Edwina, List: ET: [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign].
I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality." Unlike Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects, a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of which emerged this universe of actual existence. Or have I misunderstood you all along? Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Clark, Jon, list: > > Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be > a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. > The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded > within the particular. > > Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have > non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures > [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete > separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist > names' but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within > a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*]. > And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that > generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, > that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as > real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have > such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the > triadic format that is vital. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism > > Clark, List: > > CG: It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he > admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side > of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. > > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and > Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation > with Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket > rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an > Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree > with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at > least after about 1896. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > >> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. >> >> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I >> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by >> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, >> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example, >> matter and mind; causality; ....so, I don't find arguments defining him as >> 'Platonist' very convincing. >> >> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and >> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that >> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main >> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were >> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the >> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed >> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me >> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism. >> >> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by >> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as >> Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as >> it informs. >> >> It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits >> generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the >> nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was >> important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we >> quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating >> nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic >> emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas >> in late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a >> stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. >> >> I rather like Smyth’s arguments in *Reading Peirce Reading* where he >> notes several neoplatonic parallels. >> >> If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is >> understandable enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined >> logicians, it remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism >> and why Peirce should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic >> tradition. I propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures >> that will subsequently be seen to have a bearing on his argument in >> "Faculties." The nine are grouped in three sets, each of which deals with >> an aspect of our scientific knowledge. The first set concerns the ontology >> of knowledg itself; the second concerns the subjects of knowledge-the 'I' >> or the 'v of 'I know' or 'we know' (when these expressions are used in the >> conte of scientific inquiry); and the third set of leading ideas concerns >> the objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will become clear in >> connection with the first set why it is important to distinguish generic >> Platonic Neoplatonism. (57) >> >> I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering. >> >> None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from >> it. But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought. >> >> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's. I have argued >> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not *contradict *his >> earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that he had previously >> left vague. By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the later >> writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she cannot >> explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with the >> earlier ones, which she favors. She also seems to bristle at *any >> *suggestion >> that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever. Of course, >> these are my impressions of her positions, and I hope that they are >> accurate; if not, I would welcome her correction/clarification. >> >> I confess I missed a week of the list when it was particularly active. I >> mean to go back and read those posts. So forgive me if I assign things >> incorrectly. >> >> As I’ve said I’m not sure what ultimately to make of the NA either beyond >> it being an excellent way to understand abduction. >> >> I do think Peirce is very nePlatonic in certain ways though. Again Kelly >> Parker and Richard Smyth are worth reading here. For a while Smyths book >> was available for free as a PDF but it appears that now it’s only for sale >> as hardcover or paperback — I have the paperback version along with the PDF >> if people need excerpts. >> >
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