Edwina, List: ET: No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in a mode of Firstness] that are never actualized ... Firstness, as a 'set' of categorical possibilities is real - all of those possibilities - *when operational within a triadic morphology* ... The same with Thirdness ... it functions only within the triad.
Thank you for clarifying this. However, similar to Clark's comments earlier, I do not fully understand what you mean by "operational," "triadic morphology," and "functions" in this context. As far as I know, Peirce did not use any of these particular terms as qualifiers when affirming the reality of Firstness (possibility, qualities) and Thirdness (generality, habits). I suspect that we still have a disconnect over Peirce's careful distinction between reality (all three categories) and existence (Secondness only). Furthermore, there are many passages where he discusses the categories--including the reality of all three--without saying much (if anything) about signs or "the triad." For example, this is true of most of the cosmological/cosmogonic texts, which were the initial jumping-off point for this thread. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon - list > > First - and yet again - please do not unilaterally define my views as > 'unlike Peirce'. I would appreciate it if you would instead say something > like: 'My reading of Peirce is different from your reading; I read Peirce > as ....... > > No- my reading of Peirce is that there are real possibilities [i.e. in a > mode of Firstness] that are never actualized. I do NOT think that > Firstness only exists *when a single possibility is actualized. *Firstness, > as a 'set' of categorical possibilities is real - all of those > possibilities - *when operational within a triadic morphology*. After all > - the very essence of a possibility is that it is NOT particularized but > remains ....unarticulated but possible. However, I consider that this > 'state' of Firstness is operational only within the triad. > > The same with Thirdness. I do not read Peirce as seeing Thirdness > operational outside of the triad that forms matter/mind. Thirdness, as a > basic category, does indeed provide continuity within the morphological > articulation of specific Signs, but it isn't *in itself* prior to and > underlying actuality. Again, it is a mode of organization that provides > habits-of-continuity, generalizations...that mediate and form specific > triadic Signs. BUT - it functions only within the triad. > > I think this is a basic difference in our readings of Peirce. I focus that > the categories are basic and necessary - but- operate only within the > Triadic Sign. You seem to interpret Peirce in a different way. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 7:50 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism > > Edwina, List: > > ET: [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a triadic Sign]. > > > I did not say *within *Secondness, I said *with *Secondness; and I > essentially meant exactly what you said, that you "don't consider that > Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have non-embedded reality." Unlike > Peirce, you deny that there are real possibilities that are never > actualized, real qualities that are not instantiated in any actual objects, > a real continuum that is prior to and underlies all actuality as > represented by the blackboard, and real Platonic worlds out of only one of > which emerged this universe of actual existence. Or have I misunderstood > you all along? > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 5:58 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Clark, Jon, list: >> >> Aristotle certainly admitted that generals are real! You don't have to be >> a Platonist to accept that! That's a basic component of his metaphysics. >> The difference is that for Aristotle, they function only when embedded >> within the particular. >> >> Again, I don't consider that Firstness, Secondness or Thirdness have >> non-embedded reality. They are 'real' in that their operational natures >> [Firstness as spontaneity, freedom, quality; Secondness as discrete >> separation and Thirdness as habit, continuity of type] are not 'nominalist >> names' but they do not function outside of their being embedded *within >> a triadic Sign*. [Not within Secondness, Jon, but within a *triadic Sign*]. >> And, I agree that Peirce was a scholastic realist - which means that >> generals are 'real', i.e., not nominalist subjective names - but- again, >> that doesn't to me mean that they have a separate nature. I see them as >> real and operational only as embedded within a TRIADIC SIGN. You can have >> such a triadic sign totally - in a mode of Firstness, after all. It's the >> triadic format that is vital. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *To:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Monday, October 24, 2016 6:28 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism >> >> Clark, List: >> >> CG: It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he >> admits generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side >> of the nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. >> >> >> Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My >> understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that >> she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and >> Thirdness (generalities, habits) to be real apart from their instantiation >> with Secondness (actualities, facts). In fact, her usual blanket >> rejoinder--as reflected in what you quoted--is that Peirce was an >> Aristotelian, and therefore not a Platonist. On the other hand, I agree >> with Max Fisch and others that he was a robust three-category realist, at >> least after about 1896. