fool to say in his heart that which he could not 
conceive? or how came he to be able not to conceive that which yet he said in 
his heart? For it may be thought that to conceive and to say in one’s heart are 
one and the same thing. If it is true—nay, because it is true, that he 
conceived it, because he said it in his heart; and also true that he did not 
say it in his heart because he could not conceive it; it follows that there are 
two senses in which something may be understood to be conceived or said in the 
heart. For in one sense we are said to have a conception of something, when we 
have a conception of the word that signifies it; and in another sense, when we 
understand what the thing really is. In the former sense then we may say that 
God is conceived not to exist: but in the latter, He cannot by any means be 
conceived not to exist. For no man that understandeth what fire and water mean, 
can conceive that fire is really water; though he may have this conception, as 
far as the words go. Thus in like manner no man that understandeth what God is 
can conceive that God does not exist; although he may say these words [that God 
does not exist] either with no meaning at all, or with some other meaning than 
that which they properly bear. For God is that than which no greater can be 
conceived. He who well under standeth what this is, certainly understandeth it 
to be such as cannot even be conceived not to exist. Whosoever therefore 
understandeth in this way that God exists, cannot conceive that he does not 
exist. Thanks be to Thee, O good Lord, thanks be to Thee! because that which 
heretofore I believed by Thy grace, I now by Thine illumination thus 
understand, so that, even though I should not wish to believe in Thine 
existence, I cannot but understand that Thou dost exist.















          Ben Novak 
          5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
          Telephone: (814) 808-5702

          "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts 
themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart 
will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes 
may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message 
will have gone." Oswald Spengler



          On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 5:11 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

            Ben,  


            What is Anselm's ontological argument, for it is my opinion that 
someone from Missouri is expected to know it. 


            If I, being from Missouri, is not expected to know about Anselm's 
ontological argument, then why are you imposing the question on us, which 
includes me?


            Best,
            Jerry R


            On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 3:05 PM, Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

              Dear Jon Alan Schmidt: 


              I would like to go back to the point that this chain of emails 
began. Jon Alan Schmidt asked about something he found Peirce had said in the 
Neglected Argument, which had been omitted in the version published in the 
Essential Peirce:




                CSP:  Among the many pertinent considerations which have been 
crowded out of this article, I may just mention that it could have been shown 
that the hypothesis of God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion 
as it may seem.  On the contrary, it is connected so with a theory of the 
nature of thinking that if this be proved so is that.  Now there is no such 
difficulty in tracing experiential consequences of this theory of thinking as 
there are in attempting directly to trace out other consequences of God's 
reality.


              Jon said that raised "a few interesting questions," namely:
                1.. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory 
of the nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their 
"logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper, or 
something else? 
                2.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically 
connected with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? 
                3.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this 
theory of thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, 
deductively trace and inductively test? 
                4.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of 
the nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would 
thereby also be "proved"?

              I have some tentative thoughts about these matters, including a 
couple of ideas that I found in the secondary literature, but would appreciate 
seeing what others have to say initially.



              So, let me respond. 


              I thought I understood firstness, secondness, and thirdness when  
our discussion began. This is the example I had in mind.  I am a student 
sitting in a class listening to an interesting lecture, when suddenly an 
explosion occurs. It could be a firecracker under behind the professor's desk, 
or a truck wreck on the street right outside the classroom windows. The sound 
of true explosion, whatever it is, is  sudden, unexpected, and immediate.  The 
sound or other shock waves hitting my body constitute firstness--I feel them. 
Secondness is what my body does in reaction, which is to  immediately and 
involuntarily, raise my head, flinch, and commence other bodily reactions to 
the explosion waves reaching me. Thirdness occurs next, when my mind begins to 
wonder what just happened. All this  can happen in far less than the blink of 
an eye.  Peirce's analysis of it by breaking it down in this way was thought to 
be a fertile way of beginning to understand thinking, or to begin a theory of 
thinking.


              Please correct me again, Jon, if that is not an elementary 
example of firstness, etc. 


              However, I soon got lost in the subsequent discussion of these, 
where thirdness became intertwined with secondness and firstness, and so on, in 
the subsequent emails.  I do  not doubt that all of you are correct that Peirce 
did take this rudimentary example to far heights of thinking which I may just 
be constitutionally unable to rise to. But my reading of Peirce suggests that 
he was a very pragmatic person who appreciated someone from Missouri showing up 
and saying "show me." In any event, so much of the subsequent discussion 
involved concepts going back and forth with no examples that allowed them to be 
brought to earth for examination. At least, that is what it seemed to me.


              So, is it possible to get back to the original question. Remember 
that Peirce thought that all this became clear to him his daily walks through 
the woods, and he wrote this essay suggesting that its thinking would be 
available to anyone of ordinary intelligence who pondered the three universes 
suggested on their own daily walks through the woods.


              So, let's go back to Jon's 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, because I 
think he  is on to something:
                1.. How exactly is "this theory of thinking" logically 
connected with "the hypothesis of God's reality"? 
                2.. What would be some "experiential consequences of this 
theory of thinking" that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, 
deductively trace and inductively test? 
                3.. What exactly would it mean to "prove" Peirce's "theory of 
the nature of thinking," such that "the hypothesis of God's reality" would 
thereby also be "proved"? 
              In response, some raised the ontological argument of St. Anselm. 
But the raising of it was not followed through. Here is my question (which I 
hope "nests" all three of Jon's questions): 


              What would Anselm's ontological argument look like if it were 
restated in Peirce's terms? In other words, could Anselm have discovered the 
same argument as Peirce? Would this give us any insight into the theory of 
thinking? Peirce says that we could, with comparatively little difficulty, 
deductively and inductively test such a theory of thinking. Someone from 
Missouri might say, "Show me."


              Ben Novak








              Ben Novak 
              5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
              Telephone: (814) 808-5702

              "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the 
arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of 
Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of 
notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their 
message will have gone." Oswald Spengler



              On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:34 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> 
wrote:



                  On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote:
                    I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy 
of science courses in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on 
Kuhnian issues both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the 
last was accepted enthusiastically, I continually got grumblings about how  was 
not teaching the Standard View properly.

                    Maybe things have improved, with more naturalistic 
approaches becoming more prevalent, but the culture wars really made a mess of 
trying to bring in Peircean ideas because the view that science was a mere 
social construct seemed to be supported by naïve interpretations of Peirce. So 
I found myself apparently fighting myself at some times.



                Yes, the culture wars (which are still with us) are rather 
annoying. Not just because of how they try to make science into something we 
can control and thereby reject but because of how often they just read 
philosophers so badly. Lots of figures who make more careful subtle 
distinctions about science’s social aspects are appropriated for tasks they’d 
be aghast at. (Kuhn is the classic example although it’s not hard to find 
others)



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