Jon, List
I read this section On Signs and the Categories [see 8.327 and on, and also in 
the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-....as analyses of the 
categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these three ideas 
the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. 

My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, which are, 
each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this outlined in the Set 
of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there are four semiotic 
relations. 

You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I.
But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and Representamen-and 
two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings the number of 
Relations up to a basic Six.

Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with 
restrictions of course.

The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode of 
Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a mode of 
Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct contact 
mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in a symbolic 
mode.

Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself which 
can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I...

But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are SIX: We 
have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But Secondness 
functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. And Thirdness 
functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and 3-1.  I have 
written on all of this...

The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or informational 
interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, D-I and F-I..... 
PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX categorical 
modes....provides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological semiosis.

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)


  List:


  While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed 
that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the 
three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the 
Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object.  He then implied that 
they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, 
Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination 
after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a 
Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  
However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves 
seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual 
(Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought.


  Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical 
Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and 
(triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me 
to be all Trichotomies."  However, he never definitively stipulated on what 
basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive 
terms in each case.  The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to 
all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049.


  This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to 
one of the three Universes.  If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to 
be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum?  In particular, 
what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these 
three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of 
rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted 
(manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by 
instinct/experience/form?  Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that 
addresses these specific questions?


  Thanks,


  Jon


  On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

    Gary F., List:


    I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you 
mentioned.  Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady 
Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument."


      CSP:  One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being.  It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to the principle of contradiction.  I denominate the objects of this Universe 
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability 
of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an 
Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential 
vagueness if for no other reason.  For that which is not subject to the 
principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP 2.478-479)


      CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first 
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure 
mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that 
mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere 
capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves 
their Reality. (CP 1.455)


    These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby clarifies that 
"capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of "Idea" in CP 1.452 
called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not imply capability of 
actualization."  This is thus the universe of pure possibility, rather than 
potentiality.  Whatever belongs to this universe "is not subject to the 
principle of contradiction" because it "is essentially vague."


      CSP:  Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in 
their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, 
etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, 
consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, 
Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts.  Every member of this 
Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to the Principles of 
Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a 
proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479)


      CSP:  The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and 
facts.  I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute 
forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and 
fairly examined. (CP 6.455)


    These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby confirms that 
whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the Principles of 
Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle."


      CSP:  The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its 
Nature necessitant, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a 
universal proposition.  Especially, continua are of this nature.  I call 
objects of this universe Necessitants.  It includes whatever we can know by 
logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479)


      CSP:  The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in 
active power to establish connections between different objects, especially 
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially 
a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so 
to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as 
intermediary between its Object and a Mind.  Such, too, is a living 
consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant.  Such is a 
living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." 
(CP 6.455)


    These seem to have some important differences.  In particular, the letter 
to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, laws, and 
(especially) continua, rather than Signs.  It then goes on (EP 2.480) to 
discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third universe, can be 
a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a Necessitant (Type).  The 
letter to James confirm that "A Sign is anything of either of the three 
Universes ..." (EP 2.497)


    Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three 
categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three universes, 
if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and perhaps even 
replace) the former.  It thus leaves me wondering how to interpret CP 1.480, 
where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality 
nor in that of fact" and "a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from 
those worlds and exists in the universe of representations."  One plausible 
explanation is that Peirce simply changed his mind about this between c.1896 
and 1908; another is that what he meant by "world" or "universe" in c.1896 was 
different from what he meant by "universe" in 1908.  I will obviously need to 
think about this some more.


    As for the discussion of "Universes" and "Categories" in "Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.547-549), it is not clear to me that Peirce 
used either of those terms there in the same sense in which we are using them 
here.  I will quote the concluding paragraph--where he aligned the "three 
Universes" with the "modes of reality," which are presumably the "Modes of 
Being" that he had just identified as Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny--in 
case anyone would like to comment further on it.


      CSP:   I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, 
but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have 
explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of hypostatic 
abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, 
sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs 
that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think 
of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. 
Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from 
these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed 
endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members? 
My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the 
subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be 
confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny 
(or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of 
Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be 
proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the 
division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality 
into Realms for the different Predicaments. (CP 4.549)


    Regards,



    Jon


    On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:

      Gary F., List:


      Thank you for those references.  I was thinking about conducting a search 
myself, and you have saved me the trouble, although I may still do some digging 
through CP.  I will take a look as soon as I can, although I am traveling 
tonight and tomorrow and do not have my hard copy of EP 2 with me.


      Regards,


      Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
      Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
      www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


      On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:03 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

        Jon, Gary R et al.,



        I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up with the 
discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late texts to 
see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems to have shifted 
toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I found a couple of 
extended discussions of the difference between “Categories” and “Universes,” 
one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also found two other places where 
Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the long letter to Welby of Dec. 1908 
(EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James (EP2:497). He doesn’t refer to 
Categories in these letters, so that would seem to support your suggestion. I 
found very little that uses either term from 1909 on.



        I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the 
‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch up 
with the thread.



        Gary f.



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