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. >>> >>> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I >>> find Peirce a thorough Aristotelian - and the debate, for example, by >>> Aristotle vs Platonism [in many areas, including in physics, metaphysics, >>> politics] ...seems to find support in Peirce's views on, for example, >>> matter and mind; causality; ....so, I don't find arguments defining him as >>> 'Platonist' very convincing. >>> >>> I confess I always saw neoPlatonism as Platonism that took seriously and >>> embraced many ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. To such an extent that >>> particularly Aristotle transformed Plato. Of course if you asked the main >>> neoPlatonists like Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblicus and so forth what they were >>> they’d just say Platonists. But then I think that’s more due to the >>> oversized role dogma played in that era’s platonism. Even if you differed >>> from Plato you said you were merely giving Plato’s ideas. In any case to me >>> neoPlatonism is a subset of Platonism. >>> >>> As to Peirce being a Platonist it always helps to ask what we mean by >>> that. After all some call mathematicians who admit to numbers being real as >>> Platonists. It’s such a loosely used term that it misleads often as much as >>> it informs. >>> >>> It seems to me Peirce is a Platonist in several senses. First he admits >>> generals into his ontology as real. Thus he was on the platonic side of the >>> nominalist debates of the medieval era and modern era. I think that was >>> important even if it’s less of an issue in these post-Quine days where we >>> quantify regularly over abstract entities. Second, his cosmology relating >>> nothing to the categories or universes seems very similar to neoPlatonic >>> emmanation theories. Third his notion of abduction is very similar to ideas >>> in late Platonism such as by Proclus. That is rather than mystical in a >>> stereotypical sense it’s provoking philosophical reflection. >>> >>> I rather like Smyth’s arguments in *Reading Peirce Reading* where he >>> notes several neoplatonic parallels. >>> >>> If a commitment to generic or "garden-variety" Platonism is >>> understandable enough among mathematicians and mathematically inclined >>> logicians, it remains unclear how that position differs from Neoplatonism >>> and why Peirce should be attracted to Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic >>> tradition. I propose to explore this subject by discussing nine conjectures >>> that will subsequently be seen to have a bearing on his argument in >>> "Faculties." The nine are grouped in three sets, each of which deals with >>> an aspect of our scientific knowledge. The first set concerns the ontology >>> of knowledg itself; the second concerns the subjects of knowledge-the 'I' >>> or the 'v of 'I know' or 'we know' (when these expressions are used in the >>> conte of scientific inquiry); and the third set of leading ideas concerns >>> the objects of scientific knowledge. I hope it will become clear in >>> connection with the first set why it is important to distinguish generic >>> Platonic Neoplatonism. (57) >>> >>> I’d posted that list before. It’s worth considering. >>> >>> None of this is to simply reduce Peirce to Plotinus or Proclus. Far from >>> it. But it is to acknowledge certain commonalities in their thought. >>> >>> On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> This actually sounds more like my position than Edwina's. I have argued >>> that Peirce's later cosmological/cosmogonic writings do not >>> *contradict *his earlier ones; rather, they *clarify *some details that >>> he had previously left vague. By contrast, Edwina seems to *reject *the >>> later writings--especially "A Neglected Argument," which she admits she >>> cannot explain and does not even attempt to explain--as incompatible with >>> the earlier ones, which she favors. She also seems to bristle at *any >>> *suggestion >>> that Peirce was a (neo-)Platonist in *any *sense whatsoever. Of >>> course, these are my impressions of her positions, and I hope that they are >>> accurate; if not, I would welcome her correction/clarification. >>> >>> I confess I missed a week of the list when it was particularly active. I >>> mean to go back and read those posts. So forgive me if I assign things >>> incorrectly. >>> >>> As I’ve said I’m not sure what ultimately to make of the NA either >>> beyond it being an excellent way to understand abduction. >>> >>> I do think Peirce is very nePlatonic in certain ways though. Again Kelly >>> Parker and Richard Smyth are worth reading here. For a while Smyths book >>> was available for free as a PDF but it appears that now it’s only for sale >>> as hardcover or paperback — I have the paperback version along with the PDF >>> if people need excerpts. >>> >>
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