Jon - list
First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as 'unlike
Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something like: 'My
reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce as .......
No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in a mode
of Firstness] that are never actualized. I do NOT think that Firstness only
exists when a single possibility is actualized. Firstness, as a 'set' of
categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - when
operational within a triadic morphology. After all - the very essence of a
possibility is that it is NOT particularized but remains ....unarticulated but
possible. However, I consider that this 'state' of Firstness is operational
only within the triad.
The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness operational
outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a basic category,
does indeed provide continuity within the morphological articulation of
specific Signs, but it isn't in itself prior to and underlying actuality.
Again, it is a mode of organization that provides habits-of-continuity,
generalizations...that mediate and form specific triadic Signs. BUT - it
functions only within the triad.
I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that the
categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the Triadic Sign.
You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
Edwina, List:
ET: [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].
I did not say within Secondness, I said with Secondness; and I essentially
meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality." Unlike Peirce, you deny
that there are real possibilities that are never actualized, real qualities
that are not instantiated in any actual objects, a real continuum that is prior
to and underlies all actuality as represented by the blackboard, and real
Platonic worlds out of only one of which emerged this universe of actual
existence. Or have I misunderstood you all along?
Regards,
Jon
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Clark, Jon, list:
Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be a
Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. The
difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded within the
particular.
Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have
non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures
[Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete separation
and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist names' but
they do not function outside of their being embedded within a triadic Sign.
[Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. And, I agree that
Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that generals are 'real', i.e.,
not nominalist subjective names - but- again, that doesn't to me mean that they
have a separate nature. I see them as real and operational only as embedded
within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of
Firstness, after all. It's the triadic format that is vital.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Clark Goble
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
Clark, List:
CG: It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he
admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of
the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era.
Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My
understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that she
denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and Thirdness
(generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation with
Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket rejoinder--as
reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an Aristotelian, and therefore
not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree with Max Fisch and others that he
was a robust three-category realist, at least after about 1896.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme.
On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism],
I find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by
Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics,
politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example, matter
and mind; causality; ....so, I don't find arguments defining him as 'Platonist'
very convincing.
I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously
and embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that
particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main
neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were
they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the oversized
role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed from Plato you
said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me neoPlatonism is a
subset of Platonism.
As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by
that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as
Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as it
informs.
It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits
generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the
nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was
important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we
quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating
nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic
emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas in
late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a
stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection.
I rather like Smyth’s arguments in Reading Peirce Reading where he
notes several neoplatonic parallels.
If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is
understandable enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined
logicians, it remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism and
why Peirce should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic
tradition. I propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures
that will subsequently be seen to have a bearing on his argument in
"Faculties." The nine are grouped in three sets, each of which deals with an
aspect of our scientific knowledge. The first set concerns the ontology of
knowledg itself; the second concerns the subjects of knowledge-the 'I' or the
'v of 'I know' or 'we know' (when these expressions are used in the conte of
scientific inquiry); and the third set of leading ideas concerns the objects of
scientific knowledge. I hope it will become clear in connection with the first
set why it is important to distinguish generic Platonic Neoplatonism. (57)
I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering.
None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far
from it. But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought.
On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's. I have
argued that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not contradict
his earlier ones; rather, they clarify some details that he had previously left
vague. By contrast, Edwina seems to reject the later writings--especially "A
Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot explain and does not even
attempt to explain--as incompatible with the earlier ones, which she favors.
She also seems to bristle at any suggestion that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist
in any sense whatsoever. Of course, these are my impressions of her positions,
and I hope that they are accurate; if not, I would welcome her
correction/clarification.
I confess I missed a week of the list when it was particularly active.
I mean to go back and read those posts. So forgive me if I assign things
incorrectly.
As I’ve said I’m not sure what ultimately to make of the NA either
beyond it being an excellent way to understand abduction.
I do think Peirce is very nePlatonic in certain ways though. Again
Kelly Parker and Richard Smyth are worth reading here. For a while Smyths book
was available for free as a PDF but it appears that now it’s only for sale as
hardcover or paperback — I have the paperback version along with the PDF if
people need excerpts.
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