Edwina, List: ET: I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy.'
Just that the Dynamic Interpretant can be a Possible, an Existent, or a Necessitant; i.e., it is not confined to the second Category or Universe. JS: ... the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought division. ET: I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean here.. Suppose that the Universes pertain to subjects and the Categories pertain to predicates, as Peirce wrote in CP 4.545. I am hypothesizing that the distinctions between the two kinds of Objects (Dynamic/Immediate) and among the three kinds of Interpretants (Immediate/Dynamic/Final) are based on the phenomenological Categories, while the trichotomy of each individual correlate is based on the ontological Universes. Do your six relations correspond to the six correlates (1-1=S, 2-2=Od, 2-1=Oi, 3-3=If, 3-2=Id, 3-1=Ii)? Regards, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 2:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, list: > > 1) I'm not sure where or what function the three universes have; I admit > that I haven't paid much attention to them. I don't see them as an > ontological alternative to the phenomenological categories. My first > impression is that they are quite different but again, I haven't paid > enough attention to them to conclude what role the universes have. > > 2) The dyadic category of Secondness does have two aspects: 2-2 and 2-1 or > active and passive. I'm not sure what you mean by 'the latter is still > divisible into a trichotomy. Do you mean the Dynamic is divided in itself > into the three categorical modes? [which i don't agree with...] > > 3) You write:" the Categories correspond to the Immediate/Dynamic/Final > division, while the Universes correspond to the feeling/action/thought > division." > > I'm afraid I don't get this; the categories are themselves defined within > such terms as 'feeling/action/thought'...so, I'm not sure what you mean > here.. > > Yes - agreed - that's my preference [the categories etc]; I don't see > where the three universes fits in... > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* [email protected] > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 3:02 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, > and also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-....as > analyses of the categories [not universes]. > > > As I just discussed in light of Jappy's papers, 8.327ff is from 1904, > before Peirce developed his notion of Universes as an (ontological) > alternative to (phenomenological) Categories. However, 8.315 is from 1909, > and does include the word "category" several times. > > CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind > actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the > Dyadic category, the category of Action. This has two aspects, the Active > and the Passive, which are not merely opposite aspects but make relative > contrasts between different influences of this Category as More Active and > More Passive. In psychology this category marks Molition in its active > aspect of a force and its passive aspect as a resistance. > > > The only category named is "the Dyadic category, the category of Action," > and it is associated specifically with the Dynamical Interpretant; but I > think we agree that the latter is still divisible into a trichotomy. It > seems like this passage might even support my working hypothesis that in > Peirce's later thought, the Categories correspond to the > Immediate/Dynamic/Final division, while the Universes correspond to the > feeling/action/thought division. > > ET: My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, > which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this > outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there > are four semiotic relations. > > > Right, you prefer to stick to the three trichotomies and ten sign classes > of 1903. As such, it makes sense for you to stick to speaking of > Categories, rather than switching to Universes. I think that it is an open > question whether Peirce should have done the same, or was right to change > his theoretical framework, especially since he was unable to finish working > out the details of the second approach. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, List >> I read this section *On Signs and the Categories* [see 8.327 and on, and >> also in the previous section [William James, Signs] 8.314-....as analyses >> of the categories [not universes]. Peirce is quite specific: "I call these >> three ideas the cenopythagorean categories" - referring to Firstness, >> Secondness and Thirdness. >> >> My focus has always been that the triad O-R-I is a SET of Relations, >> which are, each one of them, in a categorical mode. You can see this >> outlined in the Set of Ten Classes [2.227]. But I don't think that there >> are four semiotic relations. >> >> You have the basic set of three: R-O; R-R; and R-I. >> But, there is also the Representamen-Immediate Object; and >> Representamen-and two other Interpretants, Immediate and Final. That brings >> the number of Relations up to a basic Six. >> >> Each one of these six can be in a different categorical mode - with >> restrictions of course. >> >> The R-O Relation, of Representament to Dynamic Object, can be in a mode >> of Firstness, where the information presents in an iconic form. Or in a >> mode of Secondness, where the information presents in an indexical, direct >> contact mode. Or in a mode of Thirdness, where the information functions in >> a symbolic mode. >> >> Same with the other Relations; that of the R-R or Representamen in itself >> which can also be in any one of the three Categories. And the R-I... >> >> But- you also have the differences in the categorical modes. There are >> SIX: We have 1-1 or Pure Firstness which has no degenerate types. But >> Secondness functions in both a genuine and degenerate mode: 2-2 and 2-1. >> And Thirdness functions in a genuine and TWO degenerate modes: 3-3, 3-2 and >> 3-1. I have written on all of this... >> >> The point is - the SIX multiple 'nodal sites' of semiotic or >> informational interaction/Relation within the basic triad: DO-IO;R-R; I-I, >> D-I and F-I..... PLUS the fact that each of these can be in any one of SIX >> categorical modes....provides a vastly complex and adaptive morphological >> semiosis. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 10:42 AM >> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> List: >> >> While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I >> noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents >> of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign >> itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He >> then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here >> called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the >> order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible >> can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by >> nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the >> three Interpretants *themselves *seem to be more properly characterized >> as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each >> divided into feeling/action/thought. >> >> Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to >> Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal >> Interpretant, and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal >> Interpretant--also "appear to me to be all Trichotomies." However, he >> never definitively stipulated on what basis they were thus to be divided, >> instead merely suggesting three descriptive terms in each case. The only >> hint is his remark that applying the same rule to all ten trichotomies >> would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. >> >> This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong >> to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a >> *relation >> *to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In >> particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the *semeiotic >> *relations >> with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I >> relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and >> presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of >> assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the >> literature that addresses these specific questions? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon >> >> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary F., List: >>> >>> I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that >>> you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one >>> to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." >>> >>> CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself >>> alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one >>> consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It >>> follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not >>> even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this >>> Universe *Ideas*, or *Possibles*, although the latter designation does >>> not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, >>> if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on >>> account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that which >>> is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP >>> 2.478-479) >>> >>> >>> CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first >>> comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, >>> pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name >>> within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being >>> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually >>> thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 1.455) >>> >>> >>> These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby clarifies >>> that "capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of "Idea" in >>> CP 1.452 called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not imply >>> capability of actualization." This is thus the universe of pure >>> possibility, rather than potentiality. Whatever belongs to this universe >>> "is not subject to the principle of contradiction" because it "is >>> essentially vague." >>> >>> CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists >>> in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, >>> qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last >>> analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more >>> unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call *Facts*. >>> Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to >>> the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is >>> expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479) >>> >>> >>> CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and >>> facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute >>> forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and >>> fairly examined. (CP 6.455) >>> >>> >>> These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby confirms >>> that whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the Principles >>> of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle." >>> >>> CSP: The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its >>> Nature *necessitant*, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something >>> expressible in a universal proposition. Especially, *continua *are of >>> this nature. I call objects of this universe *Necessitants*. It >>> includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479) >>> >>> >>> CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in >>> active power to establish connections between different objects, especially >>> between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is >>> essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially >>> such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power >>> of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a >>> living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. >>> Such is a living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social >>> "movement." (CP 6.455) >>> >>> >>> These seem to have some important differences. In particular, the >>> letter to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, >>> laws, and (especially) continua, rather than Signs. It then goes on (EP >>> 2.480) to discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third >>> universe, can be a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a >>> Necessitant (Type). The letter to James confirm that "A *Sign *is >>> anything of either of the three Universes ..." (EP 2.497) >>> >>> Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three >>> categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three >>> universes, if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and >>> perhaps even replace) the former. It thus leaves me wondering how to >>> interpret CP 1.480, where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be >>> in the world of quality nor in that of fact" and "a *thoroughly *genuine >>> triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of >>> *representations*." One plausible explanation is that Peirce simply >>> changed his mind about this between c.1896 and 1908; another is that what >>> he meant by "world" or "universe" in c.1896 was different from what he >>> meant by "universe" in 1908. I will obviously need to think about this >>> some more. >>> >>> As for the discussion of "Universes" and "Categories" in "Prolegomena to >>> an Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.547-549), it is not clear to me that >>> Peirce used either of those terms there in the same sense in which we are >>> using them here. I will quote the concluding paragraph--where he aligned >>> the "three Universes" with the "modes of reality," which are presumably the >>> "Modes of Being" that he had just identified as Actuality, Possibility, and >>> Destiny--in case anyone would like to comment further on it. >>> >>> CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, >>> but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have >>> explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of >>> hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create *entia rationis* that >>> are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning >>> predicates from being signs that we think or think *through*, into >>> being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making >>> it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the >>> operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions >>> derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. >>> What then are the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this >>> subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns >>> Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the >>> different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from >>> Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is >>> different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that >>> in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, >>> whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into >>> *Realms >>> *for the different Predicaments. (CP 4.549) >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary F., List: >>>> >>>> Thank you for those references. I was thinking about conducting a >>>> search myself, and you have saved me the trouble, although I may still do >>>> some digging through CP. I will take a look as soon as I can, although I >>>> am traveling tonight and tomorrow and do not have my hard copy of EP 2 with >>>> me. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:03 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon, Gary R et al., >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up with the >>>>> discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late >>>>> texts to see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems >>>>> to have shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I >>>>> found a couple of extended discussions of the difference between >>>>> “Categories” and “Universes,” one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also >>>>> found two other places where Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the >>>>> long letter to Welby of Dec. 1908 (EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James >>>>> (EP2:497). He doesn’t refer to Categories in these letters, so that would >>>>> seem to support your suggestion. I found very little that uses >>>>> *either* term from 1909 on. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the >>>>> ‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch >>>>> up with the thread. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary f. >>>>> >>>>
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